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ISS DESIGN SURVEY 
Section I 
ITTTRODUCTION 
The Design Survey of the Apollo Inert ial  Subsystem was funded by NASA 
under Contract NAS-12-642. This  contract was  administered by the NASA Electro- 
nics Research Center of Cambridge, Massachusetts. The purpose of this  document 
is to record  the history of the Apollo Inertial Subsystem design and development 
(CSM and LM) in o rde r  to  provide a source  document for  subsequent design c r i t e r i a  
monographs. 
The record  provided by th is  document covers the design, development, and 
test ing of a n  inert ial  subsystem intended for  manned spaceflight beyond ea r th  orbi ts  
In addition, i t  highlights the experience and knowledge accumulated by this  portion 
of the Apollo program. Finally, technical and program-oriented recommendations 
have evolved naturally f rom the experience documented and such recommendations 
a r e  given a s  an important par t  of this  Design Survey. 
The text is structured to  present  cer ta in  sections with a narrat ive t rea tment  
of the ent i re  topic. Section 11, the Apollo Mission, introduces the reader  to the 
overall  mission plan within which the Apollo Inertial Subsystem is utilized. A de-  
scription of how the inert ial  subsystem requirements evolvedout of the overall  mis -  
sion plan follows. The reader  who is familiar  with Apollo may wish to omit the de- 
tailed mission description. 
Section 111, The Apollo Inertial Subsystem, an Overview, comprises  one 
section wherein the present  design and i t s  evolution, a description of Inertial Sub- 
sys tem Problems and Solutions, Assembly and Tes t  Highlights, the Inertial Sub- 
sys tem Reliability Assessment,  and finally, Checkout and Flight Experience a r e  
presented. This section provides enough technical detail t o  be meaningful yet is 
general  enough t o  be comprehended without requiring a specific background in the 
Apollo Program.  
Section IV, Inertial Subsystem (ISS) Components, presents  a more  detailed 
t rea tment  of individual components and can be used a s  a reference section to follow 
up on problems discussed in Section 111. 
Section V, System Flight Experience, reviews the salient features of the 
e a r l y  manned flights. 
Section VI, Conclusions, summarizes  a l l  of the mater ia l  of the ISS Design 
Survey with regard  to the lessons  learned and implications fo r  the future. 
Section II 
THE A POLLO MISSION 
2.1 Apollo Configuration 
The goal of the Apollo Project  is t o  place human exploration t eams  onto the 
moon and re tu rn  them safely t o  ear th .  A spaceship consisting of th ree  modules is 
launched on a t ra jec tory  t o  the moon by a Saturn V launch vehicle. The Command 
Module (CM) is designed fo r  atmospheric r e -en t ry  and i s  to  be the home f o r  the 
three-man crew during most  of the t r ip .  The Service Module (SM) provides maneu- 
v e r  propulsion, power and expendable supplies. The Lunar Module (LM) is the 
vehicle which actually makes  the lunar descent. It c a r r i e s  two of the three-man 
crew t o  the lunar surface while the other two modules remain in lunar orbit.  The 
Apollo Guidance and Navigation System is the p r imary  onboard equipment used for  
determination of the position and velocity of the lunar  module and fo r  control of i t s  
maneuvers.  Similar  guidance equipment is contained in  both the Command Module 
and the Lunar Module. Each vehicle is equipped with a device f o r  remembering 
spat ia l  orientation and measuring acceleration, a n  optical angle device fo r  angle 
measurements ,  displays and controls, means  to  interface with a spacecraft  control 
sys tem and indicators, and a central  digital data processor .  
T o  facilitate a g rea te r  understanding of the part  played by the Apollo Inert ial  
Subsystem, a description of the Apollo mission follows. 
2. 2 Mission Phases  
The overall  Apollo mission t ra jec tory  is summarized in Figure 2-1. The 
heavy l ines in the figure correspond to  the short  thrusting maneuvers which a r e  
separa ted by the much longer free-coasting phases. The t ra jec tory  shown in 
Figure  2-1 i s  purposefully distorted to  show the fea tures  of each phase more  clearly.  
Lunar Orbit InsertionIlO)/ Ljlnar Orbit 
Ascent and k-J 
Earth Atmospheric 
Entry and 
Landing I231 
113, 14, 15, 16, 17) 
Translunar 17.8.9) 
Ill 
Earth Launch 
( 2 , 3 . 4 )  Translunar Injection I61 
Fig. 2-1 The Overall Apollo Missioil 
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The numbers re la te  to the rnission-phase subdivisions which are discussed in detail 
in the following paragraphs.  
2. 2.1 Phase  l - - Prelaunch 
The prelaunch phase includes a schedule of activity to  prepare and verify a l l  
equipment fo r  flight. Automatic programmed checkout equipment is utilized to  per-  
f o r m  exhaustive t e s t s  of the major  subassemblies.  
Ground support equipment communicates directly with the Saturn and Apollo 
CM guidance computers to  read in  initial conditions and mission and t ra jec tory  con- 
s tants  a s  these pa ramete r s  vary  a s  a function of countdown status. Both s e t s  of 
iner t ia l  guidance s e n s o r s  a r e  aligned t o  a common vert ical  and launch azimuth 
framework.  The ver t ica l  is achieved in  both cases  by erection loops sensing grav- 
ity. Azimuth in  Saturn is measured optically f r o m  the ground and controlled by 
means  of a n  adjustable p r i sm mounted on the stable member .  Azimuth in  Apollo is 
verified optically onboard by the astronauts and held by gyrocompassing action. 
During countdown, both sys tems a r e  t ied t o  an ea r th  f rame  reference.  Jus t  before 
liftoff, both sys tems  respond to  signals t o  r e lease  the coordinate f r ames  simul-  
taneously f r o m  the ea r th  reference  t o  the nonrotating inert ial  reference t o  be used 
during boost flight. A th i rd  se t  of guidance equipment located in the Lunar Module 
(LM) is used near  t o  the moon. 
2. 2. 2 Phase  2 - -  Ear th  Launch, F i r s t  Stage 
During f i r s t  stage flight, the Saturn guidance sys tem controls the vehicle by 
swiveling the outer  four rocket  engines. During the initial vert ical  flight, the ve - 
hicle is rolled f rom i t s  launch azimuth t o  the flight path azimuth. Following this  
maneuver, the Saturn guidance sys tem controls the vehicle in an open-loop pre-  
programmed pitch maneuver which is designed t o  pass  safely through the period of 
high aerodynamic loading. Inertially-sensed accelerat ion signals a r e  not used 
during th is  phase to  guide the vehicle t o  the desired flight path, but r a the r  l a t e ra l  
accelerometers  aid in  controlling the vehicle to  stay within the maximum allowable 
angle of attack. Stable control is achieved in overcoming the effects of flexure 
bending, fuel slosh, and aerodynamic loading by the use of properly located sensors  
and control networks. 
Both the Saturn and Apollo Command Module guidance sys tems continuously 
measure  vehicle motion and compute position and velocity, In addition, the Apollo 
sys tem compares  the actual motion history with that t o  be expected f rom the Saturn 
control equations and generates an e r r o r  display to  the crew. This and many other 
sensing and display arrangements  monitor the flight. If abort c r i t e r i a  a r e  exceeded, 
the crew can f i r e  the launch escape system. This escape s y s t e n ~  consists  of a 
rocket  on a tower attached to the top of the Command Module,which has  the capability 
of lifting the crew rapidly away f r o m  the r e s t  of the vehicle. Parachutes would be 
l a t e r  deployed for  landing. 
In a normal flight, the f i r s t  s tage is allowed t o  burn t o  nearly complete fuel 
depletion a s  sensed by fuel level  m e t e r s  before f i r s t  stage engine shutdown is 
commanded. 
2 .  2. 3 Phase 3 -- Earth  Launch, Second Stage 
Shortly af ter  the initial fuel set t l ing ullage and the f ir ing of second stage 
thrus t ,  the aerodynamic p ressure  dec reases  to  ze ro  a s  the vehicle passes  out of the 
atmosphere.  At th i s  t ime the launch escape system is jettisoned. Aborts at  th is  
t ime,  if necessary,  would normally be accomplished using the Apollo Service Mod- 
ule propulsion t o  accelera te  the Command Module away f rom the r e s t  of the vehicle. 
Since the problems of aerodynamic s t ructure  loading a r e  unimportant in 
second stage flight, the Saturn guidance system s t e e r s  the vehicle towards the de- 
s i r e d  orbital insert ion conditions using propellant-optimizing guidance equations. 
Thrus t  control is achieved by swiveling the outer four engines of the second stage.  
During second-stage flight, the Apollo Command Module guidance sys tem 
continues to  compute vehicle position and velocity. Also, this  sys tem computes any 
of severa l  other possible pa ramete r s  of the flight to  be displayed to the crew for  
monitoring purposes.  In addition, the free-fal l  t ime  to  atmospheric ent ry  and the 
corresponding entry-peak accelerat ion a r e  displayed to allow the crew to  judge the 
abor t  conditions existing. 
2 .  2. 4 Phase 4 - - Earth  Launch, Third  Stage 
The third Saturn stage o r  SIVB has  a single engine for  main propulsion which 
is gimballed fo r  thrust-vector control. Roll control is achieved by use of the SIVB 
roll-attitude control th rus te r s .  
The Saturn guidance sys tem continues to s t e e r  the vehicle t o  orbital  altitude 
and speed. When orbit is achieved, the main SIVB propulsion is shut down. 
During second and third stage boost flight, the Apollo Command Module has 
the capability, on astronaut option, t o  take over the SIVB stage guidance function if 
the Saturn guidance system indicates fai lure.  If this  switchover occurs,  the m i s -  
sion presumably could be continued. More dras t ic  fai lures would require an abort  
using the Service Module propulsion. In such a case,  the Apollo guidance computer 
would be programmed to  provide a number of abort t ra jec tor ies :  (1) immediate safe 
r e tu rn  to  ear th ,  (2 )  r e tu rn  to  a designated landing site, or  (3) orbit for  la ter  re turn  
to  ear th .  
SIVB engine shutdown occurs  about 12 minutes af ter  liftoff a t  100 n. mi.  
altitude near  c i rcular  orbit.  
2. 2. 5 Phase  5 - -  Ear th  Orbit 
The Apollo spacecraft  configuration remains  attached t o  the Saturn SIVB 
stage in ea r th  orbit.  The Saturn sys tem controls attitude by on-off commands to  
two of the smal l  fixed attitude th rus te r s  for  pitch and t o  four more  shared for  yaw 
and roll.  
Ground tracking navigation data telemetered f rom the Manned Space Flight 
Network (MSFN) station& a r e  available to cor rec t  the position and velocity of the 
Saturn navigation sys tem and provide navigation data for the Apollo navigation 
sys tem.  In Apollo, the crew can a lso  make navigation measurements  for  onboard 
determination of the ephemeris  by making landmark o r  horizon direction sightings 
using a special  optical system. The Apollo inert ial  equipment alignment is updated 
by s t a r  sightings with the same  optical system. F o r  these measurements the crew 
has  manual command-control of attitude through the Saturn system. Normally, 
limited r o l l  maneuvers a r e  required t o  provide optical system visibility to  both s t a r s  
and earth.  
Typically, the earth-orbital  phase l a s t s  for  severa l  hours before the crew 
signals the Saturn sys tem t o  initiate the translunar injection. 
2. 2. 6 Phase 6 -- Translunar  Injection 
Translunar  injection is performed using a second burn of the Saturn SIVB 
propulsion, preceded by a n  ullage maneuver using the smal l  th rus te r s .  Saturn 
guidance and control sys tems again provide the necessary  s teer ing and thrust  vec- 
t o r  control t o  the near  parabolic velocity which, for  crew safety considerations, 
put the vehicle on a so-called "free re turn"  t ra jec tory  to  the moon. The sys tem 
a i m s  to  th is  t ra jec tory  which ideally is constrained to  pass in back of the moon and 
re tu rn  t o  ear th-entry  conditions without additional propulsion. 
As  before, the Apollo guidance system independently generates appropriate 
pa ramete r s  for  display to  the crew fo r  monitoring purposes. If the Saturn guid- 
ance sys tem indicates failure, s teering takeover by the Apollo crew i s  possible 
without need for aborting the mission. 
2. 2, 1 Phase 1 - -  T r a n s p a s i t i o ~ ~  and Docking 
The spacecraft  configuration injected onto the translunar free-fal l  path must  
be reassembled for the remaining operations. 
The astronaut pilot separa tes  the Command and Service Modules JCSM) f rom 
the SIVB. He then tu rns  the CSM around for docking t o  the LM which is housed in- 
side the adapter in front of the SIVB stage. To  accomplish this, the pilot has  a 
th ree  -axis, left-hand translat ional  controller and a three  -axis, right -hand rota-  
tional controller. F o r  the maneuver, output signals f rom these  controllers a r e  
processed t o  appropriately modulate the f ir ing of the sixteen low-thrust reaction 
control jets of the Service Module. The normal response f rom the translat ional  con- 
t r o l l e r  is proportional vehicle acceleration in  the indicated direction. The normal 
response  f rom the rotational controller is proportional vehicle angular velocity 
about the indicated axis. 
During the separation and turnaround maneuver of the CSM, the SIVB con- 
t r o l  sys tem holds the LM attitude stationary t o  permit  a simple docking maneuver 
of the command module to  the LM docking hatch. The SIVB, Saturn instrument unit 
and LM adapter a r e  staged t o  leave the Apollo spacecraft  in  the t rans lunar  config- 
uration. Final  docking is completed l e s s  than 6. 5 hours f rom liftoff. 
2 .  2. 8 Phase 8 -- Translunar  Coast 
Soon af ter  injection into the translunar free-fal l  coast phase, navigation 
measurements  a r e  made and processed to examine the acceptability of the t r a j ec -  
tory .  If these data indicate the need,  an  ea r ly  midcourse maneuver cor rec t s  the 
flight path e r r o r  before it propagates with t ime into l a rge r  values which would 
needlessly waste correction-maneuver fuel. 
Once this  f i r s t  correction is made - -  perhaps a couple of hours f r o m  injec- 
t ion - -  the navigation activity on board proceeds a t  a more  leisurely pace. Ground 
tracking data can be telemetered t o  the craft  when available. Using these  ground 
data andlor  onboard sextant-type landmark-to-star  angle measurements,  the on- 
board computer co r rec t s  the spacecraft  s ta te  vector position and velocity infor-  
mation. 
The astronaut navigator can examine, with the aid of the computer, each 
datum input available - -  whether f rom ground tracking telemetered t o  the craft  o r  
taken onboard - -  to  s e e  how it could change the indicated position and velocity be- 
fo re  it is accepted into the computer state vector correction program. In this  way, 
the effects of mistakes in  data gathering or  t ransmiss ion can be minimized. 
2 ,  2 ,  9 Phase 9 - -  Midcourse Corrections 
The navigator periodically examines the computer est imate of indicated 
uncertainty in position and velocity and the est imate of indicated velocity correction 
required to  improve the present  trajectory.  If the indicated position and velocity 
uncertainty is suitably smal l  and the indicated correction is large enough to be 
worth the effort in making, then the crew prepares  f o r  the indicated midcourse 
correction.  Each midcourse velocity correction requ i res  initial spacecraft  orienta-  
tion t o  put the est imated direction of the thrus t  axis along the desired accelerat ion 
direction. Once thrus t  direction is attained, the propulsion system is fired under 
the measurement  and control of the guidance system. Use of the guidance sys tem 
requ i res  that the iner t ia l  measurement sys tem be aligned by optical star-direction 
sightings. 
Typical midcourse corrections a r e  expected t o  be of the order  of 30 feet per 
second. If the required correction happens to  be very  small ,  it is made by using 
the smal l  reaction control th rus te r s .  Larger  corrections a r e  made with a shor t  
burn of the main service  propulsion engine. About th ree  such midcourse velocity 
correct ions  a r e  required on a t r i p  to  the moon. The direction and magnitude of 
each correction adjust the t ra jec tory  s o  that the  moon is finally approached nea r  
a des i red  plane and pericynthian altitude which provides for sat isfactory conditions 
for  the lunar orbit insertion. 
2. 2.10 Phase 10 - - Lunar Orbit  Insertion 
F o r  lunar orbit insertion, a s  in a l l  normal thrusting maneuvers with the 
service  propulsion engine, the inert ial  guidance sys tem is f i r s t  aligned using s t a r  
sightings. Then the sys tem ganerates initial conditions and steering pa ramete r s  
based upon the navigation measure  of position and velocity and the requirements of 
the maneuver. The guidance initiates engine turn-on, appropriately controls the 
direction of the acceleration, and signals engine shut-down when the maneuver is 
complete. 
The lunar orbit insert ion maneuver is intended to  put the spacecraft in a 
near-c i rcular  orbit of approximately 80 n. mi. altitude. The plane of the orbit is 
selected to  pass  over the landing region on the front of the moon. 
2. 2.11 Phase 11 - - Lunar Orbit 
In lunar orbit, navigation measurements  a r e  made t o  update the actual 
orbital  motion information. The navigation measurement  data a r e  processed in  the 
computer using much of the same  program used in the translunar phase. Several 
sources  of data a r e  possible. Direction measurement to  lunar landmarks o r  
horizons and ealth-based radio tracking telemetered data a r e  si tni lar  to the e e n -  
surements  used ea r l i e r  in the flight in  ear th  orbit Because of the lack of lunar 
atmosuhere,  the t imes  of selected s t a r  occultations by the lunar  l imb can conven- 
iently be measured.  Orbital period measurements  a r e  available by timing success-  
ive passages over the same  t e r r a i n  feature o r  successive occultations of the same  
s t a r .  Enough measurements  must  be made to provide accurate initial conditions 
f o r  the guidance sys tem in  the LM for  i t s  controlled descent to  the lunar surface.  
Before separation of the LM, the landing a r e a  is examined by the crew using the 
magnifying optics in the command module. At this  t ime.  direction measurements  
t o  a part icular  surface feature can re la te  a desired landing s i te  o r  a r e a  to  the 
existing indicated orbital  ephemeris  in the computer. These  part icular  landing 
coordinates become par t  of the LM guidance system initial conditions received 
f r o m  the command module. 
After two of the crew t rans fe r  to  the LM and separa te  f rom the Command 
and Service Module (CSM), the remaining man in the CSM continues orbital  navi- 
gation a s  necessary  t o  maintain a n  accurate knowledge of the CSM position and 
velocity. 
2. 2.12 Phase 12 - - LM Descent Orbital  Insertion 
The LM guidance sys tem is turned on and checked out ea r l i e r  in lunar orbit 
before separation and before initial conditions a r e  received f rom the CSM. About 
twenty minutes before initiation of the LM descent injection maneuver, the vehicles 
a r e  separated, the LM guidance sys tem receives  final alignment f rom s t a r  sightings, 
and the attitude f o r  the maneuver is assumed. The maneuver i s  made using the LM 
descent stage propulsion under control of the LM guidance system. The throttling 
capability of the descent engine is exercised a s  a check of i t s  operation during the 
shor t  burn. The maneuver is a 100 ft. per  second velocity change to  reduce the 
5250 ft. per second orbital  velocity for  a near-Hohmann t r ans fe r  to  8 n. mi. altitude 
pericynthian which is t imed t o  occur at  a range of about 200 n. mi. shor t  of the 
final landing area .  
2. 2.13 Phase 13 - -  LM Descent Orbit Coast 
During the free-fal l  phases of the LM descent, the CSM can make tracking 
measurements  of the LM direction to  confirm the LM orbit with respect  to  the CM. 
F o r  that part  of the t ra jec tory  in  the front of the moon, ea r th  tracking provides an 
independent check. The LM, during appropriate intervals in the coasting orbit, 
checks the operation of i t s  r ada r  equipment. The directional tracking and ranging 
operation of the rendezvous r a d a r  is checked against the radar  transponder on the 
CSM. These data provide the L M  computer with added information for  a descent 
orbit  check. A t  lower a l t i tudes ,  the L M  landing radar  on the descent stage is oper-  
ated for checks using the moon surface re turn .  Alignment updating of the LM 
guidance system is performed i f  desired.  The CM from i t s  orbit,  using the tracking 
sys tems and onboard computer, can monitor this  phase of the LM descent. As 
pericynthian i s  approached, the correct  LM attitude for the powered descent phase 
i s  achieved by signals f rom the guidance system. 
2. 2.14 Phase 14 - -  LM Powered Descent Braking Phase 
This  phase s t a r t s  at  the 8 n. mi.  altitude pericynthian of the descent coast 
phase. The descent engine is reignited, and the velocity and altitude-reducing 
maneuver is controlled by the LM inert ial  guidance and control system. 
The descent stage engine is capable of thrust  level  throttling over the range 
necessary  t o  provide initial braking and controlled hover above the lunar surface. 
Engine throttle set t ing is commanded by the guidance and control sys tem t o  achieve 
proper path control, although the pilot can override th is  signal if desired.  
Thrust  vector direction control of the descent stage i s  achieved by a combin- 
ation of body-fixed reaction jets  and limited gimballing of the engine. The engine 
gimbal angles follow guidance commands in a slow loop s o  a s  t o  cause the thrust  
direction t o  pass through the vehicle center  of gravity, thus minimizing ihe need 
fo r  continuous fuel-wasting torques f rom the reaction jets. During a l l  phases of the 
descent, the operations of the various sys tems a r e  monitored. The mission could 
be aborted for  a number of reasons.  If the p r imary  guidance and control system 
performing the descent control is st i l l  operating satisfactorily, i t  would control the 
abort  back t o  rendezvous with the CSM. If the p r imary  sys tem has failed, a simple 
independent abort  guidance sys tem can s t e e r  the vehicle back to  conditions for ren-  
dezvous. F o r  a normal  mission, however, the braking phase continues until the 
altitude drops to  about 4 n. mi.  Then guidance control and t ra jec tory  enter  the final 
approach operation. 
2. 2.15 Phase 15 - -  LM Powered Descent Final  Approach 
One significant feature of this  phase i s  that the controlled t ra jec tory  i s  se- 
lected t o  provide visibility of the landing a r e a  to  the LM crew. The vehicle attitude, 
descent ra te ,  and direction of flight a r e  controlled by the guidance s o  that the land- 
ing si te appears  fixed with relat ion to the window. A simple ret icle pattern in the 
window gives anindication of whether the landing point is aligned with the number 
indicated by the computer display. The pilot may observe that the landing point indi- 
cated, with relat ion t o  other a r e a s  nearby, is in an a r e a  of unsatisfactory features.  
The pilot can then elect  to  select  a new landing point fo r  the computer control by 
turning the vehicle about the thrus t  axis until the ret icle in tersects  the better  
area .  He then hits a "mark" button to  signal the computer, r eads  the re t ic le  
riurnber which is i n  l ine with th is  a r e a  into the computer and then the guidance 
sys tem appropriately red i rec t s  the path. This  capability allows ea r ly  change of 
landing a r e a  and efficient fuel control during acquisition of the new a r e a  which 
otherwise might have to  be performed wastefully l a t e r  during hover. 
Automatic guidance control during the terminal  phase uses  weighted combin- 
at ions of inert ial  sensing and landing radar  data. The weighting depends upon 
expected uncertainties i n  the measurements.  The landing r a d a r  includes altitude 
measurement  and a three-beam Doppler measurement of three  components of L M  
velocity with respect  t o  the lunar surface.  
2. 2.16 Phase 16 - -  Landing and Touchdown 
At any point in  the landing, the pilot can elect  to  take over  par t ia l  o r  com- 
plete control of the vehicle. F o r  instance, one logical mixed mode would have 
altitude descent r a t e  controlled automatically by modulation of the thrus t  magni- 
tude and pilot manual control of attitude for maneuvering horizontally. 
The final approach phase ends near  the lunar  surface, and the spacecraft  
en te r s  a hover phase. Th i s  phase can have various possibilities of initial altitude 
and forward velocity depending upon mission ground ru les ,  pilot option and observed 
l o c a l t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s .  D e s c e n t s t a g e f u e l a l l ~ ~ a n ~ e  p r o v i d e s  f o r  a p p r o x -  
imately two minutes of hover before touchdown. This  must  be accomplished in the 
t ime  allotted o r  abort  on the ascent stage is initiated. The crew will make final 
selection of the landing point and maneuver t o  it ei ther by tilting the vehicle o r  by 
operating the reaction jets  for  translat ion acceleration. Inasmuch a s  the flying 
dust and debr is  result ing f rom rocket  exhaust degrades radar  and visual information, 
the inert ial  sys tem altitude and velocity computation is updated by the landing radar  
s o  that, a s  touchdown is approached, good data a r e  available f rom the inert ial  sen- 
s o r s .  Touchdown must be made with the craft  near  ver t ica l  and a t  sufficiently low 
velocity. 
2. 2.17 Phase 17 - - Lunar Surface Operations 
Time spent on the moon includes considerable exploration, experimentation 
and gathering of soi l  samples.  Also, during the s tay  time, the LM spacecraft  sys -  
t e m s  a r e  checked and prepared fo r  the re tu rn  voyage. The ephemeris  of the CSM 
i n  orbit is continually updated and the information relayed t o  the LM crew and 
computer. The LM rendezvous r a d a r  a lso  can t r a c k  the CSM a s  it passes  overhead 
to  provide further data upon which t o  base the ascent guidance pa ramete r s .  The 
inert ial  guidance sys tem receives  final alignment utilizing optical star-direction 
sightings prior t o  the s t a r t  of ascent. The vert ical  components of th is  alignment 
could a lso  be achieved by accelerometer  sensing of lunar gravity in  a vert ical  e r e c -  
tion loop. 1,iftoff is t imed t o  achieve the desired t ra jec tory  for rendezvous with the 
CSM. 
2. 2.10 Phase 18 - -  LM Ascent 
LM powered ascent  is accomplished with the LM ascent engine. The ascent 
engine, which h a s  a fixed mounted nozzle, is under control of the LM inert ial  
guidance and control system. Thrust  vector is achieved by operation of the sixteen 
reaction jets that a r e  mounted on the ascent stage. The engine cannot be throttled, 
but the necessary  signals f rom guidance w i l l  te rminate  the burning when a suitable 
t ra jec tory  is achieved. 
The initial par t  of the ascent t ra jec tory  is a vert ical  r i s e  followed by a pitch- 
over a s  commanded by the guidance equations. During the pitchover maneuver, the 
guidance system a l so  commands ro l l  s teer ing such that the LM maneuvers into an  
elliptical orbit coplanar with the CSM plane. 
2.2.19 Phase  19 - -  LM Midcourse Maneuvers 
A constant delta height maneuver is initiated a t  the apocynthion of the LM 
concentric elliptical orbit that  places the LM in a c i rcular  orbit which is predeter-  
mined such that the LM a r r i v e s  a t  a required position with respect  to  the CSM a t  
the terminal  phase initiation t ime. During th is  phase, the crew verif ies LM t ra jec -  
to ry  pa ramete r s  a s  computed by the LM guidance computer with the parameters  
computed by the command module computer. 
2. 2. 20 Phase 20 -- Terminal  Rendezvous and Docking 
The terminal  rendezvous phase consists  of a s e r i e s  of braking thrus t  maneu- 
v e r s  under control of the LM guidance system which uses  data f rom i t s  inert ial  
sensors  and the rendezvous radar .  The objective of these operations is to  reduce 
the velocity of the LM relat ive to  the CSM to  ze ro  a t  a point near the CSM. This  
leaves  the pilot in the LM in  a position to  initiate a manual docking maneuver with 
the CSM using the translat ion and rotation control of the LM reaction jets. Although 
these maneuvers would normally be done with the LM, propulsion o r  control prob- 
l e m s  in the LM could require  the CSM to  take the active role. 
After final docking, the LMcr'ew t r a n s f e r s  t o  the CSM. The LM is then 
jettisoned and abandoned, 
2. 2. 21 Phase 21 - -  Transea r th  Injection 
Navigation measurements  made while in lunar orbit determine the proper 
initial eon~ditions for t ransear th  injection, These  a r e  performed a s  before using 
onboard and ground -based t r a e  king data as available. 
The guided t ransear th  injection maneuver is made normally under the ccn- 
t r o l  of the p r imary  inert ial  guidance system. Several  backup means a r e  available 
t o  cover possible fa i lures  in  the pr imary system. The injection maneuver is con- 
trolled to  put the spacecraft  on a f r ee  -fall coast to  sat isfactory ent ry  conditions 
near  earth.  The t ime  of midcourse t ransear th  coast must  be adjusted by th is  in-  
jection maneuver t o  account for  ea r th ' s  rotation motion of the recovery a r e a  and a s  
l imited by the ent ry  maneuver capability. 
2 . 2 .  2 2  Phase  22 -- Transea r th  Coast 
The t ransear th  coast is very  s imi lar  t o  the t rans lunar  coast phase.: During 
the long coasting phases going t o  and f rom the moon, the sys tems and crew must  
control the spacecraft  orientation a s  required. Typical midcourse orientation con- 
s t r a in t s  a r e  those necessary  t o  a s s u r e  that the high-gain communication antenna is 
within its gimbal l imi ts  to  point to  earth,  o r  that the spacecraft  attitude is not held 
fixed t o  the local  heating effect of the sun fo r  too long a period. 
During the long periods of f ree  -fall flight to  and f rom the moon, when the inert ial  
measurement sys tem is not being used for controlling velocity corrections,  the inert ial  
sys tem is turned off to  conserve power supply energy. 
Onboard and ground-based measurements  provide for navigation upon which 
is based a s e r i e s  (normally three)  of midcourse correction maneuvers during t r a n s -  
ea r th  flight. The aim point of these corrections i s  the center  of the safe ea r th  
ent ry  corr idor  suitable for the desired landing a rea .  This safe corr idor  is ex- 
pressed a s  a variation of approximately rt17 n. mi. in the vacuum perigee. A too- 
high ent ry  might lead t o  an uncontrolled skip out of the atmosphere. A too-low 
entry  might lead t o  atmospheric drag accelerat ions exceeding the tolerance of the 
crew. 
After final safe entry conditions a r e  confirmed by the navigation sys tem 
pr io r  to  the en t ry  phase, the inert ial  guidance sys tem is aligned, the Service Mod- 
ule is jettisoned and the initial entry attitude of the Command Module is attained. 
2. 2. 23  Phase 2 3  - - Earth  Atmospheric Entry  
Initial control of ent ry  attitudes is achieved by guidance system commands 
t o  the twelve reaction jets on the command module surface. As the atmosphere is 
entered, aerodynamic fo rces  create  torques determined by the shape of the CM and 
center-of-mass location. If initial orientation was correct ,  these torques a r e  in a 
direction towards a. stable t r i m  orientation with heat shield forward and flight path 
nearly parallel  to  one edge of the conical surface.  The control system now oper-  
a t e s  the reaction jets to  damp out oscillation about th is  t r i m  orientation. The 
result ing angle of at tack of the ent ry  shape causes  an  aerodynamic lift force which 
can be used fo r  entry path control by rolling the vehicle about the wind axis under 
control of the guidance system. Range control is achieved by rolling s o  that an ap- 
propriate component of that  lift is ei ther up o r  down a s  required.  Track  o r  a c r o s s  
range control is achieved by al ternately choosing a s  required the side on which the 
horizontal lift component appears.  
The ea r ly  par t  of the ent ry  guidance is concerned with the safe reduction of 
the high velocity through the energy dissipation effect of d r a g  forces .  Later ,  a t  
lower velocity, the objective of controlling the vehicle t o  the ea r th  recovery landing 
a r e a  is included in  the guidance programming. This  control continues until the ve- 
locity is reduced and a suitable position is achieved for  the deployment of a drogue 
parachute. Final  letdown t o  a water landing is normally achieved by three  para-  
chutes. 
Section I11 
THE APOLLO INERTIAL SUBSYSTEM, AN OI'ERVIEW 
3 .  1 Early Decisions --Block I 
During 1957 through 1959, MIT/IL performed a study which led to the publi- 
cation of a repor t  in June of 1959 entitled "Recoverable Interplanetary Space Probe.  " 
In September 1959, under a NASA contract, MIT/IL undertook a study of the 
guidance and control design for a variety of space missions. The study report  was 
issued in April 1960 and showed the onboard sensor capability which could support 
Navigation and Guidance for manned o r  unmanned spacecraft, Jh r ing  this period, 
NASA was defining i t s  advanced manned space flight program which would follow 
Mercury and Gemini and which was named "Apollo" in July of 1960 by the NASA 
Administrator. The program was to lead, eventually, to a manned lunar landing. 
In November 1960, a six-month contract with MIT to conduct preliminary 
design work for the navigation and guidance support for project Apollo was 
proposed by NASA. The manned lunar landing was made a national goal by 
President Kennedy in May 1961. In August of 1961, NASA awarded i t s  
f i r s t  major Apollo contract to MIT/IL to develop the guidance and navigation system. 
It is important a t  the outset to understand the factors governing the design of the 
Apollo G&N in i t s  initial phases. In late 196 1, plans were to fly an Apollo space- 
craf t  in the fall of 1963 with an MIT G&N system on board. The NASA direction 
to  support th is  schedule was to (a )  build that which we knew how to build in the time 
allotted, and (b) to use only components proven by production and operational 
experience. 
Numerous fundamental and f a r  reaching decisions were made quickly in the 
ear ly  days of the contract. The IMU gimbal question was one of the most funda- 
mental. It was reasoned that IMU in-flight alignment would be a necessity. No 
gyro would be able to maintain adequate inert ial  reference for a period of twelve 
days to  cover a l l  the necessary  maneuvers. With a realignment concept and 
recognition that a l l  maneuvers where the IMU was required were in-plane maneuvers 
with little o r  no out-of-plane steering, it was reasoned that a 3 gimbal sys tem could 
be used. This had several  advantages over a 4 gimbal IMU in t e rms  of system 
complexity, weight, power, reliability and cost. 
3. 1. 1 Gimbal System Arrangement 
Although a strapdown or  body-mounted inert ial  subsystem configuration was 
briefly examined a t  the s t a r t  of the program, no ser ious  consideration was given 
to this technrque. The smal l  development time that the schedule allowed and the 
fact that no such body-mounted system was yet out of the laboratory experimental 
stage precluded its use.  Moreover, i t  was c lea r  that schedules could be met  by 
the existing development t eam by utilizing past  experience with the design of the 
gimballed iner t ia l  measurement unit of the Polar is  Mark 2 guidance system. 
At the time the decision was made in 1961, there appeared to be no doubt 
that a three degree-of-freedom gimbal sys tem would be the optimum choice for the 
inert ial  measurement unit. To simplify hardware design, the various ground rules 
mentioned e a r l i e r  emphasized simplicity, light weight, optimum performance and 
utilization of crew capability. These ground rules  a l l  indicated that,for the Apollo 
mission, a three degree-of-freedom gimbal arrangement was to be  preferred over 
the four degree-of-freedom configuration. 
The function of the gimbal sys tem arrangement was to support the gyros 
and accelerometers  on a structure that would be kept nonrotating in space in spite 
of rotations of the spacecraft .  The only motivation for a four degree-of-freedom 
gimbal sys tem was that such a configuration could be made and operated so  that 
a l l  attitudes of the spacecraft  would be  accommodated without the problem associated 
with gimbal lock that could possibly occur with a three degree-of-freedom system. 
The question posed in 1961 and 1962 was:  Could the simpler three  degree-of- freedom 
IMU meet a l l  the requirements Apollo would ask of i t  without danger of approaching. 
gimbal lock and loss  of stable member  alignment? The answer in brief was that 
a l l  usual  Apollo maneuvers would naturally be  such that gimbal lock would be 
avoidable by a sufficiently wide margin to be  easily accommodated by the three 
degree-of-freedom candidate IMU under consideration. In unusual situations the 
operation n e a r  gimbal lock in nonemergency maneuvers could be simply avoided. 
Direct means were available to warn of approaching difficulty so that corrective 
action could be  taken. And finally, the procedure for recovery f rom loss  of 
alignment, if i t  occurred--even in emergency situations--seemed straightforward. 
The discussions that were  relevant to IMU selection a r e  included in the following 
sections. 
3 .  1. 2 Per.tinent IMU Design Characterist ics 
The IMU design under consideration borrowed heavily f rom .that of .the 
Polar is  Mark 2. The capability of this c lass  of design to maintain s-table member 
ori.enta.tion in spite of base  motion angles and rotati-onal r a t es  was well known, 
The Polar is  IMU was a three degree-of-freedom gimballed s t ructure  such a s  
shown in the "stick and wire" schematic form in Figure 3-1, and the proposed 
Apolio IMU was -to be the same,  Struc-tural features of the gimbals that were 
developed for Apollo can be  seen in  Figure  3 - 2 ,  
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Fig. 3 -1 Schematic of Inertial Measurement Unit 
Each gimbal axis of the proposed IMU had the servo torque motors and 
electromagnetic data transducers directly coupled to the two adjacent members  
without operating through a gear  train such a s  IS common in many gimbal designs. 
This operation without gears  had a multifold advantage. Most obvious was the 
elimination of concern about gear  wear and accuracy of mesh which were cr i t ica l  
factors in making a reliable servo of the necessary  high performance. Equally 
important was elimination of the requirement for the servo to provide torque to 
accelerate gear  t r a in  inert ia when no angular velocity was desired of the driven 
gimbal. Without gear t ra ins  the inert ia of the stable member would tend to  hold 
itself stationary without any help f rom the servo against any magnitude of base  
rotation motion except for the effects of (1) bearing friction, (2)  motor "back emf" 
and ( 3 )  outer gimbal inertia. Discounting these last  two effects for the moment, 
the se rvo  would need to overcome only the smal l  bearing friction of the Apollo IMU 
gimbals, even for extremely violent b a s e  o r  vehicle rotations. There  a r e  none of 
the limitations resulting from high angular ra tes  o r  accelerations of the vehicle 
imposed by the usual gimbal axis gear  t ra ins .  
The second effect mentioned above, back emf, concerns the voltage 
generator actlon of the motor, the servo amplifier drlve ~mpedance,  a correspond~ng 
lag t e r m  in the servo loop, and a base  motion coupling. The level of the output 
current  feedback under consideration in the Apollo IMU se rvo  would control these 
effects adequately so  that any concern of base  motion angular velocity coupling a s  
a result  of motor voltage would be trivial within any conceivable uncontrolled 
vehicle maneuvers f rom which recovery is  possible. 
The third effect, resulting f rom outer gimbal inertia, comes into play only 
with large  middle gimbal angles away f rom the ze ro  orientation. See Figure 3-1.  
In the extreme situation, large  middle gimbal angles cause the effect called 
"gimbal" lock. This subject i s  s o  extensive that the ensuing section has been 
devoted to its exposition. 
3 . 1 . 2 . 1  The Problem of Gimbal Lock. Gimbal lock occurs when the outer gimbal 
axis is ca r r i ed  around by vehicle motion to be parallel  to the inner gimbal axis. 
At this point the three gimbal axes  l ie  in a single plane. No gimbal freedom now 
exists  to "unwind" base  motion about an axis normal to this plane. Even though 
any vehicle orientation with respect  to  the stable member can be accommodated by 
part icular se t s  of the three gimbal angles, the condition a t  gimbal lock prevents 
accommodation of a part icular orientation change from the locked condition without 
exceedingly high outer gimbal acceleration. 
Problems with a three degree-of-freedom system like the Apollo IMU 
which was being considered could occur under circumstances other than the gimbal 
locked situation. For  instance, when the locked configuration i s  approached, a s  
manifested when middle gimbal angles approach go0, the stabilization capabilities 
of the assembly become more  and more  marginal depending on design. With 
proper gyro e r r o r  signal resolution and gain control, the locked configuration can 
be very closely approached without undesirable effects. However, a s  gimbal lock 
i s  approached more  closely, higher and higher angular accelerations a r e  required 
of the outer gimbal to hold the inner member fixed against part icular components 
of base angular velocity. By an inherent tendency to stay fixed, the inert ias of the 
inner gimbals can generate much of the necessary reaction torque to help provide 
the required acceleration of the outer gimbal over a limited range. This would be 
perfect without the accelerating torque from the outer servo motor i P  ei ther the 
inner s t ructures  were of infinite inert ia o r  the outer structure were zero  inertia. 
Lacking an infinite rat io of the two, the remaining burden of providing the accel- 
erating torclue must be taken by the servo and outer gimbal motor. 
In Apollo, the outer gimbal s t ructure  achieved necessary  s t ructura l  sliIf- 
ness  through the thin section spherical  shape with a relatively smal l  inertia. The 
inner stable member  ca r r i ed  a l l  the m a s s  of the inertial components and necessary 
thermal sink mounting block. 
Besides favorable inert ia rat ios,  much of the capability of the Apollo IMU 
to  handle near  gimbal lock conditions was at f i r s t  attributed to the use  of a smal l  
angular accelerometer  on each axis (ADA) a s  a servo stabilization feedback 
element. This device permits  very high torque gains with low servo noise problems 
over a l l  frequencies and allows specification operation over a wide margin of gain 
change. No cr i t ica l  adjustments a r e  necessary.  The Block I IMU utilized this ADA 
a s  the high frequency feedback device with good success.  Later  in the studies for 
the  Block I1 IMU, the gyro noise inserted into the loop resulting f rom the necessary  
high frequency gain was found tolerable and the ADA was eliminated. 
Moreover, i t  was argued that transient loss  of attitude resulting f rom 
gimbal lock effects, o r  any other disturbance fo r  that mat ter ,  did not necessari ly 
mean a permanent loss  of orientation indication of the IMU, unless the gyro gimbal 
output axis limit stops were  reached. Within the integration range of the gyro, the 
attitude i s  recovered a s  the gyro e r r o r  is brought back to zero. In effect, the 
orientation is memorized in the gyro output axis angle and angular velocity until 
the se rvo  can recover.  
F i r m  ground rules  on how close to  gimbal lock the Apollo IMU could operate 
satisfactorily depended upon experimental resul ts  with the actual flight configuration 
IMU. Data, using IMU #3  with breadboard electronics, were collected From this 
information, it appeared that gimbal lock could be approached a s  closely a s  10 
degrees without r i sk  and even much c loser  with some possibility of loss  of stable 
member  attitude. Stated more  graphically, a test was conducted where the Inner 
axis of the sys tem was aligned within 10 degrees of a base  motion axis perpen- 
dicular to the output axis. Base motion angular velocity then caused gimbal lock 
to be passed within 10 degrees. Stable member  attitude was held consistently for 
this configuration with base  angular velocities of 60 degrees per  second. A tentative 
and conservative listing of acceptable vehicle ra tes  and accelerations was then 
generated: 
Vehicle Angular Velocity Allowable 
About inner gimbal axis (continuous) 
About middle gimbal axis (f80°) 
Abowt outer gimbal a-xis (continuous) 
About any a rb i t ra ry  body o r  Jnertial axis 
resulting in passing up to 10 of gimbal lock (continuous) 
Vehicle Angular Acceleration Allowable 
About any axis and within above ra te  limits 
' Values marked with an as ter isk  have much higher l imits,  
but were a s  yet  undetermined. 
3. 1.2.2 IMU Operation t o  Avoid Gimbal Lock. Although the allowable vehicle 
motions described above to avoid effects near  gimbal lock were  l e s s  constricting 
than might be expected, the argument had to be made that the a rea  near  gimbal 
lock could be avoided in practical  operation. 
It was proposed that the Apollo IMU would normally be shut down during a l l  
long periods not requiring i t s  use. This would be done primarily to save power 
and corresponding fuel cell  battery reactant (estimated saving of 43 pounds of 
reactant in a 200 hour command module lunar landing mission). For  this reason, 
and because of unavoidable angle drift over long time intervals resulting f rom 
imperfect performance of the gyros, the guidance sys tem would provide for 
inflight IMU alignment against s t a r  references before the s t a r t  of each accelerated 
phase of the mission. This allowed the IMU stable member  alignment to be chosen 
for  each use to the most logical orientation. 
The decision to utilize only three degrees of IMU gimbal freedom did not 
elicit any counter arguments within NASA o r  f rom other contractors. The 
configuration was, for the most part ,  frozen long before the techniques called the 
"concentric flight plan" were  developed f rom the rendezvous experience of Gemini 
where maneuvers were designed not for efficiency but for conceptual simplicity 
and ease  of monitoring. Correspondingly, la ter  planning, without a view to g rea te r  
efficiency, identified pure  plane changing maneuvers with an in-plane burn component. 
Thus, the  possibility of exactly out-of-plane burns became f a r  more  probable than 
was thought ea r l i e r  to  be  the case.  
Currently, the out-of-plane burns during rendezvous a r e  accomplished with 
the RCS thrusters  in a low acceleration translation. In th is  way, the vehicle can be 
accelerated sideways without changing spacecraft orientation to gimbal lock 
attitudes. This method a l so  allowed for  a maneuver which did not break r a d a r  lock 
o r  astronaut line of sight on the CSM. Avoidance of any gimbal lock problem during 
the actual thrusting and entry phases of Apollo offers  no difficulty. 
For  the majori ty of mission aborts,  the TMU gimbal lock situation was seen 
to  put no more  constraint on successful abort  than on normal  mission phases. Two 
mission phases were identified, however, which would require cr i t ica l  dependence 
upon the IMU indicated attitude to cope successfully with the emergency. The f i r s t  
of these was high altitude abort  pr ior  to launch escape tower jettison. If the 
command module tumbles during this operation there is a possibility that the 
outer axis might pass  through the cr i t ica l  a r e a s  near  gimbal lock causing the loss  
of IMU attitude information, If co r rec t  entry attitude is not assumed ear ly  enough, 
the reaction jets might not be  able to overcome and cor rec t  the improper but stable 
attitude of having the conical end point forward a s  contrasted with the proper blunt 
end forward entry orientation. In view of the ra te  limitations of the backup 
attitude sys tem and the problems of getting attitude cues  through the windows, 
dependency on IMU attitude information might be necessary.  The probability 
of exceeding crew s t r e s s  l imi ts  by a conical end forward entry in the situation 
described is the product of: (1) the probability that abort  is initiated at the 
cr i t ica l  altitude, ( 2 )  the probability that the abort initiates an uncontrolled tumble, 
( 3 )  the probability that the tumble causes the IMU to pass  through i t s  cr i t ica l  gim- 
bal  lock a reas ,  and (4) the probability that the pilot cannot sense the direction of 
drag ear ly  enough to cor rec t  attitude o r  that the command module enters  conical 
end f i rs t .  It was conjectured but not proven that the resulting probability was an  
extremely smal l  number. 
The second mission phase, which was identified a s  being cri t ical  with 
respect  to  IMU gimbal lock limttations, was during the LM lunar landing. A hard 
over LM descent engine gimbal failure in .the yaw direction would require positive 
pilot action almos-t immediately to  avoid gimbal lock. F r o m  a vertical hover 
orientation, a random tumble f rom -the vert ical  has  an 11q chance of passing within 
10 degrees of the lock orientation i f  not s-topped before 90 degrees. If the a.ttitude 
information was lost by such a maneuver, the vehicle would be thrusting nearly 
horizontally and probably downward unless the engine was immediately shut down 
which, of course,  would be the proper f i rs t  action during this emergency. 
3 , l .  3 Considerations of a Four Degree-of-Freedom IMU 
Difficulties near  gimbal lock can be avoided by -the addition of a fourth 
gimbal to  the IMU. This additional gimbal is called the redundant gimbal since i t  
provides more  degrees of freedom than theoretically necessary  on a geometric bas is .  
This redundant gimbal, i f  used, would have been mounted outside the normal outer 
gimbal. The order  would have been: inner, middle, outer, and redundant. See 
Figure 3-3.  The most likely operation would use the inner -three gimbals to drive 
the stabilizing gyro e r r o r  signals .to ze ro  while the fourth gimbal would be  driven so  
a s  .to keep the middle gimbal n e a r  ze ro  and away f rom -the gimbal lock orientation. 
This could be done by generating a redundant gimbal ra te  command by expressions 
s imi la r  t o  
- sin A(middle) 
A(redundan.t) -  
cos (outer)  
s o  that a negative feedback occurs  t o  drive the middle angle towards zero.  ' I t  
should be possible to make the inner three gimbals have the same dynamic per-  
formance a s  the simpler three degree-of-freedom system. Any base  motion 
coupling, though, avoided in the Apollo sys tem a s  described ear l ier ,  would make 
redundant gimbal motions appear a s  disturbances on the middle o r  inner servos,  
thus requiring special attention in loop responses.  The redundant gimbal must be 
accelerated i f  i t  is t o  do its job, even when the middle gimbal angle i s  near  zero.  
In fact, a situation like gimbal lock occurs  for outer angles near  90 degrees a s  can 
be seen in the above equation. Close to 90 degrees outer gimbal angle, the 
redundant gimbal must  be  driven a t  a very fast  ra te  to hold the middle gimbal 
angle a t  zero. In practice, this  offers no r e a l  difficulty a s  long a s  the vehicle body 
ra tes  a r e  within cer ta in  l imits.  
With .the four degree-of-freedom gimbal system, there a r e  no cons-traints 
on vehicle attitude although r a t e  l imi ts  do s t i l l  exist for certain paths of attitude 
motion. 
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Fig. 3 -3 Four Degree-of -Freedom IMU 
The disadvantages of using a four degree-of-freedom IMU were considered 
significant. To execute the fourth gimbal would have required an extra  servo 
different from the other three servos  in dynamic design. Extra data transducers,  
o r  the equivalent, on the middle and outer axes to  determine the redundant glmbai 
commands would have also been required. 
The expense involved in having to  add .the fourth gimbal depended upon a 
number of factors.  In order  .to achieve -the required guidance sys tem performance 
demanded of -the lunar mission, .the desired lMU alignment accuracy s.tood out as a 
cr i t ica l  design factor. This meant gimbal data transducers having peak e r r o r s  no 
worse -than 20 seconds of a r c  would be  required in o rder  t o  use  -the optics sys tem 
for  s t a r  alignment references.  The addi-tion of a fourth gimbal .to achieve the 
alignment would have compounded the problem in .the IMU structure,  in .the computer 
interface, and in -the flight computer program. 
At the time, the 20 a r c  second accuracy data transducers determined the 
s ize  of the Apollo IMU. Without these large  units the IMU would have been severa l  
inches smal le r  i n  diameter. It was est imated that a fourth gimbal using these s a m e  
proven transducers would have ra ised IMU st ructure  weight by 15 pounds and 
increased the volume by 725 cubic inches. 
The Polar is  advanced guidance sys tem in a four degree-of-freedom con- 
figura-tion was estimated to weigh only 213  the Apollo three degree-of-freedom uni-t 
and would have had equivalent performance except for the accuracy of the axis da-ta 
transducers.  Advances in smal l  accurate data t ransducers  were being studied wi-th 
-the goal of direct  digital encoding of gimbal angles. This could have led to simpli-  
fication of the CDUts,but the interface wtth the existing "eight ball" attitude display 
would have been much m o r e  difficult. 
Additional complexity would have resulted in making full use  of a four 
degree-of-freedom system. An additional CDU ( 3  pounds plus electronics for 
Block I hardware) would be required for  flexible operation with the computer. The 
additional gimbal would have required a longer resolution chain to generate autopilot 
attitude e r r o r  for pilot display. This chain was already difficult to achieve under 
the requirements imposed by the existing autopilot interface. Also, the computer 
would have had t o  assume the burden of providing the r e a l  t ime resolutions required 
t o  convert s teer ing angles in accelerometer coordinates into proper CDU commands. 
Although this was done anyway in the more  capable Block I1 flight computer, i t  was 
not realist ic to do s o  in the Block I computer. 
The addition of a fourth gimbal, other things belng equal, would necessarrly 
have increased the power drain on the main fuel  cell  batteries,  besides having 
required an extra  se t  of servo electronics. Heat transfer f rom the gyros  inside 
to  the heat sink on the housing would have been made much more  difficult by the 
addition of the fourth gimbal. The redundant axis would have had to have sl ip r ings 
to  be useful and would have had to  c a r r y  a l l  s ignals on the outer axis r ings plus 
those of the redundan.t axis instrumentation. 
One problem considered was generating three degree-of-freedom a-ttitude 
ball  commands f rom a redundant four degree-of-freedom IMU. This could have 
been solved by the development of a compatible four degree-of-freedom ball, but 
.the s ize  penalty on the panel would have been prohibi-tive. The electrical  resolution 
conversion f rom four degrees of freedom .to -the necessary  -three degrees becomes 
bound up in .the equivalence of gimbal lock for which .the redundant gimbal was .to 
have prevented. Although the four degree-of-freedom IMU avoids gimbal lock and 
loss  of attitude, the attitude information is difficult -to display. 
The advantages of the redundant gimbal seemed to have been outweighed by 
equipment simplicity, s ize  advantages, and corresponding implied hardware 
reliability of the direct  th ree  degree-of-freedom unit. Since no operational 
difficulty of significance could be imagined with the three degree-of -freedom gimbal 
system, the decision to avoid the fourth gimbal was made. 
In retrospect ,  some hesitation about the wisdom of the decision might b e  
expressed. As stated ear l ier ,  the orbital  operations during rendezvous with the 
"concentric flight plan" made the probability of desired orientations near  gimbal 
lock much higher than the more  efficient direct  rendezvous originally envisioned 
where needed orbital  plane changes were combined with the needed in-plane transfer 
orbit burns. There is no doubt that with present technology, a four degree-of-freedom 
all-attitude IMU could be produced with no m o r e  total weight, volume, power, o r  
failure r a t e  than the present  three degree-of-freedom unit of 1964 vintage. But for 
that mat ter ,  the three degree-of-freedom unit would also correspondingly benefit 
f rom present technology. 
3.1 . 4  Component Section 
3. 1.4. 1 Gyroscopes. The f i r s t  step in selecting a gyro was to  perform an e r r o r  
analysis of the e .qec ted  -trajectories to determine .the criticali-ty of performance. 
Wkth .the realignment capability and with position e r r o r s  for landing of l e s s  than 10 
t 
nautical miles, a 1 0  meru  gyro appeared feasible. Several  candidate gyros were  
considered. A modification of the type of gyro used for Polar is  was chosen for the 
Apollo application. The production records  were  impressive and i t s  performance 
was satisfactory. Moreover, the designers were  familiar  with the instrument. 
A decision was made to have separate  NASA inert ial  component procurement and 
to have only one source for each component. The flight schedule was somewhat 
uncertain, however, and i t  was decided to allow a s  much time a s  possible for that 
contingency. The expected wheel hours in operation were to be about 2000 for  ear ly  
flight sys tems and about 1200 for la ter  flights. This assumption has  since been 
proven too low by a factor of about 50%. 
Some design changes were made to  -the gyro which made it different f rom 
the  Polar is  instrument. The torque generator was changed f rom a two winding 
current  product .torque -to a single winding curren-t squared -torque. This was done 
to  provide -the mos t  efficient interface be-tween the computer and the IMU, principally 
fo r  alignment. The suspension frequency and signal generator frequency were 
changed f r o m  4800 Hz and 800 Hz,  respectively, to 3200 Hz.  The change was 
dictated by the available computer timing pulses. 6400 HZ could have been 
selected but experience with higher frequencies was lacking. 
To assure  a quali-ty gyro, acceptance specifica-tions were tightened, and a 
reliability program was s tar ted which would provide reliability data and failure 
prediction methods applicable to production line gyros. 
3. 1.4. 2 Accelerometers.  The accelerometer selected was a modified Polar is  
16 PIP. This selection was based pr imari ly  upon the simplicity of the P I P  over the 
16 PIGA (the other possible MIT/IL choice) and the inherent reliability believed 
possible. The performance requirements were not extensive, but were difficupt 
f o r  the PIPA to fulfill. Apollo asked for about 100 par ts  per million accuracy and an 
acceleration range of f 16 g.  The knowledge of torque generators and electronics being 
what i t  was dictated the choice of reducing the pendulosity f rom 1 grn c m  to 114 gm cm, 
which had the obvious effect of magnifying bias ins-tability. To achieve bet ter  
scale  factor stability, .the tapered suspension was added to the design. A significant 
number of design changes were  incorporated throughout the l i fe  of the program. 
' 1 meru i s  a Milliearth Rate Unit equal to 0 .  0 15 degree per  hour. 
The initial conception for the accelerometer was that of a ternary or  three 
state torqued accelerometer because the computer would not be able to handle the 
limit cycle operation of a binary f3 A V pulse-input. It was further decided to have 
a three scale factor accelerometer, A nominal scale factor with a capability of 
about 16 g t s  was the primary mode. There was to be a low g capability where the 
A V scaling was to  be decreased by a factor of four. This was primarily done to 
abet performance during the early phases of entry, particularly during the skip 
out portion. In the event of a steep entry provision, the accelerometer was 
subjected to the maximum acceleration capability by reverting it to a binary mode 
that increased the A V  by a factor of approximately 2 .  These decisions, in view 
of the fact that many requirements were then unknown, represented the best 
engineering judgment available. Later,  the accelerometer was changed to  a 
binary torqued single scale factor device which permitted considerable system 
simplification. 
3. 1.4.3 Component Data Management. Both inertial components were to have 
common test  equipment at the factory of the inertial component manufacturer, MIT 
and the Inertial Subsystem contractor. This communality of test equipment was in 
line with maintaining transfer of inertial performance from location to location. 
MIT thus maintained configuration control over both the PIP and IRIG test 
consoles. In the case of the gyro test console, the design work of the analog equip- 
ment was done by AC Electronics, and MIT designed the digital portion. MIT 
designed the final test  consoles for the 16 PIP Mod D. 
lt was decided early in the program .that MIT would maintain inertial 
performance parameters for a l l  components. This early decision and its 
execution se t  up the now existing gyro and PIP  performance parameter -tabulation 
and distribution system. Initially, MIT set  up .the system and maintained records. 
Later, Dynamics Research was brought in to do .the job which had grown considerably. 
The possibility now existed for comparing the Apollo gyro with .the very similar 
Polaris gyro. Such comparisons were infrequent, however, and not of much value. 
Later, for other reasons, the entire job was transferred to AC Electronics. The 
data system improved with each transfer and, because of the renewed interest, 
i s  now a good up-to-date operating sys.tem. 
3. 1.5 IMU Design 
The IMU stable member was made of beryllium to save weight and give 
better dimensional stability to  the inertial component orientatlon. There were 
no gimbal stops on any axis, .thus permitting any s-table orientation. A decision 
was made to provide a hermetically sealed IMU based on the requirement of 
operation in a vacuum. The enclosed a i r  in the IMU was necessary  to provide a 
medium for conducting heat from the stable member  to the coolant. 
Several  components in .the IMU such a s  torque motors,  r e so lvers  and s l ip  
r ings needed fur ther  development. MIT developed and qualified .two sources  for  
each component; and AC Electronics, a s  .the IMU manufacturer, made -the 
independent supplier  choice for production. The torque motor and s l ip  ring 
developments were  straightforward and proceeded smoothly. One sl ip r ing vendor, 
however, was subsequently disqualified because of fai lure to deliver an adequa-te 
product. 
3. 1.5. 1 IMU Angle Resolvers. The resolver  development proceeded along the 
s a m e  general  guidelines outlined above, but more  elements, requiring more  
advanced state-of-the-art technology, needed developing. The resolver  development 
was intimately tied to the method of angle interface between the IMU, optics, and 
computer. The method of angle interfacing with the CDU i s  described in Sec. 4. 5. The 
sys tem required 1 and 16 speed reso lvers  fo r  the IMU, and s ize  8 and 11 one speed 
A 
reso lvers  for the CDU. The required precision was about 2 0  s e c  for  the 16 speed 
r e s o 1 v e r . Development started on these configurations with two vendors. The 
competition engendered between the two vendors was very beneficial to the program, 
both f rom a technical development and a cost  standpoint. There were  at the s t a r t  
of the program several  groups at MIT involved in resolver  development, but la ter  
were  centralized into one group for g rea te r  efficiency and competency. Later  
developments dictated the need for m o r e  resolvers  for the sextant, scanning 
telescope and CDU. This development followed the pattern s e t  initially. 
3. 1. 5. 2 Temperature  Control. There  was a ser ious  attempt f rom the beginning 
to provide the temperature control sys tem with a l l  the reliability and flexibility 
of the original design requirements. Early attempts to use  thermal heat of fusion 
sa l t s  were tr ied.  This idea was sound but proved to be unworkable based upon 
mission time l ines for IMU operation. The study was one of the first to definitize 
sys tem operation on a lunar landing mission. The Block I configuration temperature 
control sys tem provided a flexible,reliable sys tem for manned flight. I t  was, in 
fact, over designed and, a s  such, was simplified considerably for Block 11. Test  
and flight r esu l t s  to date have justified this simplification. 
The thermal interface for the IMU and the G&N system in general  was a 
difficult negotiation. I t  was decided ear ly  that the IMU should have integral cooling 
in -the spacecraft ,  This decision was based on substantial technical data provided 
by MIT and proved to be a sound one inasmuch a s  no leak problems developed. 
Later ,  when integral cooling for a l l  electronics packages in the G & N  was to  be 
actually implemented, i.t could not be negotiated. To provide integral coolant in 
the IMU, a rol l  bonding and passage inflation .technique was decided upon. F i r s t  
at tempts were promising, but the design was not ready for initial re leases .  A 
welded coolant passage was designed, but fabrication problems with the design lent 
impetus to  the ro l l  bonding technique which became incorporated a t  an  ear ly  poin-t 
in Block I produc-tion. 
3. 1 .6  ISS System Design 
Considerable effort was spent in making available a s  many backup modes a s  
possible. Usage of segments of the sys tem with other segments currently opera-ting 
was a ground rule.  The use  of the IMU a s  an at-titude reference without .the computer 
was a l so  incorporated. 
An ear ly  attempt was made to put in manual AV steering by a visual 
monitoring of the Y and Z PIPA outputs. The astronaut would manually align the 
IMU with the  X PIPA along the direction of thrust, then manually s t a r t  and stop the 
engine, s t ee r  to  maintain ze ro  AV along Y and Z, and time the burn for  the net 
A V  gained. There  were, however, operational problems with the design and 
associated with production. In the middle of Block I production, the above mentioned 
backup mode was dropped and the design was changed to  reflect it. Other backup 
modes were  retained but never utilized. All Block I flights were unmanned and no 
ability to utilize backup modes was available. The decision, a t  the advent of Block 
11, was to remove many of these modes of operation and concentrate on the pr imary 
mode of operation. 
The tes t  and checkout of -the ISS were carefully controlled f rom a number of 
standpoints. Commonality of t e s t  equipment wherever possible was incorporated. 
Care  was .taken to have -the sys tem a s  close t o  i-ts operating configuration a s  
possible. It was not possible, however, .to attain exactly that configuration. Later  
testing of the complete G&N system was to  be in the spacecraft configuration, a 
decision which was difficult .to implement in the beginning but was well worth .the 
effort in the end. 
In order  to check for adequate mechanical and thermal design, electrical  
sys tem functioning, and overall sys tem performance, several  IMUs were 
constructed, which included an engineering functional model and a produc-tion model. 
Such multiple model construction permitted evaluation of various design phases to 
proceed simultaneously. 
The performance requirements for .the Inertial Subsystem and the G & N  
sys tem were not clearly specified by NASA. The e r r o r  analysis of the trajec-tories 
and ea r ly  mission studies were  conducted by MIT, and reasonable specifications 
were  applied. 
There  was no target  to hit a s  with an ICBM. For  entry, the ships moved 
to pick up the spacecraft ,or there was a little extra  fuel to  cor rec t  for steering 
e r r o r s  resulting f rom inert ial  performance. This proved to be both a help and a 
hindrance. The hindrance, of course ,  was that MIT had to make decisions 
without a l l  the program information available when necessary.  It helped in that 
i tems could speedily be decided upon, and, of course,  MIT gave more  consideration 
to  the detailed mission requirements. F r o m  an  inert ial  performance standpoint, an 
analysis of the e r r o r s  resulting f rom the IMU revealed that moderate performance 
could be required for manned missions. The most cr i t ica l  parameter  was the 
gyro bias drift, and that was the resul t  of the long time lapse between alignment 
and the thrust  termination. Rather l a rge  e r r o r s  in acceleration sensitive gyro 
drif ts  could easily b e  tolerated a s  well a s  moderately large  PIPA scale  factor 
e r r o r s .  Moderate accelerometer b ias  e r r o r s  could a lso  be tolerated. A decision 
was made to  hold a moderately tight iner t ia l  performance specification because of 
two factors:  (1) the ear ly  flights were  to  be unmanned, and i t  was not known when 
nor  what mission would be flown, and ( 2 )  the tighter performance was more  
conducive to higher reliability. Indeed, experience showed that on the unmanned 
flights, because of the variety of missions,  a different e r r o r  component was 
predominant for each unmanned mission. Many early decisions made during Block I 
production was possible based upon knowing the mission for which the sys tem was 
scheduled. It was possible t o  avoid retrofi t  cos ts  and speed up the deliverable 
hardware when the mission was known. For  example, the backup A V  lights were  
eliminated ra the r  than retrofitted because of the unmanned first flight with the G&N. 
The requirement for maintaining the IMU at  operating temperature a l l  of the time 
was examined both ear ly  and late in the program. Because of the various opera- 
tional and handling requirements, i t  was burdensome to keep the IMU always a t  
operating temperature.  There  were two reasons  for this requirement. The f i r s t  
was one of not knowing the performance effects of cooldown and warmup. Subsequent 
t e s t s  showed that the IMU could probably survive if the temperature did not go 
below 70°1?. However, there were some detrimental effects f rom gas generation in 
PIPS a s  a result  of lowered temperature,  but these were corrected by subsequent 
design changes, Based on th is  reason alone, constant maintenance of IMU 
operating temperature  seemed a good decision but no longer i s  considered so. 
The second reason for this requirement was the lower volume compensation 
limit of the P I P  and IRIG bellows. Temperatures outside of the operating range 
tended t o  damage the component. This temperature l imit  for the PIP,  the higher 
of the two, was about 6 5 ' ~ .  A study of the environmental conditions showed that 
it was possible to  go below this temperature.  Since protection to stay above this 
temperature  was more  difficult to obtain than maintaining operating temperature,  
the la t ter  method prevailed. 
Selecting the basic timing signals to be available f r o m  the computer and the 
resultant  frequencies of operation for  the synchronized power supplies was an 
ear ly  fundamental decision; once made, changes could not be accepted without 
ser ious  consequences. The decision was to  have an 800 Hz gyro wheel; al l  e lse  
was to be  a binary multiple of that. The suspension signals fo r  the IRIG and P I P  
then would be  ei-ther 3200 Hz o r  6400 Hz a s  in the previous Air  Force and Navy 
work. However, this  decision in any future program should be carefully weighed 
pr ior  to  commitment. 
The design and re lease  to manufacture of the signal conditioners to be used 
for  sys tem checkout and telemetry considerably lagged the remainder of the G&N. 
This caused the late re lease  of the harnesses  and "work arounds" to compensate 
for lack of telemetry measurements during G&N factory checkout. 
3. 2 Block I ISS Development 
3.2.1 General  Chronology 
During the Fa l l  and Winter of 1961 - 1962, the ISS concepts described in 
Section 3. 1.6 gradually evolved into design requirements.  Preliminary design 
information from North American Aircraft Corporation (who was selected in 
November 1961 to design and build the Apollo Spacecraft) concerning interfaces 
and environment was made available. Material  in this category was distributed in 
MIT/ IL1s in-house Apollo document, AGANI ' , during October, November, ,January, 
and February.  At the same time, NASA's Langley Space Task Group was makmg 
available ea r ly  reference trajectories for Saturn I flights SA-7 through SA-11. It 
is of in teres t  to note that plans then called for MIT/lL1s System No. 5 to fly a s  a 
passenger on Mission SA-9 in 1964. System No. 6, a lso  in 1964, was to be flown 
on Mission SA- 10 a s  a 7-day manned orbital flight. 
' Apollo Guidance and Navigation Informa-tion. 
Once the basic accelerometer  and gyro designs were chosen and the three-  
gimbal IMU configuration decided upon, the design effort in specialized a r e a s  could 
proceed. Although much of the basic inert ial  subsystem was derived f rom the 
Polar is  Guidance System design, the Apollo requirements differed from the very 
beginning because of the interface with the astronauts.  Therefore, much conceptual 
work had to be  done during 1962 to define the sys tem modes and the display and 
control means available to the astronauts.  
In -the Block I system, the elec.tromechanica1 CDUs were  a bas ic  element 
in displaying IMU gimbal angles to  .the crew and in commanding gimbal angles in a 
coarse  align mode. Design work on the CDUs and the related mode switching 
resulted in initial definition in  November 1962. At -that time, -the three  ISS CDUs 
were  s t i l l  interchangeable with the two optics CDUs. Later  on, the two designs 
became differen-t because of special  optics requirements and because -the inflight 
r epa i r  policy was dele.ted. 
The ear ly  ISS development models, in accordance with the development 
plan, included a Thermal Model, a Mechanical Integrity Model, a Vibration Model, 
and a Subsystem Prototype, ISS #4. Around this framework of developmental 
models, the design and fabrication effort moved forward during 1962. This section 
includes some of the highlights of the Block 1 design phase. An overall pattern of 
progress  is visible f rom the general  concept to the specific design. 
In October 1961, the overall  sys tem was identified a s  having an  inert ial  
measuring unit (IMU), a sextant (SXT), an Apollo guidance computer (AGC), a 
power and servo assembly (PSA), a sun finder assembly (SFA), final approach 
equipment (FAE),  an  angular momentum wheel (AMW), and communications (CMM). 
The SFA, FAE, AMW, and CMM did not survive the initial sys tem concept. In 
January of 1962, an initial procedure was identified for alignment of the IMU during 
prelaunch, inflight, and lunar countdown phases (at  this ear ly  stage, the Apollo 
program had not yet settled on the lunar orbit rendezvous mission mode). The five 
Block I ISS modes of coarse  align, fine align, CDU zero,  attitude control and 
entry were well-defined in mid-1962, and in November of that year  a first proposal  
for a switch configuration was published. Fur ther  consideration of switch design 
and moding considerations led t o  a final mode-switching circuit  design in November 
1963. The Block I ISS block diagram evolved gradually f rom an initial version in 
December of 1962 to a well-defined concept by May 1963. A mas te r  layout wiring 
diagram for the IMU was initiated in July 1962 and was the bas is  for IMU harness  
design, slip-ring wire assignment, and IMU connector selection. 
The analytical work involving the relationship between inert ial  component 
performance and position and velocity dispersions could not get underway until 
NASA nlissioa and trajectory designs were  made firm. As early a s  July 1961, a 
preliminary es t imate  suggested that the then existing inert ial  state of the a r t  
would probably mee t  general  Apollo mission requirements.  Unfortunately, the 
initial p ressure  and ground rule did not permit  careful  consideration of technological 
gains in inert ial  components which were  then available and could have been 
incorporated. 
In November 196 1, preliminary gyro performance specifications had been 
agreed upon. Actual e r r o r  studies began ear ly  in 1962. The entry maneuver 
was studied f i r s t  because its general  nature was predefined and it would be the 
most cr i t ica l  for  Apollo inertial subsystem performance. Results for this mission 
phase were published in  June 1962 followed by a study of lunar orbit injection 
performance brought out in July. By ear ly  1963, the Apollo mission definition was 
in a state which permitted analysis of other mission phases, such a s  translunar 
injection, lunar landing, and lunar take- off. These resul ts  were made available 
in March. At the same t ime, the e r r o r s  involved in the process  of fine aligning 
the IMU in space with the optics had been scrutinized. An e r r o r  budget applicable 
to  th is  process  and including both IMU and optical e r r o r s  was published in February 
1963. 
Consideration of .the attitude reference sys tem be-tween the Guidance and 
Navigation system and the spacecraft began ear ly  in the program. Only in Block I1 
did NASA call  fo r  direc-t control of reaction control sys tem jets and the service  
module propulsion sys tem by the G&N system, which -then became -the pr imary 
Navigation, Guidance and Control System o r  PNGCS. Actually, early in Block I 
.there were some abortive studies of direct  links between the G&N system and the 
spacecraft  attitude and propulsion systems,  but finally .the Block I attitude e r r o r  
signals went only to  the Command Module Stabiliza-tion and Control System !SCS). 
By August 1962, this attitude e r r o r  interface was defined a s  using the 
G&N c a r r i e r  frequency of 800 Hz. The basic configuration of -the resolver chain, 
which generated s teer ing e r r o r  signals f rom -the IMU and CDU resolvers ,  was 
defined by September of thxt year.  A preliminary design of the complete a-ttitude 
e r r o r  network was available in March 1963. 
A specification of the IRIG performance requirements was identified a s  
early a s  November 1961. The adoption of the Polar is  25 IRIG design for Apollo 
enabled specification work t o  begin on the pulse-torquing requirements which were  
crucia l  in the mission because of the multiple in-flight alignments. Specifications 
were  firmed up for the pulse-torquing electronics by May of 1962. In March 1963, 
pulse-torquing tes ts  of the Apollo IRIG indicated that there would be a problem of a 
bias shift depending on the sign (positive o r  negative) of the l a s t  pulse command. A 
requirement was generated fo r  a computer pulse sequence that would always end 
with two positive pulses for bias rese t ,  even for a negative command. 
Turning now .to a consideration of the IMU, the transktion f rom the Po la r i s  
design t o  Apollo requirements proceeded quite rapidly. An inventory of required 
gimbal mounted electronics was published in December 1961 followed by an IMU 
wiring diagram in July 1962 and detailed specification of IMU/ GME connectors in 
October of .that yea r .  Estimates of gimbal friction torque in January 1962 and of 
IMU gimbal moments of inert ia in August helped wtth the design of .the stabilization 
amplifier circuits .  Bode plots of .the stabilization loop dynamics were  published in 
preliminary f o r m  in September 1962 and in final form, July 1963. 
During the s a m e  period, negotiations were underway with vendors for the 
design, development and procurement of torque motors,  single and multi-speed 
resolvers ,  and sl iprings for the Apollo IMU. The procurement effort involved 
agreement on implementation of NASA's stringent quality assurance requirements 
for  manned spaceflight hardware.  In this connection, concern a r o s e  about the sl ip 
r ings  t o  be used in the IMU. These cr i t ica l  elements were  extremely compact and 
yet  had to c a r r y  45 to 50 conductors in a noise-free, low-resistance manner.  One 
vendor had a product submitted fo r  Apollo consideration which had a history on other 
programs of unidentified contaminant growth. After review of the situation, this 
part icular vendor's component was disqualified for Apollo use. 
In December 1962, work on the temperature control of the Apollo IMU began 
with a general  examination of the duty cycle and heat balance. T h e f o 11 ow i n  g 
April, specifications based on the IRIG and PIP  requirements were made available 
t o  the  temperature control designers.  Electronic design of the redundant termperature  
control sys tem then proceeded. There  was a one-wire mechanization diagram avail- 
able in October 1962, followed by the re lease  of individual circuit  design proposals 
and specifications the following January and February. 
Packaging considerations for  the ISS electronics, a s  contained in the PSA, had 
to  follow the availability of overall  circuit  concepts. F i r s t  es t imates  in this a r e a  
were  made available in March of 1962. In November of that year ,  a preliminary 
PSA envelope s ize  was published along with a breakdown of this volume into 
eight "blocks". Concepts changed a s  more  of the interface with the North 
American Command Module was identified, By April 1963, the Block I PSA had 
assumed i t s  final form factor of 10 trays, which were  removable in space for in- 
flight repair .  
3.2.2 ISS Development Problems 
Details about the ear ly  subsystem integration and .test operations involving 
the Block I Inertial Subsystem a r e  included in .this section. The mater ia l  presented 
is indicative of -the kind of problems that emerged during developmental testing. 
Although these  specific problems were unique .to -the Apollo Block I ISS, their 
general  nature provides worthwhile guidelines to other developmental programs. 
A breadboard version o.f the GSE (Ground Support Equipment) was partially 
built by AC Elec-tronics (then known a s  AC Spark Plug) in Milwaukee and given 
final form at  the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory. Test  cables were cons-tructed and 
a prototype computer simulator fo r  providing clock pulse generation and output 
pulse shaping was fabricated by .the Raytheon Company. 
System testing of inert ial  subsystems was conducted to evaluate the 
fundamental soundness of the sys tem design, evaluate preliminary test  methods, 
t r a in  engineers, uncover problem a reas ,  and evaluate design changes. The 
following problems were encountered and correct ive  programs initiated: 
(1) Torque pulses in one Pulsed Integrating Pendulum Accelerometer 
(PIPA) loop were observed to couple into other PIPA loops. This problem was 
substantially reduced by shielding the P I P  torquer l ines within the IMU between 
interaxis sl ip r ings and by changing certain sl ip r ing assignments. 
(2)  The PIPA loop moding was found to be bistable, oscillating between i t s  
design value of 3 :3 and a value of 4:4. An increase in PIPA damping coefficient 
f rom 80,000 to 120,000 dyne-cm/rad/sec  was initiated to insure solid 3:3 moding. 
(3) The 3200 Hz pulse width modulated temperature control system, 
carrying substantial power, was observed t o  generate 6400 Hz spikes 
which could be observed throughout .the system. 
(4) The alignment and calibration of the gyros required modification of the 
original t e s t s  so  that large  e r r o r  signals f rom the two gyros not under test would 
not couple through a common IRIG preamp output to b ias  the values measured on 
the part icular gyro being tested. Appropriate hardware changes were requested for 
the production Apollo Ground Support Equipment (GSF:) to provide gyro caging 
capability to maintain low gyro e r r o r  signals on those Instruments not under test. 
( 5 )  Attention was given to  noise levels on the torque motor voltages. Viiith 
the long ISS t es t  cable runs,  the levels were typically 10 to 1 2  Volts peak-to-peak. 
300 k Hz oscillation on the IRIG e r r o r  outputs was reduced to  an acceptable low level 
by floating the individual shields along the interconnect cables to reduce existing 
cable line capacitance. 
(6 )  Gimbal frequency response plots displayed secondary resonances by the 
middle and outer gimbals at 40 and 35 Hz which were  not predicted by the l inear  
t ransfer  function for  IRIG e r r o r  response to a tes t  input. 
This t ransfer  function had a first order  lead t e r m  in the numerator a t  161 
rad / sec  and a second order  denominator t e r m  at  278 rad / sec  with a damping 
ra t io  of 0. 8. Although i t  is not now possible to determine the exact test conditions, 
these  data do show an effect which, in Block 11, was established a s  an OA coupling 
phenomenon. 
(7 )  A synchronizing transient was found when going f rom the coarse  align to  
fine align mode which i s  in excess of the expected transient resulting f rom coarse  
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align loop standoff and IRIG float stops. This transient caused up to 10 of gimbal 
angle offset and was attributed to a capacitor charge a t  the torque drive amplifier 
input of the servo amplifier .  This capacitor charged up in the coarse  align mode 
f rom the demodulated IRIG e r r o r  signal and discharged upon entering the fine align 
mode. To prevent this l a rge  coarse-to-fine align synchronization transient f rom 
taking place, back-to-back diodes were used that dissipated the residual capacitor 
charge a t  the t ime of t ransfer .  
(8)  It was found that the middle and outer servo loops could be forced into a 
6 Hz oscillation, depending upon the magnitude and phase of the IRIG e r r o r  prevailing 
a t  synchronization. This problem was solved by the separation of power and signal 
grounds within the se rvo  amplifier modules. 
( 9 )  In ear ly  closed loop P I P  performance checks, i t  was discovered that the  
breadboard three  axis  loop, which was packaged in a single drawer,  produced dc 
loop crosscoupling, which was almost entirely eliminated after  "prototype" packaging 
was incorporated. 
(10) The suspension power supply required a hlgher output voltage which was 
provided by increasing the output t ransformer  turns ratio. This kept the suspension 
loop in the l inear operating range after  allowing f o r  additional cable and sl ip r ing 
resis.tance in the forward and feedback l ines.  
(11) Angular Differentiating Accelerome.ter (ADA)--The ADA is a damped 
torsional m a s s  that senses  inert ial  rotation under its own dynamics. The device 
has  a low pendulosity, preferably zero.  The problem cited a r o s e  during the 
acceleration phase of .the IMU qualification program. The IMU was on a centrifuge 
mounted rigidly t o  -the a rm.  During centrifuge testing, the gimbals oscillated with 
a frequency equal to  -the rotational frequency of the centrifuge. It became apparent 
.that the ADA mounted t o  -the gimbal was nonrotating and a s  such was under the  
influence of a rotating acceleration. With i t s  pendulosity, the response was a s  if 
it were in inert ial  rotation with attendant stable member  misalignments. A quick 
check revealed that .there were  no ro-tating accelerations for  any missions -that, wi-th 
the specified allowable ADA pendulosities, would give any problem. 
(12) Testing done i n  backup mode showed that the suspension Irequency 
was not held closely enough to maintain instrument centering a s  shown by excessive 
instrument quadrature levels and PIP timing pulses not compatible with loop 
operation. This backup mode was dropped f r o m  the sys tem about February 1964 
before fur ther  circuit evaluation was continued. 
(13) Tuning capacitors were required a t  the encoder outputs to make them 
l e s s  sensitive to  cable impedance matching effects which resulted in double-pulsing 
of the encoder. 
(14) A great  reduction of 6400 pps noise was attained by putting 0. 1 uf 
a c r o s s  the temperature loop proportional control t ransis tor  and had the effect of 
increasing the temperature current  r i s e  time. The improvement in noise a t  the 
PSA was by a factor of six with little improvement found within the ZMU. 
(15) A capacitor was required a c r o s s  the suspension supply line at -the s-table 
member .to tune -the 2V 3200 Hz suspension input and permitted the suspension line 
to  be phase-adjusted to the computer genera-ted interrogate pulse train timing. This 
change resulted in more  optimum .timing within the torque-to-balance loops. 
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' The backup mode for  the ISS assumed that the Apollo Guidance Computer had failed 
and a l l  power supplies were  free-running. 
(16 )  A modified stable member  ha rness  featured shortened and twisted 
emergency and control heater lines, paralleled sl ip ring assignments on the 
dlicosyn excitation, changed suspension feedback location to permit  bet ter  
balance of the individual component suspension voltages, and P I P  and 
IRIG torquer l ines  a s  twisted pai rs .  After an evaluation of these changes, a 
large  reduction of the 6400 pps noise within the IMU was made by additional 
shielding incorporated a t  the intergimbal axis assemblies.  
(17) An evaluation was made of additional stable member  mounted hea te r s  
in which individual inert ial  component temperature  gradients were measured with 
respect  to the stable member  orientation. F i r s t  runs  were  made a t  high and low 
power conditions using the normal  average IRIG sensor  controller  without the 
stable member  heaters .  Then both average IRIG and average P I P  temperature 
control was evaluated a t  both extreme power conditions using the stable member  
heaters.  The test  resul ts  showed that by using the additional stable member  hea te r s ,  
average deviations of instrument temperatures  versus  stable member  orientations 
were  reduced f rom 1 . 5 ' ~  to l e s s  than 0 . 5 ' ~ .  This testing was mainly concerned 
with the scale  factor sensitivity of the PIPA loop to temperature,  showing a 
difference between ear th  component calibration and the units performance in a z e r o  
gravity environment. 
(18) The PIPA torquing loop was found t o  display an effect that caused the 
appearance of a deadzone about null during .the issuance of torquing commands. 
The effect resulted f rom the interroga-tor which was a th ree  state logic device with 
a binary switch maintaining the torquing current  in the direc-tion consis-tent with the 
l a s t  directional interroga-tor switch command. The problem a rose  when a smal l  
c r o s s  coupling of .the interrogator switch output with the -torquing pulse line 
occurred.  Thus the resultant  torquer current ,  applied during an interval when the 
interrogator was commanding, differed slightly f rom the torquer current  applied 
during an  interval  that the interrogator was not commanding, but -the binary switch 
was maintaining the direction of the las t  interrogator command. This effect 
called AKO (Alternating Kickoff) presented considerable problems in using the 
instrument for  detecting the gravity perpendicular plane required for PIPA bias  
and alignment measurements.  Design changes were made to correct  th is  problem. 
(19) An evaluation was made using a two level PIPA loop turn-on involving 
an initial low torquing current  turn-on before the normal  loop turn-on (See 
Section 3.3 .2) .  This change had the effect of centering the float before applying 
full torquer cur ren t  thus reducing the normal closure current  hysteres is  effects in the 
torquer until float-to-case alignment o r  torquer pole alignment was obtained. 
Further ,  this change introduced significant PTPA loop bias performance 
improvement and was incorporated into Block I design. 
By the spring of 1964, NASA's Apollo Program plans had matured, 
pract ica l  resul ts  f rom the Mercury program were  available, and the final 
requirements on the PGNCS were  being released. It was during th is  period that 
NASA and MIT/IL initiated discussions about a Block 11 version of the Apollo ISS. 
The genesis and direction of the Block I1 effort a r e  discussed in Section 3.  3 .  
This section completes a brieP chronological review of Block I Apollo ISS 
design and development milestones. In March 1964, nearly a l l  ISS production 
drawings, procurement specifications and tes t  procedures were  released. Block I 
entered i ts  production phase during 1964 a s  AC Electronics Corporation and the 
MIT/IL design team turned pr imari ly  t o  the Block I1 design and development effort. 
However, continued support of the Apollo industrial contractors,  Sperry, and AC 
Electronics was provided in the process  manufacture, assembly, final test, 
reliability tes t ,  and qualification test. Similarly, a s  the Block I sys tems moved 
into an  installation phase a t  the North American plant a t  Downey, California, and a 
checkout, countdown, and launch phase a t  the Kennedy Space Center, MIT/IL 
design staff members  assumed temporary o r  long-term responsibilities in support 
of sys tems in the field. 
3.  3 Block I1 ISS Development 
As the Apollo development became more  advanced, a number of factors 
made a block change of design desirable. F r o m  the beginning,a block change 
concept was visualized a s  being inevitable, since the Block I design was created in 
the absence of many necessary  guidelines and specifications. In July 1962, NASA 
changed the lunar landing concept f rom the earth orbital  rendezvous to the lunar 
orbital  rendezvous technique. Accordingly, in November 1962, Grumman 
Aircraft  Engineering Corporation was selected to build the lunar module (LM). The 
MIT/IL system would provide navigation, guidance, and control. Thus, the LM 
concept made an obvious block change point for NASA's Apollo Program. 
In June 1964, MIT/IL was asked to proceed with a Block I1 design for  the 
command module a s  well a s  the LM. F o r  both vehicles, the sys tem was given 
direct  interfaces with the gimballed pr imary propulsion systems, a s  well a s  the 
reaction control jet c lus ters .  
3 . 3 .  1 Ciianges f rom Block I to Block I1 
3 .  3. 1. 1 IMU Design. MIT proceeded to make suggestions a s  to possibilities for 
incorporating into the Block I1 package certain significant changes. NASA a t  the 
s a m e  time was viewing what they saw a s  possibilities for changes. NASA asked 
that  MIT build a smal ler ,  lighter IMU. After studying the possibilities, MIT 
recommended that by keeping the same stable member ,  the IMU could be reduced 
by about 113 in weight with a corresponding reduction in diameter of 14 inches 
to  12  inches. The resolver  chain simplification that came with the CDU changes 
permitted a reduced number of resolvers .  The combining of 1 and 16 speed 
reso lvers  onto the  same r i m  reduced by three -the number of resolvers ,  leaving 
only one resolution and th ree  angle measuring units in the IMU. The removal 
of .three -torque motors  and .the ADA's (Angular Differentiating Accelerometers)  
and ADA amplifiers made possible the shrinkage of .the intergimbal assemblies  to 
reduce .the overall IMU weight and size. The temperature  control sys tem was 
simplified thus reducing the amount of gimbal-mounted electronics. The IRIG was 
to have m o r e  compact c realignment hardware by incorporating the preamp design 
into the end cap hardware. The P I P  suspension module was redesigned to have an  
integral  assembly with a connector which would allow easy assembly of the P I P  
into the IMU. 
3. 3. 1. 2 PEA/PTA Design The LM installa-tion presented significant problems for 
the accelerometer  in  view of the seventeen feet of cable between the IMU and PSA 
o r  prepared PIPA electronics location. What was desired was a location c lose  to 
the IMU and on a cold plate with bet ter  temperature control. Discussions with 
GAEC revealed that  it was possible to put the PIPA electronics in an  assembly in 
the vicinity of the IMU and a lso  have its cold plate in s e r i e s  following the IMU, 
thus achieving a lower cold plate temperature  and a lower temperature deviation of 
the heat sink. The possibility of doing the same thing in the command module, was 
of course,  also considered. The electronic CDU was approved for  incorporation 
leaving the old CDU cold plate available which was in s e r i e s  right af ter  the IMU in 
the coolant loop and a s  such provided a colder, bet ter  controlled heat sink. Since the 
Block I1 design was to be humidity-proof, the concept of a sealed assembly was 
introduced necessitating several  changes in philosophy with respect  to the 
accelerometers.  There  would be  no further requirement for module interchange- 
ability. Because the sealed electronics package precluded final adjustment of 
accelerometer  b ias  and scale  factor a t  the ISS o r  G&N level, the computer 
compensation range was increased. 
3 .  3 ,  1 . 3  Block I1 Gyro. The most sensitive parameter  for the gyro was bias drift. 
Several changes,which were aimed .towards reducing -this term,  were incorporated 
into the Block I1 gyro design. Axial suspension was added, and radial suspension 
st iffeners were  tripled .to reduce float displacement with respect  to the case.  A 
r e s e t  winding was added t o  the torque generator, which, when excited with 
alternating current,  was effective in reducing the residual magnetism o-f pulse 
torquing -to a very low level. This residual effec-t was a source  of inconvenience 
in .the Block I instrument, for  i t  required two additional pulses, a plus and a minus 
that provided no net .torque on the float, but always left the -torque in a standard 
s-bate with a known fixed component of bias. Finally, a bias compensation winding 
was added .to newtralize the net ,total fixed bias and to compensate for reaction 
.torque changes resulting f rom voltage fluctuation of the signal generator and 
magnetic suspension excitation. 
Other changes included a m o r e  efficient signal genera-tor, and a redesign 
of the gyro prealignment hardware. The gyro wheel package was not changed. 
3. 3. 1.4 PSA Design. The Block I1 PSA packaging was changed drastically f rom 
the  Block I. All CDU electronics was removed f rom the PSA and much of the PIPA 
electronics. Since .the Block I1 PSA was no-t constrained by the requirement for an 
in-flight module replacement capability, i t  was designed a s  a he rme  tically sealed 
assembly. The LM PSA was s imilar  -to the command module Block I1 PSA, 
except .that it was smal le r  since i t  did not contain optical subsystem elec-tronics. 
3. 3. 1.5 Block I1 CDU. In 1963, an  effort -to replace the CDU gear boxes with an 
a l l  elec.tronics CDU was started.  This resolver  reading system was breadboarded 
and demons-trated to  NASA. A weight est imate of about 18 pounds was given for the 
configuration devised t o  duplicate .the elec-tromechanical CDUs. This estima-te was 
regarded a s  a significant weight savings. The sys-tem looked promising and NASA 
approved .the concept fo r  incorporation. Subsequently, a NASA decision to have a 
digital autopilot in both the LM and .the CM resulted in numerous changes to -the CDU. 
This and o-ther decisions increased the CDU weight .to its presen-t 3 7  lbs.  
3.3.1.6 Moding Capabilities. The new CDU and Apollo Guidance Computer (AGC) 
made numerous moding changes necessary  and desirable. IMU Cage was -to be -the 
only manual mode except for sys-tem turn-on and coarse  alignment. Everything 
e l se  was to be moded by the AGC. 
3,  3 .  2 Block I1 JSS Development Problems 
The breadboard Ground Support Equipment used for early Block I testing 
was modified, and additional t e s t  equipment and interconnect cabling were  assembled 
-to meet the new requiremen.t of Block I1 .testing. The second GSE utilized was with 
Class  A Ground Support Equipmen.t which was furnished by AC Electronics and 
officially modified fo r  .the Block I1 and LM systems. 
A breadboard LM ISS was assembled and used to perform a s e r i e s  of 
investigatory engineering tests. 
Thermal  .tests were conduc.ted to investiga.te required thermal  padding 
methods and t o  determine the location of the  stable member  thermostat  such tha-t 
the  individual component had minimum sensi-tivkties -to gimbal position. 
Experimental data of accelerometer  b ias  changes were taken a f te r  closing 
the  loops both f r o m  the null position and af ter  storage in the plus and minus one 
gravity position. Similar data were  taken by closing the loop with reduced torquing 
current  for a one minute period and then returning to the normal  torquer current  
using the same closed loop positions. Results of this testing showed that the low 
current  closed loop position had improved bias  stability. This change was 
incorporated into both Block I and Block I1 PIPA loops. The reason for  this 
improvement is believed to  have resulted f rom acquiring torquer pole alignment 
during the period of operation using reduced torquing current  thus producing lower 
hysteres is  effects. 
To save IMU power throughout the t ranslunar  phase of the mission, .the L M  
sys tem was mechanized such that -the suspension was shut off until 90 seconds 
before PIPA loop closure.  The effec-t of -this turn-on was studied and i t  was 
determined that the sensitivity of PIPA loop bias  to  this .type of turn-on was not 
significant. 
Block I1 and LM G&N testing began in October 1965 and continued until 
July 1966. Some of the more  significant resul ts  of that testing a r e  l isted below: 
(1) Expected high and low +28 Volt dc bus ISS variation in the LM was 
2 4 .  5 V d c  to 32. 5 V dc at  the Grumman G&N interface. This bus tolerance 
compares to a 25. 8 V  dc to 31. 8 V  dc ISS bus voltage variation a t  the C / M  interfacae. 
Because the LM buss  tolerances were  changed during the ISS design phase, and the 
voltage available a t  a part icular power supply was about one volt lower than was 
available at  the G & N interface,  the PIPA loop pulsed torque power supply (PTPS) 
required redesign to maintain voltage regulation over the l imi ts  of the expected 
LM bus tolerance.  Loss  of voltage regulation on the PTPS would have resulted 
in  significant PIPA loop bias and scale factor performance degradation. 
( 2 )  The PIPA loop quadrature levels could not be verified i n  the system from 
P I P  stat ion calibration. Fur the r  checks showed that  the stable member  wiring 
and s l ip  r ing reass ignments  between the suspension l ines and the instrument 
e r r o r  signals reduced the  quadrature levels i n  the system. 
(3)  The r e s e t  coil of the P I P  was removed to  reduce the effects on the 
deviation of scale  fac tor  a s  a result  of excitation suspension overvoltage. 
(4) During this  period, P I P  and IRIG p e r f ~ m a n c e  data were  accumulated. 
Alignment t r ans fe r  measurements  from the t e s t  a r e a  into the  system were  a l so  
made of the PIPS. 
(5) A se rvo  loop oscillation problem was found during coarse-to-fine 
align moding on the middle gimbal. I t  was l a t e r  determined that loop oscillation 
could be induced on a l l  axes  with gyro float angles of from 100 s e c  to  about 600 
s e c  and, fur ther ,  was sensit ive to gyro temperature  which caused a 5%/OF' change 
in  the gain of the t r ans fe r  function. After the problem a r e a  was identified, i t  
could be  induced on a l l  Block I1 sys tems tested. 
To provide stable operation fo r  l a r g e  input signals,  nonlinear compensation 
was provided by parallel  signal diodes in  the forward path of the se rvo  amplif iers,  
The breakdown voltage of these  diodes was about 40C mV. This voltage permitted 
the servo to be driven well into saturation before diode breakdown reduced the 
amplif ier  gain resulting in  a sustained gimbal oscillation. 
Bringing the breakdown level of the diodes down to 250 mV resulted in  good 
loop performance a t  synchronization, yet the breakdown point was high enough 
to insure  an  adequate l inear  region of operation when considering both possible 
demodulator imbalance and the variations of the diode breakdown point with 
tem perature.  
(6)  A comparison of the ability to  obtain se rvo  loop frequency response  
resul ts  using the normal GSE recorder  to that of a Boonshaft and F'uchs se rvo  
analyzer was made. The resu l t s  indicated a favorable comparison. 
(7) Tes t s  were  performed which determined that IMU gimbal r a t e s  up to 
1 2 . 5  radians per second could be attained from an IMU cage command. The r a t e  
l imitat ion of the se rvo  loop resulted from the torque motor back EMF. 
(8) It was  discovered that both the middle gimbal and outer gimbal torque 
motor voltage noise levels and the associated loop frequency response  varied a s  a 
function of the position of the inner gimbal. A study of the gyro orientation and the 
gyro  output equations, which were  combined in  the gyro e r r o r  resolver  on the 
inner  gimbal, revealed that the e r r o r  voltage applied to the middle gimbal and outer 
gimbal torque motors  was a function of twice the inner gimbal angle. The other 
e r r o r  t e r m  always present  in  the gyro output equation was the OA coupling term 
which will always appear and could cause this  type of trouble in any system i f  
careful  consideration isn't  given to gyro output axis inert ia.  T o  eliminate the 
sensit ivi ty of the gyro loop t r ans fe r  function gain to inner gimbal angle, the Z 
0 gyro  was physically rotated about i t s  output axis by 180 . Mechanically, this  change 
necessi tated installing a new se t  of alignment pins, displaced 180' from the old ones,  
a t  the s table  member .  To maintain loop phasing, the Z gyro suspension voltage 
input was reversed,  and the torquer l ines were  reversed a t  the Z gyro ha rness  
connector of the stable member .  
(9)  Problems were  experienced with the IMU mounting bolts a s  a resul t  of 
binding of the mounting screw at  the IMU mounting hole. Alignment bushings were  
added to  effect accurate  IMU-to-navigation base  alignment, and to preclude binding, 
sufficient clearance between the mounting bolts and the bushings was maintained. 
3 .4  Reliability 
3 .4 .  1 Scope 
MIT organized a n  effective Apollo Reliability program that utilized accepted 
pract ices  and controls to ensure  that the reliability inherent in the system design 
was of the highest attainable. Fur the rmore ,  every effort was taken to a s s u r e  
that the reliability initially achieved would not become degraded during development 
and productlon. The f l r s t  steps taken to provide NASA with sys tem reliability 
commensurate with mission success  and crew safety requirements was the 
preparation of the Guidance and Navigation Reliability Program (R-349). This 
document defined the specific levels of effort, MIT responsibilities, and the role 
of the participating contractors in the Apollo reliability program. In short ,  R-349 
established the program in which MIT was responsible for  administering and 
controlling the  design, development, production, shipment and field use  of G&N 
systems. It was shown therein that the participating contractor's function was to 
provide MIT wi.th reliability support f rom their facilities within the scope of their 
negotiated contracts with NASA. 
The scope of the G&N reliability program was established by NASA in NCP 
250-1 (Reliability Program Provisions fo r  Space System Contractors)  and was 
implemented by MIT, the G&N industrial contractor, AC Electronics Division of 
General Motors and directed subcontractors, Raytheon Company and 
Kollsman Instrument Corporation. All aspects  of this program were applicable to 
a l l  elements of Apollo airborne hardware and mission essential  ground support 
3. 4. 2 Design Review 
To assure  that the potential for reliability existed in the design, and to 
achieve ear ly  maturity in design, considerable emphasis was placed on the design 
review aspect of the program. The Design Review Board (DRB) consisted of the 
G&N Technical Director and his  designated design group heads. Each design 
group head in turn called upon design engineers and contractor personnel in his 
a r e a  of responsibility to  cover the design being reviewed. The membership of the 
board was of personnel capable of providing a total assessment  of the design under 
consideration. An MIT reliability group representative and a sys tems group 
representative were always present a t  D R B  meetings. In addition to the technical 
aspects  of the design, other i tems considered were  interface compatibility, 
logistics, suitability for fabrication, assembly test o r  use, and reliability. 
All documents describing o r  applicable to guidance and navigation hardware 
including layouts, engineering drawings, specification control drawings, procure- 
ment specifications, p rocess  specifications, assembly and test procedures, circuit  
schematics,  and wiring and logic diagrams were subjected to a design review pr io r  
to the time of re lease  o r  change. Essential  reliability factors and principles of 
design considered in the Design Reviews were a s  follows: 
(1) Fai lure  modes, probable cause and effect, 
( 2 )  Protection against human initiated failure o r  induced failure f rom other 
causes.  
(3)  Standardization of design and par ts .  
(4)  The elimination of inherently unreliable components. 
(5 )  Use of known mater ia ls  and processes.  
(6) Component par t  application and derating. 
( 7) Producibili ty 
( 8) Maintainability 
(9) Simplicity 
(10) Safety and human engineering. 
( 11) Conformi-ty t o  environmen.ta1 specifications. 
The complete details and operating procedures of the MIT Design Revlew 
Board a r e  contained in MIT Report R-496 (Design Review Procedures) .  Included 
therein a r e  mechanical and electronic design review check l i s t  forms,  electronic 
component s t r e s s  analysis form, and DRB report  form.  
The contractors augmented the MIT effort described above by reviewing a l l  
designs for considerations of producibility, optimization, standardization and 
additional reliability of quality assurance and elements. They conducted design 
reviews to great  depth on elements of the sys tem f o r  which they were delegated 
design responsibility. Recommendations stemming f r o m  contractors1 reviews 
were  processed by them through the MIT engineering groups and then through the 
MIT DRB. 
All design re leases ,  drawings, specifica-Lions, and documents associated 
wkth manufac-ture fabrication, and test  of Apollo Guidance and Navigation equipment, 
and a l l  changes tha-t were made on these documents issued f r o m  the formal 
procedures of the Change Control Board. Configuration management, control and 
identification requirements were defined by NASA in document N P C  500-1. The 
procedures used by MIT to implement those requirements were defined in MIT 
repor t  E-1087. 
3. 4. 3 Reliability Testing 
The design environment within which the Guidance and Navigation was 
required to operate was defined in Interface Control Documents (ICD) negotiated 
between MIT and the spacecraft  contractors,  North American Rockwell Corporation 
and Grumman Aircraft  and Engineering Corporation. North American was 
responsible for the Command Module and Grumman Aircraft  & Engineering for 
the Lunar Module. The design environments included such things a s  acceleration, 
vibration, shock, temperatures,  humidity, pure oxygen environment, electrical  
input power, and p ressures .  Since these were negotiated ear ly  in the program when 
the anticipated environments were largely unknown, the ICD design l imi ts  were 
generally conservative. 
Design evaluation testing was conducted ea r ly  in the design phase on 
mockups, prototypes and f i r s t  ar t ic le  development hardware to a s s u r e  that the 
equipment a s  designed did indeed possess  the integrity and have the capability to 
meet and exceed performance requirements,  and to determine and define margins 
and limitations of the design in excess of requirements.  The design of each 
element was rigorously examined with regard  to thermal evaluation, mechanical 
integrity, marginal voltages, vacuum, functional and operating characteristics, 
stability, alignment, sys tem integration and interface, and other peculiar 
character is t ics  o r  environments such a s  humidity, salt ,  contaminants, and 
electromagnetic interference to which a part icular element i s  sensitive. 
A formal Qualification Test  Program was established to provide maximum 
assurance that the G&N equipment performed its required functions under the 
environmental conditions for the Apollo Mission. ND 100203 7 (Apollo Airborne 
Guidance and Navigation Qualification Specification) identifies the elements of the 
G&N system and the block configuration to be qualified to each type of environmental 
s t r e s s  level. In general, the total G&N system was qualified to nominal mission 
levels,  and the subsystems and subassemblies were qualified to design levels with 
overs t ress  in cr i t ica l  environments. P a r t s  were qualified to a design level  with 
emphasis on ability to determine par t  quality. The qualification c r i t e r i a  for par ts  
were establishedby: (1) the expected maximum s t r e s s  level  anticipated in the worst 
case  sys tem application, ( 2 )  and adequate margin of safety, and (3) the degree to 
which a measure  of quality in the manufacturing techniques was desired. 
Separate reliability programs were conducted for  the I R I G  and PIP. They 
a r e  discussed in the IRIG and PIP sections of this survey. 
3 .  4. 4 Reliability Analysis 
During the conceptual phases of the MIT design effort, considerable 
reliability analyses were  performed on the Apollo mission and various design 
approaches o r  sys-tem configurations .to es-tima-te mission success  probabilities. 
Techniques of redundant computers, IMUs, and inflight maintenance were 
considered. As a result  of these  studies, i t  became readily apparent tha-t mission 
reliability requirements for guidance could be  attained without ei ther major 
redundancy within the sys tem o r  inflight maintenance if the reliability of two system 
elements could be significantly improved over current  experience, namely, the 
computer micrologic and the gyros used in .the IMU. 
The micrologic problem was attacked by a searching test activity leading to 
an  understanding of the various failure mechanisms prevalent in the devices. 
Correction methods and control of supplier processes  incidental to the fabrication 
of these devices were instituted followed with special screening tests  on a lot bas i s  
where dropouts were classif ied and special  c r i t e r i a  imposed to allow judgment on 
the acceptability of each lot for Apollo flight hardware. 
MIT's analysis of the Apollo mission and experience with gyros in 
ballistic miss i le  guidance sys tems clearly indicated a positive technique of 
assuring that each flight gyro would have an MTBF inflight in  excess of 100,000 
hours. An exhaustive test  program was conducted t o  study the effects of turn-on 
and turn-off versus  continuous running on performance parameter  degradation and, 
in addition, develop a technique of predicting impending failures.  Using this test 
data a s  a bas i s  for  selection, the performance data on the total  population of Apollo 
gyros were evaluated and c r i t e r i a  evolved f o r  comparing the performance history 
of a specific instrument against the ent i re  population thus allowing a highly confident 
assessment  of a specific gyro 's  reliability over the next several  hundred hours of 
operation. Such an  assessment  was made periodically on each gyro in service  and 
shortly before committing any gyro to a flight mission. 
3 .  4 - 5  Mxterials 
During the hardware design phase, MIT established a "Material Review 
Board' '  very s imi la r  in nature -to the Design Review Board previously mentioned. 
This board, comprised of qualified engineers, chemists,  metallurgists ,  and 
reliability experts,  functioned to review all  mater ia ls  selected for use in the 
guidance sys-tern design. All mater ia l  was considered for i ts  potential effect 
upon the vehicle eiivironment, i ,  e . ,  outgassing, toxicity, flammability, com- 
bustibility, and interface compatibility with other materials .  Areas  of question 
a s  .to suitability in .the design were  resolved by test and experiment. As a result ,  
mater ia ls  having undesirable character is  tics were  elimina-ted f rom the design, 
-thus generating the highest confidence in acceptabili-ty of remaining mxterials. 
3.4.6 Component P a r t s  
During initial design s tages  of the guidance system, MIT employed a 
specialized team of reliability engineers to work directly with design engineers 
in the selection and application of par ts .  P a r t s  were  procured only f rom approved 
and qualified vendors. Throughout the Apollo program, a l l  sources  of supply for 
pa r t s  were  s t r ic t ly  controlled by MIT. New par t s  a s  required were extensively 
evaluated and ultimately qualified for Apollo usage. This effort included the 
preparation and re lease  of very s t r i c t  specifications of each par t  for use in 
fabrication of flight sys tems.  
In addition, MIT established and implemented, with the support of 
participating contractors,  a sys tem for  controlling the processes  and fabrication 
techniques employed by suppliers of a l l  par ts  having a cri t ical  application within 
the Apollo guidance system. This effort, which was largely successful, has been 
responsible f o r  assuring uniform quality levels of purchased piece pa r t s  and 
components procured f rom time to time throughout the duration of the Apollo 
program. 
There were two basic sources  of information to ass i s t  the designer in the 
selection of a purchased part .  The f i r s t  was the Qualification Status List, (QSL), 
ND 1002034 which provided par t  identification and status of qualification. 
The second source of information was the Standard P a r t s  Manual. This 
manual contained the procurement specification control drawings (SCD) on all  
par ts  lis-ted in .the Qualifica-tion Status List  a s  well a s  other nonpreferred i-tems 
.that were  being used on other projects.  Before any nonpreferred par t  could be  
used, it had .to be added -to .the project QSL. 
In the event a designer could not find an appropriate part ,  desired 
additional interpretation on information found in the two documents mentioned above, 
o r  wished to use a nonpreferred par t ,  he had to seek assistance from the 
Reliability P a r t s  and Materials  Group. This group consisted of par ts  specialists  
whose job was to control the qualified suppliers list and be aware of the capab~l i ty ,  
quality and availability of pa r t s  in their part icular field. This awareness Included 
"state of the a r t "  exotic devices a s  well a s  time-honored, standard mili tary par ts .  
An individual of th is  group worked with the designer in the identification and 
selection of the  required par t s  and many times could offer assistance in vendor 
contact and expedite sample procurement. This same individual, upon agreement 
of the designers that the pa r t  was indeed suitable, would initiate the request  for 
documentation. 
The p rogram Quality Assurance requirements f o r  suppliers of pa r t s  and 
mater ia ls  was delineated in Apollo G&N document, 10 15404,which imposed rigid 
configuration, process  and Quality Control requirements.  These requirements 
were  divided into three  categories:  c lass  1 (cri t ical) ,  c l ass  2 (semi-cri t ical) ,  and 
c lass  3 (noncritical). Class  1 was invoked for p a r t s  that contributed greatly to 
mission reliability o r  had widespread usage. Class  2 was specified fo r  pa r t s  that 
were  potential contributors to mission failure but were not used extensively. C lass  
3 was usually reserved for  noncritical mechanical hardware items. J)ocumented 
and enforced supplier control was required for p a r t s  in c lass  1 and 2, which had to 
be negotiated. The contractors implemented this aspect  of the program and assumed 
the responsibility for monitoring supplier quality by means  of surveys, inspection 
data and documentation control. Included in documentation control was traceability, 
mater ia l  lot and/or  age control, and process  controls. The category of each pur- 
chased i tem was identified on i t s  specification control drawing. 
3.4. 7 Failure Reporting and Corrective Action 
The Apollo Guidance and Navigation Failure Reporting and Corrective 
Action System is described in g rea t  detail, complete with forms and implementation 
procedures in MIT report  E-1322. F o r  this reason, jus-t a short  summarization 
with an accompanying flow char t  i s  presented in this document. The requirements 
of E-1322 were  effective for MIT and each of the contractors beginning wi-th 
acceptance tests  at -the assembly level  and continuing throughout equipment life. 
Regardless of location, -the current  fai lure repor ts  were  given appropriate 
dissemination to MIT and the contractor whose hardware may be involved. The 
original copies of -the fai lure repor-ts were collected and correlated a t  the Guidance 
and Navigation Data Center. Failure analysis and correct ive  ac.tion responsibilities 
were  assigned by the respective contractors and effec-tiveness monitored by c r o s s  
correlation to  individual failure repor ts .  Any i tem that had no-t received appropriate 
analysis o r  correct ive  action remained a problem a r e a  and was periodically 
reviewed. E-1322 a lso  contained information relat ive to how the accumulated data 
were handled and analyzed in order  to present meaningful failure information and 
trend indications, 
A s  the flow chart  in Fig. 3-4 a lso  indicates, fai lures o r  discrepancies 
occurring during in-process fabrication, assembly,  o r  test within the contractors '  
organizations were  handled with the individual contrac tor t  s internal  reliability 
procedures unless they were of sufficient import  to warrant consideration under the 
plan described in this document. The detailed implementation procedures and a 
definition of this activity were contained in the contractor ts  quality plans. 
Fai lures  occurring during the design and development phase a t  MIT were 
reported to the MIT reliability group on the shor t  foi , in  see  Fig.  3-5) for cataloging 
a:ltl following proper corrective action. Information pertaining to significant 
development fai lures was transposed by the Reliability Group to the G&N failure 
fo rm a s  required by the G&N failure reporting and corrective action system (E-1322) 
and transmitted to the G&N data center for processing a s  par t  of that system. As a 
result ,  a l l  significant fai lures occurring during design verification tests, qualifi- 
cation tests ,  and t es t s  on deliverable end i tems o r  spares  were included in this 
system. Not necessari ly included, unless of special  importance, were data f r o m  
breadboard evaluation, and par t  and mater ia l  design evaluation. 
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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE O F  TECHNOLOGY 
A P O L L O  GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 
MALFUNCTION R E P O R T  F O R M  
Description of Trouble: 
Sub-assembly Name 
Failed P a r t  
P a r t  Operate Hours 
Cause:  
Action Taken: 
Submitted by 
Group 
Ser ia l  No. 
Value 
Figure  3-5 
Description of Oper. Conditions 
Location 
Manufacturer 
Date 
Mfg P a r t  No. 
Section IV 
INERTIAL, SUBSYSTEM (ISS) COMPONENTS 
4 . 1  Pulsed Integrating Pendulous Accelerometer (PIPA) 
4. 1.1 General  Description. 
The PIPA (Pulsed Integrating Pendulous Accelerometer)  used in the Apollo 
Inertial Measurement Unit was a single degree -of-freedom specific force integrating 
receiver ,  which operated closed loop a s  a torque-restrained pendulum. The ins t ru-  
ment consksted of a pendulous float magnetically suspended in a viscous fluid, s ig-  
nal generator and torque generator microsyns,  and associated electronics and cal -  
ibration modules. Figure 4-1 is a schematic diagram of t.he Pulsed Integrating 
Pendulum (PIP). 
The pendulous float was a hollow beryllium cylinder with built-in m a s s  imbal-  
ance. F e r r i t e  r o t o r s  were mounted at  each end of the float and supported the mag-  
netic suspension and microsyn functions. The float was surrounded by heavy fluid 
that  provided both a buoyant support and viscous damping. 
An applied specific force along the input axis of the pendulum caused a r o -  
tation about the output axis. This rotation was sensed by the signal generator and 
used a s  an  e r r o r  signal to  initiate a response from the torque generator. 
A cutaway view of the complete pendulum is shown in Figure 4-2. The pendu- 
lous m a s s  was  mounted on the periphery of the float and extended into a smal l  
groove in the damping block. The width of the groove allowed a maximum float 
rotation of f lo of a rc .  The magnetic suspension s t a to r s  were  positioned opposite 
the inside portions of the ro to r s  and formed part  of a coaxial s t ructure  with the 
torque generator on one end of the instrument and the signal generator on the oppo- 
si te end. Four  bellows provided for  volumetric compensation of the damping fluid 
between loOc - 71°c. Two alignment r ings  on the end of the instrument permitted 
accurate positioning of the input axis of the PIPA relat ive to  the mounting surface.  
The instrument was  aligned to the mounting ring before incorporation in the IMU. 
The overa l l  block diagram showing the pendulum within its control loop is 
presented in  Figure  4-3.  The signal f rom the signal generator was amplified and 
used a s  a n  input t o  a sampler  (called the interrogator)  which sampled the signal at  
d iscre te  t imes  determined by the guidance computer. J3 the signal exceeded ei ther 
PENDULOUS 
MASS SIGNAL 
TORQUE 
GEN'RATOR FLOAT [ GENERATOR 
OUTPUT AXlS 
z-- 
* 0 A 
INPUT AXlS 
I A 
PIVOT TO 
CENTER OF 
MASS LINE 
Fig. 4- 1 Pulsed Integrating Pendulum Schematic 
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the positive o r  negative threshold of the interrogator,  a command pulse was sent to 
the torque generator switch, The switch, in turn,  commanded the proper polarity 
current  to the torque generator of the instrument and nulled out the e r r o r  signal  
from the signal  generator.  The switching t imes were  precisely controlled by the 
switching pulse t ra in .  The torquer current  magnitude was coritrolled by an  u l t r a -  
s table  dc cur ren t  loop. Torque was  applied to the float in d iscre te  increments,  and 
fo r  each increment ,  a pulse was generated and sent to  the computer to provide a 
continuous monitoring of the total torque applied to the instruments.  
4. 1. 2 Operation. 
4. 1. 2. 1 Magnetic Suspension. The PIPA made use  of two quasi-elastic magnetic 
supports  to properly position the neutrally buoyant float within the case.  A c ross  
section of the magnetic s t ruc tu re  used is shown in Figure 4-4. This figure depicts 
the unique fea ture  of separated suspension and transducer functions using a single 
coaxial s t ructure .  Radial and axial  centering was produced by action of the suspen- 
s ion magnetic field on the inner surface of the tapered rotor .  
4. 1. 2 . 2  Signal Generator. Float  rotations were  sensed by a n  angle-to-voltage t r ans -  
ducer called a signal  generator.  A c r o s s  sectional view of the signal generator 
s t a to r  and rotor i s  shown in Figure  4-5. The pr imary coil of the signal generator 
(SG) was wound in  s e r i e s  around each of the eight s ta tor  poles. The flux paths s e t  
u p  by these  poles were  typified by the flux paths shown in the figure. The SG secon- 
da ry  coils were  wound such that the even-numbered poles were  180' out of phase. 
If the contoured outside diameter of the ro tor  was perfectly centered and at  z e r o  ro -  
tation relat ive to the s t a to r  (as  shown in Figure 4-5),  the total signal induced in the 
secondary of the SG would be zero .  If a rotor (float) rotation occurred in ei ther the 
positive o r  negative direction, a corresponding in-phase o r  out-of-phase output was 
obtained a c r o s s  the SG secondary,  since the reluctance seen by the positive second- 
a r y  poles was no longer equal to  that seen by the negative poles. 
4 .1 .  2 . 3  Torque Generator. Except for  the way the coils were  wound, the torque 
generator (TG) c r o s s  section was identical to that of the SG. The position of the TG 
coils and resultant  flux paths for  positive torque a r e  shown in  Figure  4-6 .  Since 
only one torquer  was on a t  any t ime,  there  were  two minimum-energy rotor  positions: 
one for positive torque, and one f o r  negative torque. The rotor  always tended to 
l ine  up a t  the minimum-energy position opposite the working poles. However, the 
frequency of switching allowed only a minute oscillation about a center  point midway 
between the minimum energy points. The torque produced was proportional to the 
square  of the flux linking the ro tor  poles and thus was a function of the square  of the 
torquer current .  
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The resulting torquing loop was a two-state o r  binary loop with torque 
applied continuously in ei ther positive o r  negative directions. The mode of 
oscillation of the float was determined by the design parameters  of the instrument. 
If m pulses occurred alternately in each direction, an  m:m mode was declared to 
exist. 
The velocity equivalent of one torque pulse was defined a s  the scale factor 
of the instrument having the units of cm/sec/pulse.  Inequalities in the positive and 
negative torquing circuits  caused an  imbalance in the resulting output pulse t r a in  
(with no input). The measure  of this imbalance was defined a s  the bias. Bias was  
usually defined in  t e r m s  of a n  equivalent acceleration applied to the float; e. g. , 
a bias of 1 dyne cm is equivalent to a n  acceleration of 4 cm/sec2  applied to a 
float having a pendulosity of 0. 2 5 gm cm . 
4. 1. 2.4 Ducosyn Flux Patterns.  Figure  4-7 shows the flux pattern present in the 
ducosyn. The heavy lines represent  the flux paths fo r  the odd poles (+ torque) and 
the dashed l ines represent  the flux paths for the even poles ( -  torque). Also shown 
a r e  the flux paths fo r  the magnetic suspension. Since the rotor was a single f e r r i t e  
piece, these fluxes were  al l  superimposed in the rotor.  The single piece fe r r i t e  
ro tor  used in the Apollo PIP  allowed interaction of the suspension and torquer 
fluxes. Assymmetr ies  in the superposition of these fluxes in the ro to r  could have 
caused variations in  PIPA bias which were  dependent upon the phase relationship 
of the fluxes. Operation in the r e v e r s e  torquer configuration ( reversa l  of current  
flow in one torque winding) brought about a symmetric superposition of fluxes which 
would be  almost independent of phase and would have reduced any bias changes to 
second order .  
Three  different conditions of flux were  present in the s ta tor .  The flux 
existing in the poles was the on-off type, a s  shown. The flux in the back i ron 
section, b, d, f and h,  reached a dc level  once the unit was turned on. (This 
condition remained constant except fo r  a slight transient that occurred at switching 
intervals. ) The flux in sections a ,  c,  e and g was a n  alternating one. The s ta tor  
flux magnitude should not have changed regardless  of the torquer winding that was 
being energized; only the duty cycle of the positive and negative pulses should 
have changed. Changes in the permeability of the ducosyn mater ia ls  would cause  
variations in the flux magnitude resulting in changes to the sca le  factor and bias.  
Permeabil i ty changes could have occurred a s  a result  of transient overshoots in the 
torquer  o r  suspension currents  a t  system turn-on and by s t r e s s e s  incurred a s  a 
resul t  of slow curing of microsyn encapsulating materials .  

4 .  1, 2 . 5  Electronics,  A functional description of the electronics involved with P IPA 
operation i s  depicted in the control-loop block diagram, Figure  4-3 .  The fi l tered 
SG signal  was amplified by the preamplif ier  and a c  differential amplif ier  and sent 
to the interrogator.  The interrogator utilized a dual channel peak detector that  was 
synchronized by the interrogator pulse t ra in  from the computer o r  system clock to 
determine the polarity of the signal from the a c  amplif ier .  The outputs from the 
peak detector controlled the s t a t e  of two multivibrators that commanded either 
positive o r  negative torque from the switch. 
The binary current  switch controlled the direction of the current  flow from 
the cur ren t  source  in  accordance with the commands received from the interrogator.  
A switch pulse-train synchronized the switching of the second multivibrator s tage  in 
the interrogator such that the pulses of current  sent through the t2rque windings 
were  of equal width. 
The current  loop is expanded in Figure 4-8. The output of the switch was  
sent  to the calibration module. This module provided the necessary  passive com-  
ponents to make the torquer coils of the PIP appear purely res is t ive  thus controlling 
switching transients and optimizing current  stability. Bias adjustment was obtained 
by u s e  of the res is t ive  shunting circuit.  Fine padding of the res is t ive  loads, R1, in 
s e r i e s  with the torque windings, allowed equalization of the t ime constants, T I  and 
The voltage drop a c r o s s  the sca le  fac tor  (SF) r e s i s t o r  was compared with a 
precision voltage reference (PVR).  The e r r o r  voltage was amplified by a high-gain 
dc differential amplif ier  and used to control the current  magnitude i n  the loop. 
4. 1, 2 . 6  Mode of Operation. Initially, the Block I Apollo torquing loop was designed 
a s  a three-state o r  t e rna ry  loop with no torquing pulses applied to  the float if the 
output of the a c  amplifier was l e s s  than the interrogator threshold. This approach 
was taken to conserve spacecraft  power. Testing of the ea r ly  PIPAs revealed that, 
a s  a resul t  of the magnetic hysteres is  of the torquer s ta tor  and ro to r  mater ia l ,  a 
significant residual  flux remained in  the c o r e  when the torquing cur ren t  was removed 
and caused the instrument to  show la rge  bias variations that were  dependent on the 
polarity of the l a s t  applied torquing pulse. I t  was further determined that the r e s i -  
dual effects could b e  largely eliminated if al ternate torquing were  imposed contin- 
uously on the torquers  thus creating a near ly  constant average magnetic s t a t e  in  the 
mater ia ls .  Consequently, a decision was made to establish a binary loop to neutra-  
l i z e  the effects of the hysteres is .  
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4.1, 3 Problems and Solutions, 
4.1.3. f Scale Factor  Instabilities. (I) Torque Current  Overshoot - - Torque current  
t rans ients  in  excess  of normal operating current  levels will change the permeability 
of ducosyn magnetic mater ia ls  by raising the operating level  on the B-R curve. Th i s  
phenomenon was identified ea r ly  in the program. It resulted f rom the finite Lime 
required fo r  the torquing electronics to  stabilize during turn-on and a lso  because of 
the decay character is t ics  of the electronics during turn-off. Design changes were 
made in  the electronics which limited these transients to  acceptable levels. 
(2) Excitation Overshoot -- Superposition of torquer  and suspension fluxes in 
the f e r r i t e  ro tor  can resul t  in  portions of the ro tor  being pushed f a r  into saturation 
if an  excitation overshoot occurs  a t  the t ime  one torquer is full-on. This phenomen- 
on was  demonstrated a t  both the microsyn and completed instrument levels. The 
complexities of the IMU ci rcui t ry  thus f a r  has  not permitted the demonstration of 
th is  phenomenon at  the system level. However, data analysis plus experimental 
evidence that large  scale  fac tor  and bias shifts occurred frequently a c r o s s  IMU turn-  
off and turn-on, gave indications that excitation overshoot effects  were  a definite 
possibility, 
(3) Long T e r m  Drift -- Long t e r m  curing of the torquer microsyn encapsu- 
lating mater ia l  caused variations in the s t r e s s e s  exerted on the torquer stator by the 
encapsulant. The permeability of the torquer stator varied a s  a function of the 
change in s t r e s s e s  with a result ing <hange in the scale factor of the instrument. The 
scale factor change was initially about -150/ppm/month but exponentially decayed t o  
nearly ze ro  in 12 t o  18 months. The magnitude of the scale factor change was p re -  
dictable once a history of scale factor measurements of the unit w a s established 
and accounted for. 
(4) Pendulosity Change - -  On severa l  ea r ly  Block I1 units, the hollow float 
used i n  the PIP was not adequately sealed and damping fluid leaked into i t s  interior.  
The presence of damping fluid in  the float produced a variable additive component 
of pendulosity. Since scale factor is inversely proportional to pendulosity, a l a rge  
and unstable change i n  scale factor resulted. The sealing technique used with 
these units was  devised for a l e s s  viscous adhesive than was  actually used resul t ing 
i n  an  improper adhesive flow and a poor bond. An improved sealing technique w a s  
developed, however, which corrected this  problem. 
4.1. 3 . 2  Bias ~ n s t a b i ~ i t i e s . ( l )  Excitation Overshoot -- A s  discussed in the previous 
section, excitation overshoots could have occurred i n  the Apollo IMU. If the ro to r  
saturation caused by the overshoot affected both torquers  equally, only a scale factor 
shift  would have occurred.  To  the extent that the saturation effects were  asymmet-  
r ica l ,  a bias shift would result.  
( 2 ) Ac Hysteresis - - The te rm ac hysteresis is applied Lo bias variations 
caused by suspension fluxes coupling through fringe portions of the rotor when the 
float i s  allowed to rotate to an angular stop. This effect was controlled by adequate 
specification of the magnetic properties of the rotor material. 
( 3 ) Position Memory - - Position memory was an acceleration bias exhibited 
by the PIPAs. Position memory caused a bias change of 0 . 1  cm/sec2 for an accel- 
erometer input ranging from 0 to - + 1 g. The change in position memory bias as  a 
function of imput acceleration was predictable and thus was compensated for since 
the expected acceleration profile was known. It was thought that eddy currents in 
the stator were a contributing factor to position memory. The eddy currents caused 
the flux levels in the stator to be frequency dependent. In the presence of an accel- 
eration, the frequency of the binary torquing (either plus o r  minus ) would vary and, 
a s  a result, the average flux levels would likewise vary. The net result was an ac-  
celeration dependent imbalance between the plus and minus torquing loops. A possible 
cure fo r  this phenomenon is currently under investigation and involves using a torque 
generator s ta tor  material  of higher resistivity thus reducing the magnitude of the 
induced eddy currents.  Preliminary tests indicated that this approach has some 
merit .  
( 4 ) Reversal of Torque Location - - The original PIP design had the torque 
generator located at the end of the instrument that contained the mounting arrange- 
ment. It was noted that bias changes were affected by s t resses  applied to the torquer 
by the clamping forces used during PIP alignment. The torquer was placed on the 
outboard end of the PIP, and a major source of bias changes was removed. 
( 5 ) Fluid Impurities - -  Contaminants o r  gas bubbles within the damping fluid 
can become positioned between the float and the case of the PIPA exerting e r ro r  
torques on the float. Proper filling techniques would minimize the possibility of 
foreign particles in the fluid at  the time of manufacture. Gas bubbles could result 
from a i r  leaking into the instrument from outside o r  from helium gas leaking into 
the fluid from the hollow float o r  from the bellows. 
A cemented metal band was used to seal  the joint between the two end housings 
of the PIP. This joint, a s  well a s  the float and bellows seals, was carefully checked 
before filling the unit with damping fluid. Filling the instrument was accomplished 
through small  f i l l  holes at either end of the case. Once filled these holes were sealed 
using metallic compression seals.  
By use  of the above Lechniqiue, the possibility of air leaking into the ins t ru-  
ment was virtually eliminated, Slow leakage f rom the float could easi1.y be kept to  
acceptable levels with known cementing and fabrication techniques. 
The bellows remained one of the most cr i t ica l  elements in the design. Rigid 
screening t es t s  on the bellows and careful inspection by X-ray techniques a l t e r  
completion resulted in bellows failures becoming r a r e  occurrences.  
4.1.3.3 Input Axis Instabilities. ( 1 ) Fluid in the Float  - - As discussed in the above 
section on scale  factor  instabilities, some Block I1 units leaked damping fluid into 
the hollow float resulting in pendulosity changes. The pendulosity changes were both 
in magnitude and direction, the  directional changes causing an IA shift within the  
unit. In the case  of these units, the IA shifts obtained were  large  (> 10 zn). 
( 2 ) Fluid Behind Rotors - - During the Block I1 program, a minor IA shift 
problem was discovered on some units. The ra te  of IA shift was in most cases  l e s s  
than 20 =/ day. The cause of the shift was traced t o  the  existence of smal l  crevi-  
c e s  behind the rotor  which became only partially filled with damping fluid a t  the t ime  
of fill. The fluid within these crevices was then f r e e  to  move within a limited channel 
behind the rotor  a s  a function of the position of the instrument relative to the gravity 
vector. Recent changes in the rotor  assembly technique were expected to eliminate 
this problem. 
( 3 ) Suspension Hang-Up - -  Suspension hang-up is caused by the a i r  gap be- 
tween the suspension s ta tor  and rotor  on a given suspension becoming large  enough 
to  cause  the unit t o  operate at ,  o r  slightly beyond, resonance. Because of build 
tolerances which cannot be easily tightened, a smal l  possibility exists  that an  Apollo 
pendulum may hang-up if the  float  is allowed to sett le into an  axial extreme. As a 
precautionary measure ,  a l l  PIPS were required to pass  a suspension hang-up t es t  
which insured that the float would re-center  f rom any possible r e s t  position. 
( 4 )  Temperature  Sensor  - -  After severa l  fa i lures  with the original sensor ,  
it became apparent that the sensor  leads should have been attached to  the flat  wire 
sensor  on the  P I P  with a s t ra in  loop. This design change was complied with ear ly  
in production. A res is tance check using a megohmmeter was introduced in o r d e r  to  
eliminate any unit which might have suffered a shorting-type failure resulting f r o m  
assembly pressures .  
( 5 ) Moding Change - -  Utilization of the binary torquing loop in the Apollo 
PIPA resulted in a stable oscillation of the float about its null, o r  minimum TG 
output signal, The number of torque pulses occurring during each positive o r  
negative going half-cycle was an indication of the  operational mode; i. e .  , two pulses 
alternately in  each direction was defined a s  a 2 :2  mode. The mode actually obtained 
f o r  a given instrument was dependent on a number of parameters ,  including the 
angular moment-of - inert ia of the f10s.t~ the T G  sensitivity, the magnitude of the 
torque pulse, and the viscous damping. 
E a r l y  Block I units moded a mixed 3:3 plus 4:4. The presence of the  4:4 
mode required additional computer t ime.  Accordingly, the viscous damping in  the 
PIPA was increased to  a value which would insure  the  elimination of the 4:4 mode. 
( 6 ) Gaussing - -  Gaussing is a t e r m  used to  describe bias changes resulting 
f r o m  variat ions in  the magnetic s t a t e  of the  TG r o t o r /  s t a to r  pair .  The ro to r  opera tes  
a s  pa r t  of the  suspension and torquer  magnetic circuits .  Current  overshoots in 
ei ther of these  two c i rcui ts  would have produced non-reversible changes in the  mag-  
netic operating point of the ro tor  mater ia l .  Fur thermore ,  l a rge  changes in  ro to r  
orientation such a s  torquing of the  ro to r  to  a ro tary  stop because of a malfunction 
in  the torquing circuit  would have caused changes in  the magnetic s ta te  a s  a resul t  
of disaccommodation. :% 
In an  adequately controlled environment, gaussing would not constitute a 
problem. However, the Apollo sys tem was not immune to transients ( particularly 
during turn-on, turn-off sequences) ,  and gaussing did occasionally occur. 
Theoretically, degaussing is the elimination of a gaussed condition by the 
application of a high level  a c  flux to the torquing circuit.  The flux level  is reduced 
gradually to  z e r o  and in theory should resul t  in no magnetic hysteres is  in the mater ia l .  
In practice,  however, the  mate r i a l  was found to  exhibit s o m e  residual  hysteres is  
a f t e r  degaussing. If the degaussing operation was always performed in an identical 
manner,  a fixed residual  was obtained, with a corresponding repeatable bias level. 
However, s o m e  variat ions normally occurred in the  manual degauss cycles with 
resultant  bias variations. The u s e  of a n  automatic degausser optimized the degauss 
cycle repeatability and normally resulted in a stable reference bias level. 
4. 1.4 P I P  R e p a i r l ~ e d e s i g n  Program.  
An improved configuration was developed fo r  the PIP repa i r  program. The 
redesign was instituted in  an  effort to eliminate fai lures result ing from bubbles and 
accumulations of fluid in  o r  around the float. Sample instruments were  built and 
*~isaccornmodat ion i s  a time-dependent variation in  the permeability of a magnetic 
ma te r i a l  following a change in the  magnetic field within the mater ia l .  
the design was verified, NASA then contracted with Sperry to do fai lure analysis  
and verification, rebuilding and testing of 50 PIPS, the majori ty of which were  
internal  r epa i r  units. 
4 ,  1.5 Conclusions 
With the experience of seven y e a r s ,  numerous conclusions may be drawn 
regarding the good and bad features of the program. 
(1) Since the basic P I P  represented a m o r e  sophisticated version of the 
Po la r i s  P IP ,  which had been in production fo r  some t ime,  most technical problems 
occurred in  external  a r e a s  of the new instrument such a s  modules, cabling, con- 
nectors and alignment r ings .  
(2 )  The importance of a reasonable degree of personnel and organizational 
stability cannot be  overemphasized. MIT maintained a constant group on the task,  
whereas  the Sper ry  engineering and production groups experienced some shifting of 
personnel. The program by and l a rge  was a successful  one, certainly to the extent 
that changes, improvements,  and correct ions ,  where required,  were  integrated into 
production with a minimum of impact to a n  uninterrupted delivery of PIPS to the 
program. 
( 3 )  Monitoring of instrument performance i n  the field, coupled with a n  active 
fai lure analysis  and correct ive  action program, provided the m eans for revealing 
any deficiencies i n  the design o r  construction of the instrument.  As the quantity of 
occurrences  of each recognized example of degraded performance o r  field fa i lure  
reached a stat ist ically meaningful total,  analytical and correlat ive techniques be- 
came effective i n  diagnosing the basic cause of the problem thus permitting appropri-  
a te  corrective action. 
(4) Any reliability t e s t  program aimed a t  determining the life character is -  
t ics  of a component such a s  the Apollo accelerometer  must  be most carefully planner 
and executed if meaningful resul ts  a r e  to be achieved. The 16 P I P  life t e s t  prograrr 
was initiated with the purpose of determinimg a n  MTBF for this  component of the 
Apollo guidance sys tem.  
The planning of this  t e s t  program proved difficult from the very  beginning. 
F i r s t ,  there  were  no recognized normal field fa i lure  modes fo r  the 16 P IP .  The 
build process  and the acceptance tes t  cycle was designed to eliminate the likelihoc 
of electr ical  shor t s  o r  opens and particulate ma t te r  i n  the damping gaps,  these bej 
the only recognized fai lure modes. With only nine units assigned to the program, 
i t  was recognized that thousands of hours of operation might well generate no fai lures 
at all, This turned out to be the case. Performance limits were therefore set up ,  
more o r  less  arbitrarily, to provide some measure of the operational reliability of 
the instrument. Some attempts were made to determine environmental effects but, 
because of the Limited number of sample units available, no definitive results could 
be obtained. Because of the unavailability of a sufficient number of regular test 
consoles and the desire to avoid impacting the acceptance testing schedule, special, 
relatively inexpensive, electronic run-in equipment was designed and constructed. 
The instvuments were operated on a long term,  continuous basis on this s e t -  
up and transferred to a regular test  station at periodic intervals for official data 
checks. Puzzling performance differences were noted when comparing results ob- 
tained at the electronic run-in station versus those secured at the console test  
station. The inconsistencies in the data could not be explained by the test  and 
engineering information then available. Eventually, the reasons for these inconsis - 
tencies were learned, and it was then apparent that the life test  setup was not suitable 
for evaluating the instrument performance. The effort was therefore terminated. 
4.1.6 Recommendations 
The results of seven years  of experience with the 16 PIP MOD D, a s  used in 
the Apollo guidance system, have shown the instrument to be basically an excellent 
one fo r  the intended purpose. The effect of system interfaces on performance have 
been throughly studied. The deficiencies of the instrument have, to a great extent, 
been revealed and corrective action taken to eliminate o r  minimize them. 
A limited number of conditions sti l l  remain for  which an explanation and 
effective corrective action have not yet been developed. 
( 1 ) Analysis of repair unit failure data revealed that a sizable percentage of 
units experienced a shift in uncompensated bias in excess of that which could be 
ascribed to test  equipment variation. Investigation into the cause of this shift should 
determine whether the shift is stable, thus permitting the use of these instruments 
and eventually allowing development of corrective action to eliminate this condition. 
( 2 ) Certain anomalies in the bias performance characteristics have been 
identified a s  resulting from disaccommodation in the ferrite material o r  the PIP rotor. '  
Work is underway to improve the magnetic structure of the ferr i te  in order  to mini- 
mize the disaccommodation. 
( 3 ) Certain other anomalies in the bias performance characteristics do not 
appear to  be related to the disaccommodation phenomenon, and the cause i s  a s  yet 
undetermined. This anomaly is identified as  position memory. 
( 4  f There  is another magnetic effect associated with gaussing which causes  
both bias and sca le  fac tor  variat ions in performance. An effort to make u s e  of an  
u l t r a - s  ensitive airbearing torque -to -balance loop in  a n  attempt to identify and quan - 
tify th is  effect is underway. 
4.2 Inert ial  Reference Integrating Gyro ( IRIG) 
4 . 2 . 1  General  Description 
The Apollo Block I IRIG was basically a modification of the type of gyro 
used in  Polar is ,  that  is, a single degree of freedom, floated integrated instrument.  
Its wheel assembly was supported by a pa i r  of preloaded angular contact ball bea r -  
ings adjusted to  give an  isoelast ic s t ruc tu re  having equal compliance along the spin 
and output axes. It was enclosed in a sealed, spher ica l  beryllium float. The wheel 
assembly was driven by a hysteres is  synchronous motor  in an atmosphere of helium 
which prevented corros ion of the f e r r o u s  pa r t s  and a lso  provided good heat  t r a n s -  
f e r  within the  float. The float assembly was suspended in a brominated fluorocarbon 
flotation fluid which provided flotation and damping. The fluid was fractionally 
distilled to  yield polymers of approximately the s a m e  length and nearly the s a m e  
viscosity. This minimized fluid stratification under operating and s torage conditions. 
A ducosyn a t  each end of the  unit performed the task of signal and torque genera-  
tion. 
A ducosyn consists  of a separa te  magnetic suspension assembly,  a separa te  
t r ansducer  microsyn mounted a s  a single coaxial-coplanar unit, and contains two 
separa te  s t a to r s  mounted to  the  c a s e  and two separa te  ro to r s  mounted on a common 
ring on the f loat  assembly.  The signal  generator ducosyn was mounted on the posi -  
t ive output axis end of the float to  provide magnetic suspension and s e r v e  a s  a 
t r ansducer  to  provide an  e lec t r ica l  analog signal  proportional to the position of the 
float. A torque genera tor  ducosyn was mounted on the negative output axis end of 
the float to  provide magnetic suspension and s e r v e  a s  a t ransducer  to  convert an  
e lec t r ica l  e r r o r  s ignal  into a torque about the output axis.  
The IRIG character is t ics  a r e  summarized in  the following table. 
ELEMENT TYPE SPECIFICATIONS 
Wheel a s s  em bly 2 8  Volt, 2 phase, 800 Hz Angular momentum: 
6 2 0.434 X 10 gm cm / s e c  
a t  24,000 rpm 
ELEMENT 
Damper 
Signal generator 
Torque generator 
T Y P E  SPECIFICATIONS 
Brominated Fluorocarbon Damping coefficients: 
Density 2.38 5 gm/ cc  at 5 about OA: 4 - 7 5  X 10 dyne 
1 3 7 ~ ~  c m  / rad / s e c  
9 
about IA: 1 .5  X 10 dyne 
c m  / rad / s e c  
9 
about SRA: 1 .5  X 10 dyne 
e m  / rad / s e c  
8 pole 33-connected mic ro-  Angle sensitivity: 
syn 4V, 3200 Hz 10mV / m r  
1 2  pole modified E - torque sensitivity T (+) 
c o n n ection with r e s e t  o r  T ( - )  to  common: 
and bias compensation 0.6 dyne cm / m a  2 
windings. 
Magnetic suspension Tapered, 20' included Radial stiffness 6 gm / 
angle 0.0001 inch 
Axial stiffness 0.8 gm / 
0.0001 inch 
Temperature  Sensors  Two thermis tors  on Resistance: 
each end housing 345 ohms a t  137' F 
suspended in fluid Resistance gradient: 
6 ohms 1" F / thermis tor  
Mechanical Character  - (1) Shroud jacket: provides magnetic shielding and 
is t ics  vacuum envelope f o r  the gyro. 
Prealignment unit (2) Size: 2.810 dia X 5. 10 in. 
(3) Weight: 1.97 lbs.  
F igure  4-9 is an  illustration showing the main features  of the gyro instrument. 
During final  LRIG assembly,  a prealignment package was added to the signal genera-  
t o r  end of the  gyro case.  Addition of this package made the gyro a prealigned unit. 
The package contained the  following components : 
( 1 ) Suspension capacitors fo r  ducosyn suspension. 
( 2 ) Temperature  sensor  normalization. 
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( 3 )  End mount heater  prealigned to the gyro input axis. 
( 4 ) Torque genera tor  normalization. 
( 5 )  Signal genera tor  preamplif ier  with normalized gain. 
The gyro was prealigned on a t e s t  stand with the input axis aligned to a slot  
in  the mounting ring. The alignment was ca r r i ed  over  to the  IMU stable member  
where a pin was precise ly  located to  pick up the slot. The use  of prealigned com- 
ponents made assembly techniques s impler ,  and brought about excellent correlat ion 
between component and sys tem performance of the gyroscope. 
The prealignment hardware  consisted of a heater  and end mount assembly, 
signal  generator preamplif ier ,  and normalization networks (See  Figure  4-10 ). The 
heater  and end mount assembly maintained the gyro a t  proper  operating temperature  
and P e r f 0 r m e d the task  of accurately maintaining input axis alignment with r e  - 
spect  to  the IMU s table  member  o r  t e s t  stand. The preamplif ier  amplified the 
signal  generator output and normalized the signal  generator-preamplif ier  gain p ro -  
duct f o r  the instrument. 
The normalization networks adjusted the suspension current ,  torque genera tor  
sensitivity, bias compensation current ,  and temperature  sensing resistance.  The 
prealigned gyro constants were: 
( 1 ) Suspension current  phase : -45' + 3O 
- 
( 2 ) Temperature  indication a t  137' F :  769. 6 ohm + 1. 0 
4, 
- 
( 3 ) Bias drift adjustment: 0 +5 m e r ~ ' ~  
- 
( 4 )  Gyro t r ans fe r  function: 1200 & 30 m ~ / m r .  
( 5 ) Pulse  torque sca le  factor:  n /2" +500 ppm r a d /  pulse 
- 
4.2.2 Apollo I Gyro Problems 
The Apollo I gyro problems were  related f o r  the mos t  par t  to magnetic 
suspension, the torque generator,  and manufacturing. 
( 1 ) The gyro bias drif t  was different depending on which torquer  winding 
was excited l a s t  (posi t ive  o r  negative).  This was the resul t  of residual  magnetism 
left in the torquer  co re  a f t e r  torquing current  was removed. To compensate fo r  
this  drif t  component, the torquing was programmed t o  always end a torquing s e -  
+ quence in  the s a m e  direction, that is, the last  pulse was always a T . This left the 
bias torque resulting f r o m  the residual  magnetism phenomenon always in the same  
direction. The magnitude of this  t e r m  remained constant within reasonable bounds 
and was compensated f o r  by the  Apollo Guidance Computer. 
:; 
1 m e r u  = 1 rnilliearth ra te  unit = 0.015 degree lh r .  
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Fig. 4-10 Apollo I1 IRIG Prealignment Network 
( 2 ) The gyro floats displaced radially when the  torquer  was energized. 
This displacement resulted f rom asymmetr ies  that were attributable to  manufactur-  
ing tolerance buildup, and to  tolerances associated with how closely the magnetic 
suspension centering could be achieved. Some units that were displaced to  thei r  
jewel extremes during torquing resulted in up to  2% pulse torque scale factor  un- 
certainty ( The required stability was 0. 1%. ) The value of the magnetic suspension 
damping res i s to r  was correspondingly decreased to  stiffen up the magnetic suspen- 
sion thus reducing the radia l  displacement when the torquer  was energized. 
( 3 ) Some of the  f i r s t  units developed acquired suspension shor ts  to  the gyro 
end housing. These shor t s  were caused by insufficient insulation between the end 
housing printed circuit boards and the mu-metal  shields. This problem was recog- 
nized and corrected by providing more  clearance between the  printed circuit  pins 
and the mu-metal  shield, and by increasing the  thickness of insulation between the  
printed circuit  board and the shield. 
( 4 )  A design improvement increased the efficiency of the  gyro motor by 
changing the hysteres is  r ing mate r ia l  f r o m  Graphmo to  Simonds 73. Because of 
scheduling problems, th is  change c o u  Id not be incorporated into al l  units and r e -  
sulted in gyro units utilizing both materials .  The system wheel supply compensation 
had to be selected depending on the  distribution of gyros in the system using Graphmo/ 
Simonds hysteres is  r ing material .  F o r  this reason,  a gyro change in an IMU could 
require  a wheel supply compensation change, hence causing a program impact by 
not supplying t r u e  gyro interchangeability. 
4.2.3 Block I1 Changes 
4.2.3.1 Reset  Winding During the Block I phase, i t  became evident that significant 
improvements could be made in gyro design. Fur the r  improvements in the gyro 
ushered in the  second generation o r  Apollo I1 instrument. The Apollo I1 gyro main- 
tained the features  of the  Apollo I with the exception of ducosyn design. In 
redesigning the ducosyns, both the  signal generator core  and torque generator c o r e  
were  changed f r o m  8 poles to 12 poles, and a rese t  winding and bias winding were  
added to  the torque generator.  The introduction of the 1 2  pole core  made possible 
the incorporation of the rese t  o r  wash winding a s  i t  is sometimes known. This 
winding was excited with 3200 Hz, positioned on the poles in such a manner  a s  to 
provide no net torque to the output axis, and was most effective in washing out the 
residual magnetism following a torquing pulse command. The reset  winding p e r -  
mitted simplification of the torquing logic and eliminated the need for  guidance 
computer programming to  account f o r  the bias t e r m  ordinarily present. The bias 
adjust winding made possible the nulling of a l l  non-g sensitive t e r m s  within the 
gyro proper.  
4 ,  2,  3 .2  Mu-Metal Shield, The 1 2  pole torquer  did introduce a "c~uu ing  ra te  sens i -  
tivity to external magnetic fields that required incorporation of a magnetic shield 
in  the form of a mu-metal  shroud end cover.  Installation of this shield was required 
as a retrofi t  to some  of the Apollo I1 gyros.  
4. 2.3.3 Configuration Design. The  magnetic suspension was redesigned to provide 
axia l  as well a s  radia l  support for  the float while increasing the radial  res tor ing 
force .  
Redesign of the end housing to accommodate the 12  pole ducosyn a l so  included 
two other significant changes: The end housing was designed a s  a single piece 
providing (1) bet ter  control on the concentricities of the suspension and microsyn,  
and (2) mic ro  -inch fi t  of the pivot, thus eliminating a radial  centering problem that 
had l imited the final assembly process  yields of the Apollo I gyros.  
A comparison of the Apollo I and I1 gyros is shown below. 
Signal Generator Single Ended Center Tap Sec 
No Quadrature Tap Quadrature Taps  
8 Poles 
Axial 0 . 8  gm/O. 0001" 
Radial 2 gm/0.0001" Radial 6 gm/0.000 1" 
Two Positive Pulses  Reset  Winding 
After  Torquing Negative 4V, 3200 Hz, 50 m a  
Continuously Demag- 
netizes Torquer  
No Bias Adj. -Bias Adjustment Bias- 
Bias  < 30 meru  < 5 meru Accep. T e s t  
< Uncertainty Level 
Torque Generator  
Pr ealignm ent 
8 Pole V 12 Pole Y 
Normalized c Torque Normalized 
Preamp on S. M K Normalized 
€ 
Preamp with Gyro 
Bias adjusted 
4. 2.4 Apollo I1 Gyro Problems 
(1) The f i r s t  Apollo I1 instruments showed a torquer  sensitivity which was 
influenced by external magnetic fields. The incorporation of a mu-metal  end bell 
on the torque generator end housing reduced this  magnetic field sensitivity to a 
negligible level. 
( 2 )  Prealignment hardware ,  initially, had a high incidence of solder  joint 
fai lures.  The problem was caused by s t r e s s e s  in the solder  joints resulting from 
flexure of a printed circuit  board a s  i t  was  mounted i n  the prealignment case .  Con- 
sequently, the printed circuit .  board was made thicker,  and the method of mounting 
was changed to minimize flexure. These measures  effectively eliminated the 
problem. 
(3) The gyro preamplif iers were  susceptible to high frequency noise. A 
capacitor placed a t  the preamplif ier  input eliminated this  problem. 
(4) A l a r g e  number of float freedom fa i lures ,  resulting from part icle con- 
tamination within the units ,  appeared in the ea r ly  phases of Apollo 11. Improved 
control over  the cleanliness of the assembly a r e a ,  tighter control over  assembly 
procedures and a genera l  improvement i n  workmanship and quality control made a 
significant improvement. 
(5) Approximately 5070 of early gyro fa i lures  were  the resul t  of bearing 
fai lures (<I000 hours) .  This  fai lure r a te  caused such a shortage of gyros that the 
use of workhorse or  norsflight status instruments to  cornplete sys tem checkout and 
selloff were required,  A repa i r  program featuring a new bearing design was intro- 
duced. However, a s  a result  of s tar tup delays and somewhat modified manufacturing 
procedures, the output of repaired gyros was too low to significantly reduce the 
s e v e r e  gyro shortage. 
The reason f o r  bearing failures continues to  be under investigation. To 
date, however, the principal reason f o r  an  increased failure r a t e  relative to  the 
Block I bearing has  not been discovered. The wheel package was unchanged f rom 
that  of the Apollo I gyros which exhibited a much better  bearing life history. 
Various cleaning procedures,  lapping methods, and re ta iner  redesigns were a t -  
tempted without conclusive resul ts  (See  Section 4.2.7 f o r  a more  detailed presen-  
tation). . 
4.2.5 Fai lure  Prediction 
4.2.5.1 Reliability Test  Program.  At the s t a r t  of Apollo system design, a gyro 
reliability t e s t  program was initiated. Two a ims  of the  t e s t  program were: ( 1)  to  
obtain a fai lure model f o r  predicting impending system failures,  and ( 2  ) t o  determine 
whether intermittent operation, a s  planned f o r  the Apollo guidance sys tem to save 
power, was any l ess  desirable than continuous operation. A total  of 10 gyros was 
divided into two groups: six were operated continuously fo r  200 hours followed by 
se rvo  performance f o r  24 hours. F o u r  were operated intermittently, i. e . ,  with 
wheels operating fo r  3 hours and off f o r  1 2  hours f o r  a total of 210 hours followed 
by servo performance f o r  24 hours. Except fo r  servo runs, a l l  running hours were 
accumulated on a torque -to -balance loop. More than 52,000 wheel hours were 
accumulated on the 10 gyro units. F o u r  wheel bearing failures occurred during 
the  accumulated running time. 
Figure  4-11 compares the acceleration sensitive drif t  about the input axis 
(ADIA) data f o r  units that were  run continuously with units that were run intermit-  
tently. F o r  the s a m e  operating t ime, the intermittently operated units resulted in 
the  more  stable performance.  Therefore,  the  intermittent mode of operation in 
the  sys tem did not result  in a performance penalty. There  were  no differences in 
the  BD and ADSRA t e r m s  f o r  the two modes of operation. 
4.2.5.2 Data Flow. Data on a l l  the  significant parameters  of gyro performance 
were  collected f o r  a l l  units f rom the f i r s t  component t e s t s  through a l l  ISS and 
G& N tests.  These  data were evaluated and formed the  basis f o r  fai lure prediction. 
Moreover, procedure was established fo r  centralized assessment  of a l l  gyro and 
INTERMITTENT WHEEL OPERATION  
Fig. 4 - 11 Wheel Operating Hours 
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accelerometer  data. The checkout procedu-res required that a copy of each data 
record b e  sent  to MIT. The flow diagram for  data from a single gyro acceptance 
t e s t  through flight i s  shown in Figure  4-12. The collected data were  converted to 
punch c a r d s  and magnetic tape in formats  suitable for  electronic data processing 
and printing. Additionally, a monthly l is t ing was printed both as a n  inventory and 
a s  data tabulation. 
4 .2 .5 .3  Gyro Acceptance Plan. The gyro acceptance plan was based on the design- 
reference  lunar  landing mission (DRM) of 200 hours total flight t ime.  Of this  
t ime,  the gyro wheel was  operated 20 hours  including the operational t ime required 
to initialize the GN & C system and to perform a n  inflight o r  ground alignment of 
the iner t ia l  measurement  unit (IMU) and, a lso ,  operation during thrusting periods. 
The maximum cumulative wheel operating t ime,  including the final ground checkout 
operation and a margin  of safety, approached 300 hours.  This value was therefore 
chosen a s  a n  upper l imi t  on the t ime of operation fo r  maintenance of angular mo- 
m entum. 
Another constraint  on gyro acceptance was the performance necessary  to 
insure  a successful  mission. Figure  4-13 shows the probabilities that gyro pe r -  
formance changes would result  in  marginal  mission performance. F o r  example, 
changes in IA accelerat ion sensit ive drift of l e s s  than 1000 meru/g  among any of 
the th ree  gyros would not c rea te  e r r o r s  equal to those l is ted in Figure  4-13, thus 
1000 meru/g  was the upper boundary for change i n  gyro performance. Unless drif t  
r a t e  curves  for  a flight gyro  l i e  to the lef t  of the appropriate curve,  a marginal  
mission i s  indicated. 
Inflight measurement  of gyro performance,  to corre la te  gyro performance 
with miss ion performance,  was considered, but measurement of the accelerat ion 
sensit ive drif t  along the input axis (ADIA) and accelerat ion sensitive drif t  along 
the spin reference  axis  (ADSRA) appeared impractical .  One possible method would 
have been to  make a position and velocity e r r o r  comparison between ground and 
onboard s ta te  vectors ,  and then to have inferred the specific gyro t e r m s  that 
caused the deviation. The bias drift (BD) t e r m s  could have been measured in  f r e e  
fall. Then, af ter  successive IMU alignment, the changes in  angular e r r o r s  measur -  
ed during a t ime interval  would yield BD. Two important aspects of the  gyro 
acceptance plan included drift performance and system tes t s ,  and performance 
indicators. 
(1) Drift Performance T e s t s  & System Tes t s  - -  Drift performance data were  
generally obtained utilizing an inertially stabilized loop (See Figure  4-14). The 
gyro instrument was mounted on a tes t  table such that the input axis  was parallel  
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Fig. 4-14 L i n e  Schematic Diagram of the Apollo IRIG Operating 
in a Sing le  -Axis Orientat ion Control System 
to  the table axis.  The gyro signal generator output was amplified and fed Lo a. 
table s e r v o  loop. The output of the table servo loop drove the table torque motor 
and rotated the gyro about i ts  input axis. In this loop, an ideal gyro would have 
maintained i t s  input axis fixed m inert ial  space. As viewed f rom the earth,  the 
t e s t  table would have rotated by an  amount equal to  the component of earth ra te  
sensed along the  gyro input axis. Dri f ts  (deviations f rom ear th  ra te  measured in 
m e r u )  would occur  a s  a result  of torques that ac t  about the gyro output axis. Since 
the magnitudes of these drift r a t e s  can be compensated, the drift r a te  stabilities 
provided a measure  of the performance of the gyro instrument. A table rate,  
determined f r o m  the t ime required f o r  the table to rotate through a prescribed 
0 
angle ( e ,  g . ,  1 ), gave the average drift r a t e  over a period of time. By consecu- 
tively positioning the table axis s o  that gravity acted along th ree  gyro axes, the  
ADSRA, ADIA, and BD drift t e r m s  could be determined by solving simultaneous 
equations. The stabilities of these  drift t e r m s  were  determined by repeated 
measurements af ter  periods of s torage t ime o r  by a continuous measurement of 
table drif t  r a t e  f o r  a fixed orientation with respect  to earth rate.  
The  design and operational goal for  mean t ime  between failures ( M T B F )  
was 100,000 hours.  That is, f o r  a group of 500 gyros that passed the performance- 
prediction cr i ter ion during preflight operations ( with a probability of 67 percent ), 
not more  than one failure was expected among the  500 during the ensuing 200 hours 
of wheel operation of each gyro. The performance tes ts  measured the  torques on 
the float and the float pendulosity about the output axis. Other tests  measured 
parameters  that were performance indicators, e. g . ,  the retainer beat frequency 
and the stability of the  required driving power. 
( 2 ) Performance Indicators - - The rotating ball-bearing re t  a i .ners p ro-  
duced a sinusoidal torque about the  gyro output axis a t  a frequency corresponding 
t o  the rotational velocity of the retainer,  but since the average value of this s inu-  
soidal torque was zero ,  there  was no resulting drift e r r o r .  The torque was 
detectable a t  the  gyro signal output a s  a sideband of the signal generator frequency 
( 3200 HZ ) and the re ta iner  frequency ( 243 Hz). The magnitude of this signal 
varied periodically a s  one re ta iner  lapped o r  passed the other retainer. A chm-ge 
in  the lap frequency was caused by a change in speed of one of the retainers.  This 
frequency stability was found to  be related to  the ADLA stability. Figure  4-15 
shows data fo r  ADIA deviation versus  re ta iner  beat frequency for  25 gyro units. 
The data f o r  each unit were obtained f rom 12 hour inertially stabilized drif t  runs 
with the  gyro input axis vertical. Data points f o r  most units fel l  close to  a l inear  
relationship line. This technique was'developed during the Apollo gyro production 
program. Evaluation of this technique indicated significant advantages over many 
methods now in use; i t ' s  s imple and easily implemented. 

The stability of the power required to operate tile gyro rnotor indicated i ts  
condition relat ive to such variables a s  frictional torques and gyro wheel bearings.  
A good power t r a c e  has  excursions of 5 m W ,  o r  about 0. 17'0 of total wheel power. 
Figure  4-16 shows t r aces  taken at  two t imes  during the life of a gyro. At t ime A,  
the power excursions were  low, but a t  t ime B, a significant decrease  appeared in 
the stability of bearing torques. Finally, the  wheel failed to reach synchronous 
speed and bearing fa i lure  occurred.  The mill iwattmeter was used both to  s c r e e n  
bearings before they were  installed i n  gyros and to determine whether there  was  
bearing deterioration on completed instruments.  Power monitoring was performed 
a t  component-level testing and on gyros installed in  the IMU. 
System tes t s  of gyro  performance measured gimbal angles o r  changes i n  
angle. One method used was to orient  the gyro input axis i n  a direction a s  to have 
z e r o  drift,  then, finding the gyro orientation with respect  to the earth,  the drif t  
performance was calculated. A second method was to  measure  an  angular velocity 
by the use 'of  the gimbal angle t ransducers  in the IMU. The base was assumed to 
be non-rotating with respect  to the earth.  
4. 2.6 Fai lure  Cr i t e r i a  
The fa i lure  prediction technique had to  have a high probability of rejecting 
bad gyros and s t i l l  had to be reasonably easy to implement. If a t  a l l  possible, the 
technique was to use  parameters  that a lso  had a direct  bearing on mission perform- 
ance. 
4. 2. 6. 1 Delta-25 Criterion.  From a study of the long term drift character is t ics  
of the gyro population, i t  was found that the ADIA term fo r  90 percent of the popula- 
tion was stable to bet ter  than 25 meru/g.  Since wheel bearing deterioration was the 
principal fai lure mode fo r  this  instrument,  a fai lure cri terion related to a 25-meru/g 
shift in the ADIA t e r m  appeared to offer a promising prediction device. This c r i -  
te r ion (Delta 25) required that the 25-meru/g shift occur a t  a single t e s t  location 
to  avoid shifts caused by tes t  equipment variability, that is be verified by a second 
data point to eliminate bad data, and that i t  occur ac ross  a s torage period of l e s s  
than four months because &ifts during long s torage were  noted in this  instrument. 
Figure  4-17 is a plot for unit, s e r i a l  no. 3A16. The bearings of this  part i-  
cular  unit failed i n  the reliability program. At approximately 2 100 wheel hours ,  the  
ADIA changed by m o r e  than 25 meru/g.  The gyro was in the s a m e  location, and the 
performance change was  verified by a second tes t .  At this point, i t  was predicted 
that this  gyro would fail.  F o r  the next 1500 hours ,  i t s  performance was very  respecta-  
ble in  that the total acceleration-sensitive drif t  along the input axis was l e s s  than 
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Fig.  4-17 25 IRIG-3A-16 Drift Coefficients 
30 meru/g .  At about 3600 hours, the ADIA changed by more  than 25 meru /g ,  and 
af ter  another 1800 wheel hours the gyro failed completely. After each Delta-25 
indication, the total change in ADLA f o r  the ensuing 300 hours was l e s s  than 2 8  meru/g ,  
providing a long lead t ime  before the unit failed. During this lead t ime,  gyro p e r -  
formance was s t i l l  suitable fo r  an Apollo mission. Note that the bias drif t  ( BD ) was 
very  stable, and the acceleration-sensitive drif t  along the  spin-reference axis 
(ADSRA) changed very  slowly during the  life of this gyro. Small  o r  gradual changes 
in BD and ADSRA were  character is t ic  f o r  a l l  wheels that failed, 
Figure  4-18 is a n  example of prediction of system performance f o r  a gyro 
installed in the guidance system. The ADSRA t e r m  changed by m o r e  than 25 meru /g  
at the t ime  of installation into the system. Subsequent t e s t s  verified th is  change. 
The Delta-25 cr i ter ion would not have picked up this pa ramete r  on that instrument 
s ince  i t  changed location. After installation in  the system, a subsequent ADIA 
change of more  than 25 meru /g  occurred and was verified. Upon this indication of 
a potential fa i lure ,  the  gyro was removed f r o m  the guidance sys tem and was tested 
until the  wheel failed. The wheel t ime  accumulated af ter  the  Delta-25 cr i ter ion was 
equivalent to  80 lunar missions.  Again, the BD and ADSRA t e r m s  remained stable 
until the gyro failed completely. 
The Delta-25 cr i ter ion is now used f o r  a l l  gyros. To implement its use  fully, 
the  performance of each gyro was measured periodically. Units that exceeded the 
cr i ter ion were either removed a s  fa i lures  f r o m  the sys tem to  be verified o r  were 
requalified. The requalification t es t  was a re run  of the  unit acceptance test .  
4.2.6.2 The F Cr i t e r ion .  Since the re  was a correlation between ADIA instability 
and impending wheel fai lure,  any parameter  that measured ADIA stability could have 
provided a basis f o r  fa i lure  prediction. There  were  th ree  c r i t e r i a  that could be 
applied: ( 1 )  a magnitude change in ADIA exceeding some level, e .  g . ,  the  Delta-25 
cri terion; ( 2 ) the standard deviation of the ADIA exceeding some level; and ( 3 ) 
the exceeding of some level  by the  r m s  value of successive ADIA differences ( r m s s d ) .  
All of these methods were  found to  obtain large  magnitudes for  a situation that oc-  
curred frequently but was not an incipient fai lure.  F o r  example, a change in drift 
could have occurred f r o m  dimensional changes in the float s t ructure ,  with the drift 
then becoming stable at a new level. It was difficult t o  find a standard magnitude- 
or-deviation cr i ter ion that would account f o r  a stable level change. The F cri terion,  
however, which was based on method 3 ,  served this purpose. By the F cri terion,  
a fai lure was predicted if the rrnssd of the las t  11. ADIA data points exceeded 
10 meru/g .  A unit requalified if its rmssd  l a t e r  dropped below 10 meru /g .  The r e -  
qualification indicated a unit that shifted in A D U  dr i f t  but was l a te r  stabilized. The 
r m s s d  was defined by the following equation: 

where x.  was the present value of ADIA, and N was 11 f o r  the  F cri terion.  
1 
Figure  4-19 shows rmssd  versus  wheel hours f o r  unit 2A5, which exceeded 
the F cri terion at 1500 wheel hours. 500 hours l a te r  i t  failed to  s t a r t  a t  the  appli- 
cation of wheel voltage. These  hours would have been sufficient t ime  t o  complete 
two preflight t e s t s  and missions.  Gyro 2 A l l  (F ig .  4-20) exceeded the F cri terion 
during acceptance test ing ( 300 wheel hours ), l a t e r  was requalified, then exceeded 
the F cri terion again a t  1200 hours. It had stable ADSRA and BD performance even 
af ter  it had exceeded the F cr i ter ion f o r  ADIA data. It was run intermittently f o r  
another 800 hours before fai lure;  again, the re  was adequate warning to have allowed 
a successful  completion of the mission. 
4.2.6.3 Usefulness and Efficiency Indices fo r  the Criterion.  Usefulness and efficiency 
- -- 
indices a r e  defined in F igure  4 -21. The usefulness of a fai lure -prediction method 
was considered a s  the percentage of gyros that were  predicted good and, in  fact, 
remained good. The efficiency of the  prediction technique rested in the percentage 
of gyros not rejected. F o r  example, if 5 percent of the good gyros  had been rejected, 
prediction efficiency would have been 95 percent. F o r  the  Delta-25 cri terion,  the  
calculated usefulness indices f o r  the Apollo Block I and Block I1 gyros were  99 and 
98 percent, respectively. The efficiency indices were 89 and 98 percent. 
F o r  the F cri terion,  a l l  but one of the Apollo Block I bearing failures were 
predicted. However, 23 units were  predicted to fa i l  but did not. This yielded a use -  
fulness index of 99 percent and an  efficiency index of 80 percent. F o r  Block 11, the 
F cr i ter ion 's  usefulness index was 99 percent and i t s  efficiency index was 96 percent. 
4.2.6.4 Fai lure  Cr i t e r i a  Summary. -- Fai lures  were  grouped into major  categories and 
were  a s  follows: 
( 1 ) Bearing Fa i lu res  - - This group contained non-start wheel units with 
ADIA instability, decreasing wheel run-down time, and e r ra t i c  wattmeter data in- 
dicating a n  impending wheel fai lure.  The group a lso  included units that failed from 
other  causes,  such a s  contamination, that is, when fa i lure  analysis showed the 
wheel bearings to be badly deteriorated and imminently susceptible to fai lure from 
this cause.  

I 
RD
T 
(SE
C)
 
0
 
SR
A 
(M
ER
U/
g) 
IA
 (M
ER
U/
g)
 
b 
D
 
BD
 (M
ER
U)
 
W
HE
EL
 H
OU
RS
 
Fi
g.
 4
-
2
0 
R
M
S
S
D
 v
s
 W
he
el
 H
ou
rs
 -
 
Ap
ol
lo
 G
y
r
o
 2
Al
l 
T 
T = TOTAL GYRO POPULATION 
\ / P = PREDICTED FAILURES \ / F = FAILED GYROS 
PF = PREDICTED UNITS 
THAT DID NOT FAIL 
PF = PREDICTED UNITS 
THAT FAILED 
FF = FAILED GYROS THAT 
WERE NOT PREDICTED 
USEFULLNESS INDEX = ;!:;" x 100 
EFFICIENCY INDEX = T - PF - PF T - PF 
Fig. 4 - 2 1  Usefulness and Efficiency 
( 2  ) Float-Freedom Fai lures  - -  This group contained instruments failing the 
float -freedom tes t .  This t e s t  identified units containing foreign fluids o r  particulate 
mat ter  in the damping fluid. Most units, which had been identified f o r  the repa i r  
program as  Category a1 repairs ,  evidenced this problem. Other i tems in Category 
III were gyro flexlead and ducosyns, i. e. , problems associated with the internal 
gyro but not with the bearings and internal  float assembly. 
( 3 ) Flex-lead Fa i lu res  on Centrifuge Testing - -  This group consisted of two 
units that had failed during centrifuge testing a t  NASA/ MSC. Fai lure  analysis had 
indicated an open wheel lead. Because of this environment testing, these units were 
not candidates f o r  repair .  
( 4 )  Elect r ica l  Fa i lu res  - - This group included typical shor t s  o r  opens in the 
gyro external  electrical  circuitry and prealignment components. It represented a l l  
units grouped in the  repa i r  program a s  Category I1 repairs .  
( 5 )  Delta-25 Predicted Fa i lu res  - -  This group consisted of units predicted 
to  fa i l  by the Delta-25 fa i lure  cri terion,  i. e . ,  a gyro exhibiting a shift in drift t e r m s  
of m o r e  than 25 meru /g  was suspect  and subjected to fu r the r  testing and analysis 
before being committed t o  flight. The cri terion was qualified in that only shifts of 
25 meru /g  o r  m o r e  occurring a t  a single t e s t  location were considered. Shifts had 
to  be verified by a second datum point, and must  have occurred a c r o s s  a s torage 
period of l e s s  than four  months. The single t e s t  location minimized any data shifts 
caused by t es t  equipment variability. The verification by a second datum point was 
necessary  t o  eliminate the  likelihood of bad data. The restr ict ion of the storage 
period between tes t s  limited the  storage-sensit ive shifts that were  noted in th is  in- 
strument.  
4 .2 .7  Fa i lu re  & Reliability Summary 
The Apollo I gyros  were  subdivided during manufacture into five groups ac -  
cording t o  the  date of manufacture. Most of the discrepancies in drawings and 
procedures were  corrected during the construction of the first two groups. The 
failure r a t e  fo r  each failure cause  was plotted f o r  each group ( s e e  Figure  4-22 ). 
Induced failures were  not included a s  fai lures in this plot. The l a rge  number of 
fai lures,  73 percent in Group I, was attributed to the changes required and to  s t a r t -  
up problems. Groups I1 to IV show a continuing improvement in the percentage of 
fa i lures ,  a low of 13 percent f o r  Group IV. Figure  4-23,a plot of the average wheel 
hours f o r  each group, shows that the average operating hours f o r  the last  four groups 
had decreased slightly. This could partly explain the decreasing number of fai lures 
fo r  Groups 111 and IV and should have resulted in fewer  fa i lures  f o r  Group V. 

I I1 I11 IV v 
B U I L D  G R O U P S  
Fig. 4-23 Average Wheel Hours of Apollo I IRIGs by Build Groups 
However, the percentage of fa i lu res  f o r  Group V made a dras t ic  jump to  33 percent,  
No evident explanation was available to account fo r  this trend reversal .  Since the 
increase  was almost entirely the result  of an increase in the bearing failures,  it 
was likely that the problem was a wheel-build deterioration, ei ther in the choice of 
bearings o r  in the performance of the wheel-build procedures. 
A s imi la r  study of Apollo I1 assembly resul ts  was made and plotted a s  shown 
in  Figure  4-24. The groups were  determined by dividing the  total  Block I1 build 
program into eight groups of about 30 units pe r  group according t o  the i r  acceptance 
date. The resul ts  compared t o  the  Block I experience were  start l ing.  The fa i lure  
r a t e  in the first group was 60 percent and succeeding groups varied f rom that r a t e  
by only 20 percent. Bearing fa i lures  were  a consistent percentage, 25 percent of 
each total; and float-freedom failures,  which were almost negligible in Block I, 
were  a steady contributing factor a t  about a 20 percent fai lure ra te .  Even the first 
group, which was expected to  be of lower quality because of production s t a r t  up 
effects, was typical of the  entire production run. 
Again, the resul ts  in the last group were atypical. The float-freedom fail-  
u r e s  r o s e  to  40 percent, double the  incidence in the ea r l i e r  groups, while bearing 
fa i lures  were  drastically lower. The lower bearing fa i lure  ra te  for  this l a s t  group 
could have been caused by a lower average operating t ime  f o r  that group. As in the 
Apollo I analysis, the  average wheel hours  p e r  group were  plotted. The resul t ,  
shown in Figure  4-25, indicates that the wheel hours f o r  Group 8 were  lower than 
f o r  the other groups. If th is  was the cause  of the improvem e n t in Group 8, bearing 
fa i lure  ra the r  than operating hours, could result  in the  las t  group being the worst  
of Apollo I1 gyros. 
F r o m  an  analysis of the  fa i lures ,  several  interesting observations were  
made. Fa i lu res  were  uniformly distributed over the  range of t ime  f r o m  acceptance 
and were therefore not time-dependent. The majority of the fa i lures  occurred in 
the f i r s t  1200 wheel operating hours,  but no part icular fai lure mode was completely 
screened out a t  this  ear ly  interval. Any unit that was removed f rom a sys tem f o r  
a problem but not verified a s  a fa i lure  was classified a good unit f o r  this analysis. 
An increasing failure r a t e  trend start ing a t  2100 total  wheel hours was 
observed. The smal l  population of units in these  life intervals ( l e s s  than 20 units ) 
provided a low confidence level. Moreover, it was not possible to  define a "wear 
out" point with the data available. Therefore,  the following conclusions were  ap- 
plicable: 
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( 1 )  The failure r a t e  p e r  wheel Life was consistent a t  20 percent p e r  300 
wheel hours and a t  14 percent per  5 months. The difference in these two failure 
ra tes  indicated that the  gyro population was not being subjected to  an average a c -  
cumulation of 300 hours over five month intervals.  
( 2 ) Sixty-nine percent of the fai lures were  identified in the f i r s t  1200 wheel 
hours af ter  assembly.  This was the resul t  of classifying a l l  Apollo I1 units soon 
af ter  acceptance a s  e i ther  potential fai lures o r  flight-quality units. F o r  these  units, 
a longer acceptance cycle ( 1200 wheel hours ) would have been very effective in 
screening a majori ty of the fai lures.  
( 3 ) It was estimated that 14 failures would have occurred if a l l  the Apollo I1 
gyros were  operated an  additional 300 hours, and 12 of those fa i lures  would have 
occurred in the ensuing five months. 
( 4 )  Inasmuch a s  catastrophic fa i lures  resulting f rom poor solder  connections 
o r  contaminant in the damping fluid could not have been predicted, such fa i lure  modes 
were  eliminated o r  held very low. 
Although the  remaining failure mechanisms f o r  the Apollo gyro were  quite 
complex, the reliability study program yielded two useful c r i t e r i a  f o r  the  pr imary 
failure mode o r  wheel fai lure.  The Delta-25 fa i lure  cri terion was not 100 percent 
effective because it predicted failure f o r  some units that were not about to fa i l  and, 
conversely, it missed s o m e  that did fail.  Fur the r ,  i t  required elimination of data 
that occurred ac ross  location changes, even though data were shown to  corre la te  
very  well at all locations. As more  data were accumulated, more  refined prediction 
c r i t e r i a  were established. The F cri terion was one SUCH promising refinement. 
Indices both of its usefulness and efficiency were  high for  the  Apollo Block I1 gyros, 
and it was e a s i e r  t o  apply than was the Delta-25 cri terion,  since the F cr i ter ion 
could be applied t o  a l l  t e s t  data regardless  of s torage period o r  of t e s t  location 
changes. The paramete r  monitored both f o r  the Delta-25 and the F c r i t e r i a  was 
ADIA. Neither BD nor  ADSRA showed significant changes that could be correlated 
with wheel fai lure.  
A s  of January 1, 1967, 361 production gyros had run a total of 380,77 1 wheel 
hours. Excluding the wheel hours on any units af ter  fai lures were predicted by the 
Delta-25 cri terion,  the total wheel operating hours  were  346, 175, which yielded 
an  MTBF of 100,000 hours with 70 percent confidence. 
Another analysis of fa i lure  data related bearing-failure r a t e  as a func t ion  
of wheel hours f o r  Block L and Block 11. This analysis was aimed at determining 
if a wear-out t i m e  was evidenced f o r  the  gyro bearing. A r i s e  in the Apolbo I1 
bearing-failure r a t e  a t  about 2100 wheel hours seems  to have been indicated, How- 
ever ,  the population was too small ,  that is, the confiderice level  was low a s  a 
result  of the l a rge  effect  of a single fa i lure  in these  groups to  have allowed this  
conclusion. As the  population operating hours increased,  however, a m o r e  defini- 
tive conclusion became possible. 
One very  interesting finding was that the average bearing failure ra te  f o r  
Apollo 11 was 10.4  percent f o r  300 wheel hours, which was th ree  t imes  the bearing- 
fai lure r a t e  fo r  Apollo I ( 3 .  1 percent) .  The cause of the higher bearing failure 
r a t e  f o r  the Apollo I1 gyro could have only been caused by a change in assembly,  
mater ia l  lots o r  processing,  o r  quality control monitoring between these  two gyros,  
s ince  the re  was no design change to the wheel package between these two instrument 
builds. By every failure c r i t e r i a  presented, Apollo I gyros operated within accep- 
table performance requirements f a r  longer than Apollo I1 instruments. The 
difference in l ife character is t ics  between the two groups had not changed substantially 
with usage and the  passage of t ime. 
There  were  some assembly and t es t  changes that  occurred between the 
Apollo I and Apollo I1 build effort. It was not possible to  t e l l  whether any of these  
contributed to  the poorer  reliability obtained f o r  Apollo I1 units. However, s o m e  
of these  differences a r e  included here  fo r  clarification. 
( 1 ) The bearings were  directly assembled into the  float f o r  most  of the  
Apollo II build, whereas the Apollo 1 bearings were  f i r s t  tested in a dynamometer 
and then disassembled, cleaned, inspected, and assembled into the  float. 
( 2 ) The GSE torque-to-balance loop and ramp generator were  changed be- 
tween the Apollo I and Apollo 11 build. The quantity of ramps  required f o r  Apollo I1 
float freedom t e s t  was decreased f rom that required f o r  Apollo I. 
( 3 ) There  was a significant change in the reliability documentation required 
f o r  Block II. This  configuration required documentation.and traceability fo r  each 
component in the  build. The l a rge  documentation requirement may have created a 
fa lse  sense  of secur i ty  and resulted in a reduced monitoring effort in the important 
a r e a s  of assembly and tes t .  
( 4 ) The Apollo I: gyro contra-ct changed f rom a cost -plus, fixed-fee basis 
in the middle of i t s  build to a f ixed-price plus incen"cve f o r  the remainder of the 
Apollo I build, The Apollo U contract was a cost-plus incentive contract. 
( 5 j ApoZlo I was built while the Po1ar. i~ production coiltract was in -house a t  
ACE, using the same assembly personnel and a rea .  The higher level of available 
Navy quality control monitoring may have helped Apollo reliability. 
( 6 ) As a resul t  of phasing out of Polar is  and other programs at ACE, the re  
was a reassignment of the  assembly and tes t  technicians working on the Apollo 
program. A higher level  of personnel reassignments appeared to  have occurred 
during the  ent i re  Apollo 11 program which resulted in a continuous retraining effort .  
T h e  l a rge  Apollo 11 failure r a t e  strongly points out the  inadequacy of the  
acceptance tes t  a s  a fully effective reliability screen.  A more  meaningful s e r i e s  
of specifications f o r  assembly,  inspection and t es t  to achieve an  effective accep- 
tance screening,  appears  t o  have been required. 
4.3 Power  and Servo Assembly (PSA) 
4.3. 1 Description 
T h e  Power and Servo Assembly ( PSA ) comprised the  electronics that sup - 
ported the operation of the inert ial  and optical subsystems and was located in a 
common module f o r  convenience in packaging and spacecraft  installation. 
4.3.1.1 Block I PSA. The Block I PSA contained most of the electronics associated 
with the  iner t ia l  subsystem, including the IMU servo  electronics, IRIG and PIP 
pulse torque electronics, CDU electronics,  power supplies, and mode switching 
electronics. Some of the  ISS electronics were  located on the IMU and included IRIG 
and PIP microsyn suspension networks, signal generator preamplifiers,  t empera -  
t u r e  control  sensors ,  and resolver  adjustment networks. Phase  correction capacitors 
were  located on the CDUs. The Block I PSA also  contained most of the electronics 
fo r  the optical subsystem. 
The  design of the Block I PSA was influenced largely by the concept of in- 
flight malfunction diagnosis and repair .  Repair  was to be done by direct  replacement 
of failed subassemblies with on-board spares .  The Block I PSA was designed with 
this concept as a ground rule. T o  this extent, the PSA electronics were  packaged 
in  small ,  replaceable modules that plugged into a wired t ray.  Where possible, 
functional subassemblies having similar requirements were packaged as identical 
modules. Thus, a l l  three IMU gimbal servo amplifiers were packaged as identical 
modules, and each contained three values of a feedback element appropriate to the 
gain. requirements of the inner, middle, and outer gimbal serovs. 
Selection of the proper feedback was effected by tray wiring when the servo 
amplifiers were plugged into the inner, middle, o r  outer gimbal positions in the 
tray. Thus, one spare gimbal servo amplifier could function a s  the repair module 
for  any of the three locations. Similarly, identical 1% and 5% 800 Hz power supplies 
were used for  the inertial and optical subsystems. 
The modules were plugged into ten individual trays and appropriately inter - 
connected by t ray wiring. The trays,  in turn, were plugged into a tray connector 
and interconnect harness assembly for  further power and signal interfacing with the 
res t  of the G &  N system and the spacecraft. To aid in inflight malfunction diagnosis, 
a connector a t  the front of each t ray provided selected test  points that were then 
available to the inflight monitoring test  set. The inflight maintenance concept was 
abandoned after the PSA design was released for manufacture and subsequently was 
never use  
The electrical problems experienced in theBlock I PSA fell into two general 
categories: those identified from engineering evaluation and qualification testing and 
reliability analysis, and those identified from System Testing. The schedule for  
delivery of hardware had not permitted the luxury of an exhaustive evaluation phase 
pr ior  to manufacturing release. Consequently, designs were being released for  
manufacture concurrent with breadboard and engineering evaluation testing. As 
circuit parameters became better defined, component values were altered to place 
them closer to design centers. Reliability analysis of component failures during 
the engineering evaluation and parts qualification phases required replacement of 
some components with more reliable ones. These problems were not considered 
inherent design deficiencies but reflected a normal refinement of the designs with 
the passage of time. 
System testing exposed design deficiencies that required PSA modifications. 
They a r e  listed below: 
( 1 )  A filtering o r  decoupling capacitor was added to the ADA preamp to  pre-  
vent the 102.4 Kpps signal of the fail circuit from being coupled into the servo loop. 
( 2 ) A parallel diode circuit was added from the summing junction of the 
gimbal servo amplifier to complementary side of the input differential amplifier in 
order  to reduce the gain for large saturable signals at the summing junction. This 
modification resulted because a large charge was trapped on a capacitor in the ADA 
filter when moding between coarse align and fine align took place. 
( 3 ) Capacitors were added to the output stage of the CDU motor drive 
amplifier to form a high-frequency break in the response of the amplifier. These 
capacitors corrected a problem that had resulted because of variations in the gain- 
bandwidth product of the output transistors.  
( 4 )  The bandwidth of the demodulator fi l ter in the encoder electronics was 
reduced by changing the value of the f i l ter  capacitors. This was considered neces - 
sary  to reduce the 6400 pps noise that was being generated by the IMU heater 
controls and coupled into the encoder. The bandwidth was reduced to approximately 
3400 Hz. 
( 5 ) The ternary mode of PIP  pulse torquing resulted in intolerable acceler - 
ometer bias instabilities. The decision to change to binary torquing required a 
redesign of much of the PIP electronics. 
4.3.1.2 Block I1 and LM PSA. The designs of both PSAs were essentially 
the same. Since the LM did not have an optical subsystem that required electronics 
within the PSA, the LM PSA was physically smaller.  The basic ISS portions of the 
CM and LM PSAs were identical, however. The inflight maintenance concept was 
dropped for  the Block I1 CM and LM. This permitted a more efficient packaging 
scheme and allowed fo r  hermetic sealing of the PSA. There were, however, certain 
calibration modules that were matched to a particular IMU. It was necessary to 
open up the PSA and change these modules in  the event that an IMU was replaced, 
unfortunately with the consequence of compromising the integrity of the PSA hermetic 
seal. The decision, therefore, was to incorporate portions of the IRIG and PIP 
pulse torque electronics into separate packages. For  the LM, the Pulse Torquing 
Assembly (PTA) ,  a s  the package was called, was located close to the IMU and ex- 
ternal to the cabin, which was physically separated from the PSA by long cable runs. 
This location minimized problems associated with long leads. Fo r  the CM, the 
PIPA Electronics Assembly ( PEA) was located in the space formerly occupied by 
the Block I CDUs. The PEA and the PTA were functionally parts of the PSA, but 
were packaged separately for  operational convenience. 
'The Block II and L M  BA. electronics were basically the s a m e  as Block I. 
Changes that were  made were to aceommodate wider variations in spacecraft  
supplied p r ime  power voltage, o r  were  refinements of the circuitry based on 
experience o r  the resul t  of improved components that became available. 
Block I experience showed that the  added margin in IMU stablization stability 
provided by the  IMU Angular Differentiating Accelerometers (ADA) was not r e -  
quired. The ADAs and associated electronics were  deleted f rom the Block I1 
design. The  CDU was changed to  a n  a l l  electronic device and packaged separately,  
thus removing the  CDU electronics f r o m  the PSA. The IMU temperature  control 
was changed f r o m  a sophisticated proportional temperature  control scheme employing 
magnetic ampl i f iers  and pulse-width modulation techniques to  a much s imple r  
thermostatically controlled on-off type. Thus, a l l  the temperature  control electron- 
i c s  f rom the  PSA were  eliminated. As with Block I, functional subassemblies were  
packaged a s  s m a l l  modules that plugged into a prewired PSA header. Where pos- 
sible,  functionally s imi la r  subassemblies were  again packaged a s  identical modules. 
The  final Block I1 modules evolved satisfactori ly af ter  severa l  component value 
changes, brought about circuitry optimization. TheBlock I1 PSA encountered few 
component -associated problems during the  manufacturing period. 
Two capacitor fa i lures  did occur. One capacitor failed "open" because of 
inadequate metallization on the end of the roll .  Since only one par t  out of 8000 pur  - 
chased exhibited this fai lure mode, it was concluded that nopar t  problem was 
evidenced by th is  one failure.  Another capacitor "open" was found to be an inadequate 
internal  lead solder  connection. The vendor instituted corrective action by using a 
number of loops f o r  the  solder  termination to  replace the single loop of the  original  
design. A res i s to r  fai lure was attributed t o  a f rac tu re  of the glass subst ra te  on 
which the  res is tance element was formed, After considering the number of devices 
used versus  the  one failure encountered, it was concluded that no par t  problem 
existed with th is  type of component. 
Two instances of parts-oriented t rans i s to r  fai lures were encountered. F i r s t ,  
a gimbal s e r v o  exhibited a high offset  null during module testing. The cause  was 
found to  be unstable, long t e r m  drift character is t ics  of the t ransis tor  P / N  1010252-1. 
The correct ive  action was t o  add a high temperature  bias sc reen  t es t  requirement 
t o  the Specification Control Drawing. This screening enhanced the detection of 
surface  contamination of the part .  Two instances of cracked dies were discovered 
in  t r ans i s to r s  of the 800 Hz amplifier. The t rans i s to r s  were  changed to another 
type; no other  correct ive  action was taken. A design oriented diode problem occur-  
r ed  when diodes P / N  1010385 were  found t o  exhibit a lowering of forward breakdown 
voltage. This anomaly occurred a s  the pa r t s  were procured l a te r  in the program. 
This condition is generally recognized a s  an  improvement of diode character is t ics ,  
but not when used in a voltage-dependent bias circuit  such a s  was the  case.  A 
change in res i s to r  value was incorporated in the design to compensate for  the 
change in breakdown voltage. 
Changes and modifications to  the PSA electronics resulted because of sys tem 
tes t  resul ts ,  the inability to procure  specified par ts  over the life of the contract, 
and the  variation of component pa ramete rs  fo r  large  numbers of components. The 
gimbal servo amplifier required a change in  output t r ans i s to r s  a s  a resul t  of d i s -  
continuance of manufacture of the  originally specified part .  Feedback diodes of the  
se rvo  amplifier  had to be tightly specified a s  the program developed because of 
p a r t s  pa ramete r  variations. A design change was incorporated in  the 3200 Hz, 1% 
supply t o  prevent overshoot of the supply output a t  turn-on. System tes t s  had shown 
the  overshoot to be a factor  in gaussing of the PIP. 
4. 4 Inert ial  Measurement Unit ( IMU ) 
4. 4. 1 Mechanical Design 
The IMU consisted of th ree  single degree-of -freedom gyros (IRIGs) and 
th ree  single degree-of -freedom accelerometers (PIPAS) mounted on a stable 
member  which was isolated f r o m  vehicle orientation by a servo-driven th ree  degree-  
of -freedom gimbal system. The IMU gimbal sys tem consisted of a n  outer gimbal 
mounted to  the case,  a middle gimbal mounted to the outer gimbal, and the stable 
member ,  which served a s  the  inner gimbal, mounted to  the  middle gimbal. The 
gimbal arrangement was compatible with the spacecraf t ' s  Flight Director Attitude 
Indicators (FDA1 ) and had the  following defined axes: 
( 1 ) The outer axis was fixed to  the vehicle and was paral le l  to, and in the  
s a m e  direction as ,  the vehicle X-axis. 
( 2 )  The middle axis was parallel to, and in the same direction a s ,  the 
vehicle Z-axis  when the  outer  gimbal angle was zero .  
( 3 ) The inner  axis was paral le l  to, and in the s a m e  direction as ,  the vehicle 
Y-axis when the outer and middle gimbal angles were  zero .  
The IMU was secured to  a navigation base and aligned to the Optical Unit 
Assembly (OUA) axes within 0. 1 milliradian. F igure  3-1 schematically depicts 
the  general  gimbal configuration and axis definitions. 
The "ao2lowing is a description a$. the PMU eomponenb sta&ing with the stable 
member and proceeding o u h a r d s  to the case (Refer  to Figure 3-2  ), 
4 - 4 , 1 , 1  Stable Member Components, The stable member was a sh t e red  block of 
beryllium, machined to  accurately locate the inertial sensors and other components. 
The inertial  components were prealigned and electrically normalized on a tes t  stand 
before they were assembled into the stable member. This saved considerable align- 
ment adjustment at later stages of testing. 
The components on the stable member were: 
( 1 ) Three size 25 single degree-of -freedom Inertial Reference Integrating 
Gyro (IRIG) units. These were prealigned with respect to slots in the mounting 
hardware. They were accurately positioned by means of locating pins precisely 
located on the stable member. The gyro end-mount supported the necessary elec-  
tronics resulting in component interchangeability. The electronics included: 
microsyn suspension networks, temperature sensor normalization networks, temp- 
erature control heaters, torque generator normalization networks, and a signal 
generator preamplifier with normalized gain. 
( 2 ) Three size 16 single degree-of -freedom Pulsed Integrating Pendulums 
(PIPAS). They were also prealigned with respect to the mounting hardware and 
accurately positioned on the stable member by means of locating pins. Each PIP  
was provided with an end -mount heater. 
( 3 ) Gimbal-mounted electronics which were necessary to service suspension 
and output signals from the pendulous accelerometers. 
( 4 ) Temperature control heaters and sensors  which maintained the inertial 
components at  proper temperatures. 
( 5 ) A prewired harness -assembly which interconnected the stable member 
electrical components and also mated with the slip rings on the inter-gimbal assem-  
blies. 
4.4.1.2 Components on the Inner Axis. The stable member was supported on the 
middle gimbal by a pair of preassembled inter-gimbal assemblies, one on each end 
s f  the axis. Figure 4-26 depicts typical inter-gimbal assemblies. 

One inter-gimbal assembly contained a pancake-type dc servo-torque motor 
having a 3 .  8 inch diameter a i r  gap ( 3.. 1 2  f t .  -1bs. / amp) ,  a 40 circuit slip ring as - 
sembly, and a duplex pair of ball bearings preloaded to provide a predetermined 
axia.1 yield rate  of 7 micro-inches per  pound. The inter-gimbal assembly housing 
and stub shaft were made of beryllium. The stub shaft supported the torque motor 
rotor and slip ring assembly, The slip rings were terminated in connectors which 
interfaced with the stable member harness and the middle axis slip rings. The 
slip ring wires were clamped to the housing a few inches away from the slip ring 
assembly s o  that they flexed with slight oscillations of the gimbal without the slip 
rings and brushes moving in relation to one other. This eliminated slip ring wear 
under most operating conditions. The bearings were floated axially to allow for 
manufacturing tolerances and thermal expansion. 
The other inter -gimbal assembly contained a combination 1 speed -16 speed 
resolver transmitter,  a 1 speed gyro e r r o r  signal resolver, a 40 circuit slip ring 
assembly, and a duplex pair of ball bearings preloaded the same a s  those on the 
other end of the axis. The stub shaft supported the resolver rotors and slip ring 
assembly. The resolvers were accurately aligned, by the resolver manufacturer, 
with respect to alignment slots on the stub shaft and housing. These slots engaged 
pins on the stable member and middle gimbal. The bearings of this assembly were 
fixed and therefore provided axial support for the stable member. The axis of ro-  
tation, a s  determined by the bearings, defined the inner axis, which had unlimited 
rotation. 
4.4.1.3 Components on the Middle Gimbal. There were no electrical components on 
the middle gimbal. The middle gimbal was made up of two hydroformed 0. 040 inch 
thick aluminum hemispheres pinned and bolted together at brazed aluminum flanges. 
There were four additional flanges to which were attached the inner and middle axis 
inter-gimbal assemblies. Pins on these flanges picked up the alignment slots of 
the resolver inter -gimbal assemblies, 
4.4.1.4 Components on the Middle Axis. The middle gimbal was supported in the 
outer gimbal by a pair of pre-assembled inter-gimbal assemblies, one on each end 
of the middle axis. They were s imilar  to the inner axis inter-gimbal assemblies. 
One assembly contained a pancake type dc servo torque motor having a 3.8 diameter 
a i r  gap, a 40 circuit slip ring assembly, and a preloaded duplex pair of bearings. 
The bearings were floated axially. The other inter-gimbal assembly contained a 
combination 1 speed and 1 6  speed resolver, a 40 circuit slip ring assembly, and a 
fixed (not floating) duplex pair of preloaded ball bearings. The axis of rotation a s  
determined by the bearings defined the middle gimbal axis. The middle gimbal had 
unlimited rotational freedom about this axis. 
4,4.1,5 Components on the Outer Gimbal. The outer gimbal was made up of two 
--- 
hydroformed 0.  040 inchthick aluminum hemispheres pinned and bolted together at 
brazed aluminum flanges. There were four additional flanges to which were attached 
the middle and outer inter-gimbal assemblies. Pins on these flanges picked up the 
alignment slots of the resolver inter-gimbal assemblies. The outer gimbal had 
slots in it to permit forced convection of heated a i r  between the middle gimbal and 
the case. This was provided by two axial-flow blowers mounted on the outer gimbal. 
The slots also permitted assembly of the outer gimbal since the flanges were internal. 
4.4.1.6 Components on the Outer Axis. The outer gimbal was supported in the IMU 
case by a pair  of outer axis inter-gimbal assemblies, one at each end. They were 
also similar to the inner axis inter- gimbal assemblies. One assembly contained 
a pancake-type dc servo-torque motor having a 3 . 1 2 5  inch diameter a i r  gap, a 50 
circuit slip ring assembly, and a preloaded axially floating duplex pair of ball bear- 
ings. The other inter-gimbal assembly contained a combination 1 speed and 16 
speed resolver, a 50 circuit slip ring assembly and a fixed duplex pair of preloaded 
ball bearings. The axis of rotation determined by the bearings defined the outer 
axis. The outer gimbal had unlimited rotational freedom about this axis. 
4.4.1.7 Components on the IMU Case. The IMU case was made from0.060 inch 
thick aluminum hydroformed spherical sections with integral roll- bonded, inflated, 
coolant passages. Two Seaton-Wilson hydraulic quickdisconnect fittings were a t -  
tached for  connection to the spacecraft water-glycol coolant system. 
Mounting pads fo r  mounting the IMU to the navigation base were accurately 
machined to locate and align the IMU in two axes. The third axis was defined by 
dowel bushings which engaged accurate holes on slots in the IMU case and navigation 
base. 
Two 6 1  pin electrical connectors interfaced with the G &  N harness; they were 
keyed to  prevent incorrect mating. An electrical sixteen speed resolver adjustment 
module and a blower control relay were located inside one of the end covers that 
sealed each end of the outer axis. 
The case covers were sealed by the use of o- rings to effect a hermetic 
seal  of the IMU. This insured that the thermal transport medium ( a i r )  within the 
IMU would not leak out during vacuum operation. Another benefit of hermetic seal-  
ing was that a greater choice of engineering materials would be available inasmuch 
a s  the constraint on the use of toxic o r  odorous materials and lubricants, and the 
seizing of bearings in vacuum would be minimized. 
4,4.1,8 Size and Weight. The IMU c a s e  diameter was 12,5 inches; i d  was 14 inches 
a c r o s s  the end covers on the outer  axis. The voluirie of the %MU was approximately 
1100 cubic inches, and it weighed about 42. 5 pounds. 
4.4. 2 Thermal Design 
4.4.2.1 General. The IMU temperature control systems were designed to maintain 
the gyroscope and accelerometer operating temperature within narrow limits. 
Thermally, the IMU could have been viewed as three concentric aluminum spheres,  
the inner sphere a s  the middle gimbal, the next sphere as the outer gimbal and the 
external one a s  the case. 
A liquid-to-air heat exchanger covered pai-t of the surface a rea  of the case. 
Between the middle gimbal and case was an a i r  circuit that used two blowers 
mounted on the outer gimbal to force a i r  from the area of the middle gimbal towards 
the case heat exchanger. The IMU heat transfer is shown in Figure 4-27. 
The Block I and Block I1 IMU1s were thermally similar.  The respective 
temperature control schemes were also very similar. In both instances tempera- 
tu re  deviations from a fixed absolute temperature werc detected. These temper- 
a ture  deviations were used to control heater power to the stable member. The 
implementation of the control schemes was, however, different. 
4.4.2.2 Block I Thermal Design. The Block I IMU temperature control design was 
hampered from the s ta r t  by an inadequate definition of the environment within which 
the IMU was expected to perform. In particular, the spacecraft thermal environ- 
ment, primary coolant loop characteristics, and prime power voltage excursions 
were unknown. F o r  these reasons, an attempt was made to include much flexibility 
into the design in order  to be able to adjust to the actual environments as  they be- 
came better defined. 
The use of thermal heat of fusion materials to serve a s  a heat reservoir was 
considered early in the design. This approach was taken to conserve electrical 
power. A thermal study, one of the f i rs t  to define system operation fo r  a lunar 
landing mission, showed that though this concept was sound, the use of these ma-  
ter ia ls  was unworkable based on IMU time line usage. This approach was abandoned 
and an electronic temperature control system was designed. 
Fig. 4-27 IMU Heat Transfer Diagram 
The temperature control scheme utilized resi.stance wire temperature 
sensing elements located in the I316 end mountss. These sensing elements connected 
in ser ies ,  measured the average temperature of the three gyroscopes. They 
formed one a r m  of a four a rm resistance bridge. The rernainder of the bridge was 
located in the PSA. The bridge e r r o r  signal, proportional to the temperature d i f -  
ference between the actual average gyroscope temperature and the desired tempera- 
ture,  controlled the operation of magnetic amplifiers in the power servo assembly 
( PSA). These, in turn, provided power proportional to temperature deviation. 
The power was in the form of a 20V, 3200 pps pulse-width modulated square-wave 
voltage to the stable member heaters. 
An additional se t  of heaters, controlled by a thermostat on the stable 
member and powered directly from spacecraft prime power to the G& N system, 
comprised a redundant temperature control system. This did not provide the pre-  
cise control of the primary system but was adequate to satisfy the crew safety and 
mission success requirements. 
Temperature sensing thermistors within the gyroscopes were used to moni- 
t o r  the gyroscope temperature. They were connected in ser ies  and formed one 
a r m  of a four a r m  resistance bridge. The other elements of the bridge were 
located in the PSA. The e r r o r  signal output of this bridge controlled another mag- 
netic amplifier which turned on an alarm light if the gyro temperature exceeded 
specified limits. It also provided an output for telemetry of IRIG temperature and 
an output to the front of the PSA tray for  use by the in-flight failure monitor. 
The temperature sensing resistance elements of the accelerometers were 
used to monitor PIP temperature in a manner similar to the gyroscope monitoring 
scheme. 
The two blowers on the middle gimbal were used to vary the thermal r e -  
sistance between the inner gimbal and the case. Saturable reactors on the outer 
gimbal varied the blower speed a s  a function of stable member heater power. 
4.4.2.3 Block 11 Thermal Design. The Block I1 IMU temperature control design 
effort was undertaken to develop a smaller,  lighter, simpler, more reliable temp- 
erature control system for  the Block I1 IMU. Advantage was taken of the knowledge 
and experience gained from the Block I INIU. The Block I1 spacecraft was essen- 
tially identical to the Block P vehicle; therefore, the IMU environment was well 
known. A good thermal model of the IMU was developed fromBlock I experience. 
The uncontrolled IMU heat sources, e. g, , inertial components, torquers, r e -  
solvers, and gimbal mounted electronics, were well defined. 
Temperature  control. of t he  Block Il  was a.ccomplished by u s k g  a mercury  
thermostat  a s  the temperature  sensing element in bistable temperature control 
system. Additional mercury  thermostats were  used to provide an out-of - l imits 
temperature  a l a r m  indication and fo r  control of the two blowers. A sensor  
of this type was used in the Block I IMU for emergency control. It proved t o  be 
accurate,  stable,  extremely reliable and had a very smal l  dead band. F igure  4-28 
is an e lect r ica l  schematic diagram of the Block I1 temperature  control system. 
As with Block I, heaters  were located on each end of the gyroscopes and on 
one end of each accelerometer.  Two additional cartr idge heaters  were embedded 
within the  stable member .  Each of the  four thermosta t  modules contained one 
control, o r  anticipatory heater, and one bias heater.  Padding res i s to r s  were  placed 
in s e r i e s  with the heaters  to adjust the power in each heater. The temperature  
difference between the IRIGs and the P I P s  was adjusted by properly proportioning 
the  amount of power in each heater. 
The temperature  control power required to  keep the control thermostat  
within its l imi t  cycle operating range varied in response to  environmental and 
power changes within the  IMU. The effect of control  power variations on iner t ia l  
component temperature  was minimized by adjusting appropriate PIP  control heater 
and control thermostat  anticipatory heater  padding res is tors .  Fixed bias heat was 
applied to  the  PIPs  t o  bring them to  proper operating temperature  whenever the 
ISS was in the operate mode. The stable member  temperature  was affected by 
fluctuations in  gyro wheel power. As wheel power increased, f o r  example, because 
of an increase  in wheel voltage, the control power and therefore the stable member  
temperature  decreased.  To keep the P I P  temperature  f rom decreasing along with 
the  stable member ,  it was necessary to add m o r e  heat to  the PIPs. This was a c -  
complished by energizing the PIP fixed bias heaters  with gyro wheel supply voltage. 
The performance characterist ics of the temperature  control sys tem a r e  
shown in  Fig.  4-29. The thermostat  cycle of operation at 5070 duty cycle was 0.3 
while a t  the s a m e  t ime  the gyroscope limit cycle was attenuated to 0.00065 degree 
F and that of the accelerometers  to 0.009 degree  F. The stable member  temp-  
e ra tu re  continued t o  drop a s  the control power was increased, a s  one might expect, 
but the inert ial  component temperature  remained constant throughout the power 
range. The blower extended the dynamic range of operation, was infrequently used 
and was limit-cycled by a thermostat. There  were  two separate  sensors  to  detect 
temperature  extremes and ale13 the astronauts.  In addition, high l imit  mechanica.1 
thermostats were  used in every heater  power line to  prevent an over  heated condi- 
tion. These  were  s e t  to open the heater power a t  a temperature of about loop over  
the  normal  control temperature .  These were ra re ly  used but when necessary  p r e -  
vented damage to  valuable equipment, 
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4. 4. 3 Mechanical Tests  
4.4.3.1 Acceleration, The Block I and Block II mechanical integrity IMUs were 
accelerated at 10, 20, and 30 g ' s  along their outer axis. These tests were run to 
determine the torque motor capabilities. 
Torque ( % of max. ) 
1 g 
10 g ' s  
20 g 's  
30 g ' s  
The gimbal breakaway torques were measured before and after these tests with no 
significant change measured. 
( 1 )  General - -  Two mechanical evaluation IMUs were built for both Block I 
and Block 11: a Vibration Model (IMU-VM and IMU 200-VM) and a Mechanical 
Integrity Model ( IMU-2 and IMU -200-2 ). The vibration models contained a dummy 
mass  to simulate the stabilized member, and contained aluminum stub shafts and 
bearing mounts sized to simulate the stiffness of the final IMU design. Tolerances 
were loose and no torque motors o r  resolvers were installed. This model was 
used to determine resonant frequencies and transmissibilities. 
The mechanical integrity IMUs were identical to functional IMUs with 
dummy inertial components that contained the vibration and acceleration pickups. 
These IMUs were used for  vibration, acceleration, and shock tests  to evaluate 
the adequacy of the mechanical design. 
( 2 )  Vibration Tests - -  The IMU models were vibrated at 1, 2,  & 3 g ' s  ( rms)  
sinusoidal input with a logarithmic frequency sweep from 20-2000-20 Hz. in 16 
minutes along each axis. Each IMU was also vibrated with a 5 g ( rms  ) random 
noise input, per  the NAA specification, along each axis. The results of these tests 
indicated resonant frequencies varying from 110 to 170 Hz. with transmissibilities 
of 7 to 22.  A problem developed during the initial vibration tests  of the Block I IMU 
and dampers were added. This is discussed in Section 4.4.4.2. The Block 11 IMU 
vibration t e s t s  verified that  the design w a s  a d ~ q n a t e ,  A Block I1 %MU was vibrated 
on the GM and L M  navigation bases. The vibration input to the navigation base was 
in accordance with ei ther the NAA o r  the GAEC random vibration specification. In 
each case ,  the input to the IMU was much l e s s  s e v e r e  than the sinusoidal inputs 
used during the design evaluation tes ts .  
( 3 ) Shock T e s t s  - - The Block II IMU was subjected to 20 g peak, sawtooth, 
6 ms r i s e ,  and 1 m s  decay t ime  shocks twice along each axis with no problems de -  
veloping. 
4.4.3.3 Leak Tests .  Al l  IMU c a s e  par ts  were helium leak-checked p r io r  to assembly.  
IMUs were  p ressur ized  to  24.7 psia fo r  varying lengths of t ime  and during the 
shock and vibration t e s t s  with no measurable  change in pressure .  
4 .4 .4  Design Prob lems  
4.4.4.1 Changes in Materials .  A brief review of the mater ia ls  incorporated in the 
Block I and Block I1 Apollo IMUs showed that the re  were  two that were new and 
different to  th is  type of system. These  were: ( 1 ) the fr ict ion mater ia l  that was 
used in the vibration dampers  of the  Block I - 1 C O  sys tems,  and ( 2 )  the Roll-Bond 
mate r i a l  used f o r  both the Block I and Block I1 water -glycol c a s e  heat  exchangers. 
Vibration dampers  were  added t o  the Block I IMUs when a high vibration 
transmissibil i ty was discovered during ear ly  tes ts .  The selection of the type of 
damper  and mate r i a l  was greatly influenced by the limited space available in  the  
IMU. Some important character is t ics  that the damper  mater ia l  had to  possess  
were  ( 1 ) l a rge  dynamic coefficient of friction, ( 2 ) good wear res is tance ,  ( 3 ) be 
very  rigid, ( 4 ) stable under high temperatures ,  and ( 5 ) be machineable. 
Johns Manville fr ict ion mater ia l  s tyle #230 was determined to be the optimum 
available mate r i a l  f o r  this  application. Final  inspection of IMU -2, af ter  vibration 
t e s t s ,  revealed that the dampers  and f r ic t ion mate r i a l  had not degraded sys tem 
performance.  
An initial requirement f o r  the Apollo IMU was that the fluid heat exchanger 
should be  a n  integral  pa r t  of the IMU. This led to  the idea of using a ro l l -  bond 
m a t e r i a l  ( s i m i l a r  to that  used in  r e f r ige ra to r s  ) which had many advantages such 
a s  light weight, low the rmal  resistance,  and required minimum volume in the  CM 
and LM. 
Techniques f o r  roll-bonding of f l a tpane l s  were well establi.shed. However., 
it was necessary  to develop techniques to hydroform these panels into hemispheres,  
inflate the passages af ter  hydroforming, and then machine and braze  the pa r t s  to  
f o r m  the spher ical  €MU case .  The mater ia l  f o r  the rol l -  bond par t s  was bf6061 
aluminum clad with #lP00 aluminum to insure  a good bond. During fabrication of 
the  IMU case,  a hydrostatic proof t e s t  was performed a t  90 psig to  insure  that  the 
p a r t s  were  structurally sound. 
4.4.4.2 Vibration Problems.  As a result  of high vibration magnification seen a t  
the  resonant frequency on the Block I IMU,. fatigue c racks  developed in the  middle 
and outer  axis stub shafts. Consequently, the stub shafts  had to be redesigned and 
vibration dampers  added t o  each axis in the torque motor  inter-gimbal assemblies .  
St ra in  gage t e s t s  then indicated a reduction in the stub shaft s t r e s s e s  by a factor  
of 3. This,  with the reduction of the transmissibil i ty by the  addition of dampers ,  
resulted in a reduction of the s t r e s s e s  in the  stub shafts t o  a level well below the  
fatigue l imit  of the  mater ia l .  
Various types of dampers  were tested and a friction damper,  which was the  
best for  the space available, was added at the floated bearings. 
4.4.4.3 Thermal  Problems.  The Block I temperature  control system proved to be 
ve ry  reliable and presented very few problems af ter  the design was completed. 
Considerable effort was expended in developing the magnetic amplifiers. Because 
weight was a major  consideration in the overall  G & N design, the early magnetic 
amplifiers were designed to  be a s  compact a s  possible. This led t o  the  use  of very 
s m a l l  wire  s i zes  and resulted in fai lures f rom wire breakage. The amplifiers 
were  redesigned in somewhat l a r g e r  packages with heavier wire; consequently, no 
fur ther  fa i lures  occurred.  
Another sys tem problem was discovered during early sys tem tes ts .  The 
3200 pps pulse-width modulated temperature  control power was observed to generate 
6400 pps spikes which could be seen  throughout the  sys tem.  An IMU wiring harness  
change reduced these  spikes to tolerable levels. 
The Block I1 sys tem initially had severa l  mercury  thermostat  fai lures.  All 
of these fa i lures  indicated handling in excess of the  specified 100 g 's .  A design 
change was made to  incorporate a mercury thermostat  with a 500 g, 2 millisecond 
duration specification, thus solving a l l  breakage problems. 
4.4-4-4 1nCergin1ha.l Component Problems. F o u r  types of components were clustered 
- - 
about the  bearings of the  IMU: one gimbal-angle resolver  transmi"cer, one torque 
motor,  two s l ip-r ing assembl ies  p e r  axis,  plus a single g y r o - e r r o r  r e so lve r  on the 
inner axis.  'The torque motors  were completely t rouble-f ree  and need not 
be discussed fur ther .  The resolvers  were  subjected to minor changes in design. 
Only the s l ip-r ing assembl ies  caused significant problems p r io r  to qualification, 
but these  had been well defined by the Block I experience; hence, Block I1 procure-  
ment was able to proceed with reasonable confidence. A m o r e  detailed study of the 
reso lve r s  and sl ip-ring assembl ies  follows. 
( 1) Gimbal-Angle Resolver Transmi t t e r s  - -  The Block 11 gimbal-angle r e -  
so lve r  was a dual pancake unit consisting of one-speed and sixteen-speed resolver  
t r ansmi t t e r s  wound on the s a m e  iron core .  The two resolvers  were  wound a s  to 
have no mutual coupling; thus they functioned a s  separa te  resolvers  while occupying 
l i t t le  m o r e  space  than a comparable sixteen-speed unit alone. 
The principal  problem in applying this  resolver  was attributed to  the require-  
ment  imposed by the Block I1 CDU that  the  low s ide  of the 16X s ine  and cosine winding 
be made  common to ground. T h e r e  was a distributed s t r a y  capacitance between the 
two secondary phases that caused a circulating current  via the common low. A 
suitable equivalent circuit  to  i l lus t ra te  the  effects  of the  s t r a y  capacitance a t  800 Hz 
is shown in F igure  4-30. 
Fig. 4-30 Effects of Stray Capacitance 
Z S S  is  the short -circuit output impedance of the resolver, and C is one-half 
the M a 1  capacitance between the secondary phases. Both an e r ro r  in indicated 
angle and an additional quadra.ture voltage were impressed on the CDU input voltages 
by current flowing through capacitance C and the equivalent output impedances. 
Within a close approximation, both the e r r o r  and the quadrature had the form cos 
(32A). Whereas e r r o r s  of this form a r e  usually corrected in high accuracy resolvers, 
there was no simple method to suppress this quadrature. As a result, a decision 
to wind the 16X secondaries for  a step-down voltage ratio was made. The output 
impedance was greatly reduced and the s t ray capacitance reduced a s  well. 
The other problematical feature of the Block I1 gimbal-angle resolver was 
increased e r ro r s  a s  compared with the Block I design. This was essentially caused 
by the rather poor shape of the iron core required to minimize the IMU size. 
Another factor was less  accurate ( although within tolerance) grinding of the beryl- 
lium parts that mount the resolver as  compared to the Block I parts (which had 
been subcontracted to a beryllium specialty house). In order  to get reasonable 
yield, the vendor altered the winding pattern to further cancel some slot harmonics 
in the e r rors ,  and the specified maximum e r r o r  was raised from 20 to 25 a r c  seconds. 
( 2 )  Gyro-Error  Resolver - -  The gyro e r r o r  resolver was mounted on the 
inner axis, adjacent to the gimbal angle resolver. The e r r o r  signals of the X and 
Z gyroscopes were rotated by this resolver into middle-gimbal coordinates, mak- 
ing the operation of the gimbal servos independent of the inner gimbal angle. 
The principal constraints on the design of this resolver were: 
a. It had to  function with small  signals when the gyros were near null and 
yet not saturate before the gyro preamplifiers did. This requirement necessitated 
an iron core with excellent linearity. 
b. It had to be shielded from the adjacent gimbal-angle resolver. 
c. Its axial width including the shields had to be small  to conserve space 
and weight. 
d.  Its impedance levelhad to be a reasonable compromise between loading 
effects on the gyro preamplifiers, and i ts  contribution to source impedance for  the 
wiring capacitance and demodulator loading. In this regard, one must note that 
the demodulator load was a function of applied voltage. Also observe that both 
signal phase shift a s  well as magnitude had to be maintained across the resolver. 
e ,  An 0,003 inch minimum a i r  gap was specified f o r  the resolver to insure 
against mechanical interference resulting from tolerance accumulation and s t ress  
effects. 
f ,  The shields influenced the performance of both the gyro e r ro r  and the 
gimbal angle resolver. 
The difficult design problem of the inner-axis resolvers was attenuating the 
3200 Hz cross-coupling between them. Only one vendor achieved the specifications 
and qualified a s  a source. Because the shield design would be much easier with 
more axial space, this problem interacted strongly with other parameters which 
could have been improved with more space. In the meantime, those responsible 
fo r  stabilization loop design were evaluating the gyro e r r o r  resolver design based 
on a "figure of merit" consisting of the ratio of tuned open circuit input impedance 
to the magnitude of the short-circuit output impedance. Such a figure, being based 
on effects in the stabilization loop circuits only, did not weigh the more complex 
aspects of space and cross  -coupling. 
Although prototype gyro e r ro r  resolvers successfully met a l l  the specifica- 
tions, a difficulty developed in production. Impedances and the "figure of merit" 
were highly sensitive to  both a i r  gap length and lamination magnetic properties. In 
early 1966, a position was reached where almost no yield was obtained that met the 
minimum a i r  gap and also the required impedance. To keep on schedule, a few units 
were accepted to a revision of the specification calling for a minimum a i r  gap of 
2 . 2  rather than 3.0 mils. This was made possible without reducing the minimum 
running clearance by performing the final grinds with the laminations already mounted 
in the stub shaft and bearing mount. Meanwhile, a new winding was designed which, 
with a 3-mil a i r  gap, achieved rather different but quite acceptable impedances. 
( 3 ) Slip-Ring Assemblies - - The Block I1 slip -ring assemblies never actually 
caused significant problems. This was true, however, only because a number of 
steps taken to achieve qualification of the Block I assemblies paved the way for  
Block 11. The ensuing discussion will therefore be a short review of Block Iprob- 
lems, solutions, and resulting effects on Block 11. 
The early Apollo experience with slip rings was based on assemblies from 
Electro-Tec, Poly Scientific, and Collectron Corporations, Between experience in 
prototype IMUs and attempts to qualify all three sources, an impressive list of 
failures was accumulated. Contamination, bearing failures, high noise, i. e., r e -  
sistance variation with rotation, and various minor mechanical problems were 
experienced, Poly Scientific Corporation was elimina.ted when they were unable to 
cure a contamhation problem after many a.t"crnpts, Gollectron had trouble main- 
taining bearing preload but was eliminated mainly because of high wear and noise 
early in ah1 life tes ts ,  This left Electro Tec, who had experienced numerous small 
bearing failures caused by contamination after exposure to a severe humidity cycle. 
Electro Tec also had some out-of-tolerance noise at the conclusion of the life 
test. 
The prospects of the Electro Tec units actually were found to be good. They 
had experienced difficulty only with the smaller bearing. Their Block 11 design 
used two of the larger  size, however. Furthermore, on teardown, most bearing 
failures were found to be the result of improper lubrication. Consequently, Electro 
Tec began buying the bearing pre-lubricated with good results. Next, a humidity 
cycle was specified which more realistically represented the actual conditions of 
storage and use, and the contamination failures ceased. Finally it was recognized 
that the life test, o r ,  officially, Extended Performance Test, was conducted with 
oscillations and slews which gave rotational rates up to three times those in an 
IMU under a locked -gimbal tumble. After changing to a more realistic activity 
level during the test ,  Electro Tec slip ring assemblies completed life testing within 
the specified noise limits. (The  10 cpm -1- 360°/ -360' oscillation was changed to 
2 cps, 3' - +lo  double amplitudedither, superimposed over a 112 to 2 rpm rotation. ) 
These noise limits, more nearly,although still severe, simulated the con- 
ditions expected in testing and operation of the IMU. The actual slip ring motions 
in an IMU were impossible to duplicate exactly since they depended on test  o r  flight 
conditions. F o r  a large percent of the time during tests  o r  flight the brushes were 
not moving over the rings since the IMU was stabilized o r  was moving at meru 
rates  as  a result of gyro drift. Periodically, the brushes were rotated to a new 
position when the IMU was rotated to a new position by the test fixture o r  the space- 
craft. As the axes arrived at a new orientation, there were some minute (seconds of 
a r c )  random oscillations a s  the IMU nulled itself at the new location. The normal 
wear of the slip ring in the IMU was caused by random oscillations. The slow rpm 
was superimposed so  that all  areas  of the ring were checked since the location of 
the brushes on the ring varied from slip ring to slip ring in the IMU. A relatively 
high rpm test  was included every 100 hours to simulate the condition during tests 
where a malfunction in the system would cause a gimbal axis to rotate with full 
torque from the torque motors. The 600 rpm requirement in the original tes t  was 
in e r r o r  and was changed to 200 rpm since the EMU was limited to less  than this 
rate  because of friction and motor back emf. 
The resu.lts were that Elect ro  Tee Corporation was the only qualified sup-  
pl ier  of Block 1 sl ip ring assemblies  and became the principal supplier  f o r  Block 11 
while other manufacturers attempted to  c u r e  thei r  djff iculties and qualify fo r  
Block IS, 
Coupling Display Unit ( CDU ) 
4.5. 1 Block I CDU 
The Block I coupling display units provided a coupling between the Apollo 
Guidance Computer (AGC) o r  the  astronaut and the  IMU and the optics. Either 
the  AGC o r  the  astronaut could have transmitted angular data to the IMU. The CDU 
also  provided the astronaut with a visual  readout of the IMU and optics angular data 
during the  coarse  align, f ine align, and manual CDU modes of operation. Desired 
angles were  transmitted by the CDU loop to  the IMX in analog f o r m  during the  coarse  
align and manual CDU modes. The CDU loop was also capable of repeating the IMU 
gimbal angles and the optics angles, and transmitting this angular data t o  the AGC 
in digital f o r m  in the  fine align mode. The CDUs in the  ISS could also have been 
used to provide a coupling between the astronaut o r  AGC and the spacecraft  autopilot. 
Five  CDUs were  required by the  G &  N system, th ree  in the ISS, and two in the 
optical subsystem (OSS ). Each CDU contained a servo motor-tachometer, four  
resolvers ,  a digital encoder, th ree  display dials, and a thumbwheel; a l l  were inter-  
connected by a s ta inless  s t ee l  g e a r  train.  Each CDU also contained a slew switch, 
which was not utilized in  the OSS CDU loop application. The gear  t r a in  was driven 
by e i ther  the thumbwheel o r  the servo motor-tachometer. The se rvo  motor-  
tachometer was an  800 cps unit that drove the CDU gear  t r a in  and produced a feed- 
back signal proportional to  the  output shaft rate.  The motor was driven by the 
Motor Drive Amplifier (MDA) in the PSA. Input signals to  the  MDA were received 
f r o m  the CDU resolvers ,  the digital-to-analog converter  in the  PSA, and the slew 
switch, al l  of which represented CDU loop e r r o r s .  The motor converted the various 
CDU loop e r r o r  signals into the appropriate output shaft angle and velocity. The 
tachometer provided a negative feedback signal proportional t o  the motor shaft 
speed to  the MDA. The slew switch provided a 6.25 Volt, 800 Hz signal of ze ro  
o r  pi phase to  the MDA to  position the  ISS CDUs during the manual CDU mode of 
operation. The four reso lvers  were  utilized either for  angular data transmission 
o r  angular e r r o r  resolution. The specific resolvers  utilized and the i r  functions 
depend on the CDU application. The digital encoder (F igure  4-31 ) converted the 
angular motion of the  CDU output shaft into a digital signal which could be used by 
the  AGC. 
25.6 KHz EXCITATION 
Fig. 4 -3  1 Digital Encoder, Functional Diagram 
The digital encoder consisted of a digital pickoff gear,  two U-shaped digital 
pickoff heads, and the encoder electronics. P r i m a r y  and secondary coils  were  
wound-on each of the two legs of each pickoff head. The p r imary  coil was excited 
with 25.6 k Hz. The secondary coils were connected in opposition. When the 
movable a r m a t u r e  (pickoff g e a r )  was symmetrically located between each of the  
two legs ,  the mutual inductance between the two legs was the same. Since the 
secondaries were wound in opposition, no output voltage resulted. This position of 
the gea r  was re fe r red  to a s  the null position. If the a rmature  was displaced f r o m  
the  null position, a g rea te r  voltage was induced in one of the coils. Motion of the 
gea r  tooth in the opposite direction s imi lar ly  produced a g rea te r  output voltage in 
the other coil. The output voltage varied sinusoidally with the displacement of the 
g e a r  teeth. Thus, this  device modulated the  excitation at  a frequency proportional 
t o  the velocity of the armature.  The second pickoff head was located s o  that its 
output voltage would be displaced f rom the first output voltage by 90 degrees.  The 
relat ive phasing between the two outputs indicated the direction of shaft movement. 
The f i r s t  pogtion of the  digital encoder electronics was a preamplif ier  which 
was followed by a synchronous demodulator. The output of the demodulator was 
converted into square  waves by the Schmitt t r igger.  The square  wave outputs were  
then fed into a logic network which identified the direction of rotation and produced 
voltage spikes on one output line ( +  ~ 4 )  f o r  clockwise rotation of shaft and on the 
other l ine ( - A $ )  fo r  counterclockwise rotation. These spikes were  then converted 
to  the proper  logic level  f o r  the AGC by pulse shaping networks. Each pulse 
presented to  the AGC represented 40 arc-seconds of shaft  t r ave l  when used with the 
ISS, o r  20 arc-seconds when used with the optics. The logic of the encoder elec- 
t ronics  provided two distinct encoder modes of operation, ei ther one pulse p e r  gea r  
tooth o r  two pulses p e r  g e a r  tooth. Again, the modes of operation depended on 
subsystem mechanization. 
While the digital encoder was providing the AGC with information about the 
position of the CDU, the  AGC had also to  be provided with a means of controlling 
the  movement of the CDU. This was accomplished by the digital-to-analog converter  
(DAC).  The DAC received commands f r o m  the AGC and converted these commands 
t o  an  electr ical  output usable in  the MDA. The inputs f r o m  the  AGC were  pulses of 
The feedback signal  f r o m  the encoder a lso  consisted of pulses,  but the repetition 
r a t e  varied according t o  the speed of encoder pickoff gea r  rotation. The AGC inputs 
caused a capacitor in the DAC to  be charged. The charge on this  capacitor was 
reflected into the DAC output s tage  by two integrated choppers operating at  800 Hz 
The output of the DAC was an 800 Hz square  wave with a maximum amplitude of 
approximately 10 Volts peak-to -peak. This output was utilized by the motor  drive 
ampl i f ier  to  position the  CDU. The negative feedback f rom the  encoder was required 
to  insure  that only a defined amount of CDU movement p e r  pulse would occur f rom 
the  AGC. The encoder input discharged the capacitor that had previously been 
charged by the AGC input, therebyshutting off the DAC. 
4. 5. 2 Block I1 
The Block I1 coupling data unit comprised the centra l  angle junction box 
between the IMU, optics, computer and the certain portions of the spacecraft analog 
e lec t r ica l  interfaces. T h e r e  were  three  basic portions of the CDU: the angle read 
sys tem o r  analog -to -digital conversion process,  the digital-to -analog conversion 
process ,  and a portion of the moding controls f o r  the guidance system. The 
analog-to-digital sys tem is covered in some  detail while the o ther  portions a r e  only 
briefly described. 
4.5,2,1 Aria-log-to-digital Conversion, Angle information was stored in a Lwo-speed 
-- -- - -- 
resolver  sys tem of a control member ,  f o r  example, a gimbal axis o r  an optical 
axis ( s e e  Figure  4-32 ). The output of the resolver  was proportional to sin 8 ,  
cos  8 ,  cos 8 ,  s inq0,  cos q0, where q was a binary number, It was a common teeh-  
nique to  have both the single speed and multiple speed resolver  use the sa-me i ron 
and utilize a single excitation winding. The second excitation winding space, phased 
go0 with respect  t o  the pr imary excitation, was used f o r  electrical  ze ro  adjustment. 
The  elements of the angle read system were  a n  analog multiplication of the  resolver  
output, an analog summation, a sampler  and quantizer, a storage counter t o  control  
the  analog multiplication, and a c  switches controlled by the counter to gate inputs 
t o  the  analog multiplier. 
The equation mechanized was : 
s in  8 cos  G - cos 0 s i n *  = s in  (0 - * )  
cos9 c o s *  + s i n  0 s i n *  = cos (8 -* ) 
where $ is a quantized angle in increments of 22-11 2 electrical  degrees,  and 0 is 
the  angle of the control member.  
As shown in Figure 4-33, this output was summed with a quantized l inear  
interpolakion of difference between sin (6' - $ ) and8 . The selection of the quantized 
angle and the quantized l inear interpolation ang led ,  was based upon the contents 
of an angle counter register .  The angle counter inputs were gated by the phase of 
the  summed voltages. Thus when the contents of the counter were equal to  the 
control member  angle: 
s in  ( 8  - @  ) + K cos (8  - + )  = 0 
The inputs to the counter were  angle increments of the control member  and these 
were  parallel-fed to the computer where the same control member  angle information 
was stored. 
Analog multiplication of the resolver  s in  8 and cos 8 voltage was accomplished 
by the use  of an a c  operational amplifier with the ratio of the feedback res i s to r  to 
the  input regis tor  equal to  the cosine of the angle* S was an a c  transistorized 
switch gated closed o r  opened by contents of the angle counter res i s to r .  The switch 
was in s e r i e s  with the feedback res i s to r  to take advantage of the high impedance 
open condition and low impedance closed condition which made the  impedance 
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equivalent t o  a portion of the amplifier gain, K .  Since the switch was effectively 
a single-pole double-throw switch, the output of the  open side differed f rom zero 
only by the input signal divided by the amplifier gain. Using the technique of t r an-  
sistorized a c  switches and operational amplifiers,  the read system was mechanized. 
The read counter contained 16 bits. The lowest o r d e r  bit was used to eliminate 
transmitt ing any l imit  cycle operation to  the computer and thus avoided creating 
unnecessary activity. The four  highest o rder  bits were  used f o r  quadrant selection 
and multiplication of the  single speed resolver ($ In addition, the bits 2' - 2 11 
were used a s  an approximate l inear interpolation of the single speed resolver  to 
within 2.  81° of the  actual  angle. The multiple speed resolver  ( sixteen speed ) was 
the precision angle transmitting device. The zero-to-peak e r r o r s  of this resolver 
were  l e s s  than 10 seconds of arc .  There was crossover  between the  sixteen speed 
and the single speed reso lvers  to assure  synchronization of the reading of sixteen 
speed resolver  within the proper cycle. The lowest order  bits were a l inear in ter-  
polation of e r r o r  using the voltage of the cos ( 0  - d/ ) a s  a source. This voltage had 
the s a m e  phase relation a s  the s in  (8 - Q ) of the sixteen speed resolver  and was 
scaled correctly by the resolver  attenuation. 
Referring to  F igure  4-34, the input to  the e r r o r  detector was the sum of 
the single speed multiplication, the sixteen speed multiplication and the l inear 
interpolation. There  was a coarse-fine mixing network to assure  synchronization 
and angle measurement using the precision resolver.  The e r r o r  detector contained 
an active feedback quadrature re jector  network which f o r  large  e r r o r  signals 
would not introduce dynamic e r r o r s  f o r  reading the  angle, but f o r  smal l  e r r o r s  
would yield the proper  precision, The output oi the e r r o r  detector was fed to  both 
the r a t e  selection logse and up-down counter logic, The contents of the counter 
were  used to control the a c  swlteiles fo r  the rnuitlpl~catron of the reso lve r  voltages 
and the l inear interpolator. 
The e r r o r  detector had three-s ta te  o r  ternary  logic. The lowest o r d e r  
pulse ra te  command to  the counter was 800 pulses p e r  second. Using this  a s  the 
lowest o rde r  assured switching of equal multiples of the resolver  c a r r i e r  frequency, 
800 Hz, which prevented rectification of the switched signal and al tering of the 
dynamic operation of the  read system. 
The high speed ra te  following command reduced dynamic e r r o r  f o r  high 
angular velocity inputs and the low speed command ra te  reduced the l imit  cycle 
e r r o r ,  
The l inear  interpolation constant K was adjusted to minimize the  peak e r r o r  
E = sin ( 6  - $ )  - K cos (6 - $  ) 
By suitably choosing K,  the e r r o r  f o r  the speed resolver  sys tem could be reduced 
t o  l e s s  than 10 arcseconds.  F o r  a 64 speed system a s  used on the optics trunnion, 
th is  e r r o r  was reduced to l e s s  than 2 arcseconds,  
8, (GIMBAL ANGLE) 
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Fig. 4-34 Coarse-fine Mixing (1 and 16  Speed Resolver) 
In addition, a bias was added to  fu r the r  reduce the e r r o r s  over  the range 
of l inear  interpolation. This resulted in a system with e r r o r s  within the range of 
predicted e r r o r s .  
All digital functions including the memory were mechanized with a th ree  in-  
put NOR gate, a silicon s emiconductor m i c r o  -integrated circuit .  This was the 
s a m e  element used in the computer. Direct-coupled t rans is tor ized logic was used 
throughout. A multiple phase clock sys tem,  generated within the  CDU and syn- 
chronized t o  the guidance computer, was used to control a l l  functions. 
4,5.2,2 Moding and Digital-to-analog Conversion. The guidance computer served 
-- ---- 
a s  the  important link between the spacecraf t  and the sensing device. All angle 
transformations were  made by the guidance computer based upon IMU gimbal angles 
o r  optics angles. F o r  any s teer ing function utilizing the IMU, the  computer through 
the  use  of knowledge of the gimbal angles provided s teer ing and attitude commands 
to  the  spacecraft  via the digital-to-analog converter .  The angle information was 
always stored in the resolvers ,  and no mechanical rezeroing of the IMU was neces-  
s a r y  to establish within the  counter the INIU gimbal angle within the uncertainty of 
the  resolver ,  the e r r o r  of the read sys tem and the bit s i ze  of the analog-to-digital 
converter .  
The digital-to-analog converter  syskem was required to accept digital com- 
vnands froin the guidance computer and generate analog voltages ( a c  and dc ) 
proportional to these  commands. The e r r o r  angle cou-nter was an eight bit up-down 
counter. Computer commands were stored in this  countei-. The counter was 
logically controlled to prevent it f r o m  being r e s e t  to  zero  in the event it was com- 
9 
manded to  m o r e  than 10  increments. The analog e r r o r  signals were developed by 
a n  800-Hz source  gated by the counter contents through a res is tance  ladder to the 
input of a n  operational amplif ier .  F o r  polarity, r eve rsa l  by switching was used t o  
command the 0 phase  o r  n phase 800-Hz input to  the ladder. All analog voltages 
used a s  s teer ing commands to the LEM, Spacecraft o r  other portions of the Apollo 
launch vehicle were  dc-isolated f r o m  the guidance sys tem,  ei ther by t r ans fo rmers  
o r  an isolated demodulator, 
The moding of the system was almost  entirely controlled by the computer. 
Provision was made f o r  two modes to  be controlled by the astronaut. One mode was 
the  cage function. In the event of a spacecraft  tumble and loss  of attitude, provision 
was made f o r  the astronaut to cage the IMU gimbals with respect  t o  the spacecraft  
af ter  he has  f i r s t  stabilized the craft.  This then gave him a means of obtaining a 
new reference  in  a very  shor t  time. The other  manual mode was s i m i l a r  in  that 
with the computer not operating he could use  the  s a m e  switch to cage the IMU with 
respect  to  the spacecraft ,  r e l ease  it, and again use  the IMU a s  an attitude reference,  
In all. other iner t ia l  subsystems,  moding was controlled by the computer. 
There  were  a number of interesting modes possible because of the flexibility of the 
CDU. The Coarse  Align Mode, that of commanding the IMU gimbal angles by the 
resolvers ,  was r a t e  controlled to  limit angular velocity input to the gyroscopes. 
The input to  the  e r r o r  detector was summed with the analog command f rom the 
computer to  provide s table  operation. The gimbal angle pulse increments f rom the  
read sys tem were  used as feedback pulses to  the e r r o r  angle counter. 
4. 5. 3 CDU Problems 
4.5.3.1 Block I Problems.  - The problems associated with the Block I CDU were  of 
a mechanical nature. The gear  t r a ins  used with the CDU exhibited excessive wear,  
and a few units "froze" in  operation. To c o r r e c t  this  fai lure mode, a carefully 
selected lubricant was added to the gears .  Another gear  box associated fai lure was 
with the motor  tachometer  supplied by one of the two vendors of this  component. 
Because of mechanical tolerances,  i t  "froze" a t  elevated temperatures .  The c o r -  
rective action f o r  this  fa i lure  was to select  the motor-tachometer f rom the  vendor 
whose product did not exhibit th is  fai lure mode. 
4-5.3.2 Block II Problems The operation of the CDU, in a sys tem configuration, 
-- 
disclosed two problems that required design changes, 
( 1 ) The coarse-f ine  c rossover  f o r  the CDU was originally designed to take 
place at a mzximum c o a r s e  e r r o r  of 9 degrees ,  System tes t s  showed that under 
cer ta in  conditions a n  oscil latory l imit  cycle condition developed between the coarse  
and fine sys tems,  A design change was made to  reduce the c rossover  point to 
7 .  5 degrees  f r o m  null. This solved the problem. 
( 2 ) The CDU contained capacitor -coupled t r ans i s to r  switches a s  shown. 
Immediately following power application o r  af ter  long periods of inactivity, the dc 
charge  that would normally accumulate on the capacitor would not be present  o r  
would have "leaked off. I '  
When switching action was initiated, the charging action of the coupling 
capacitor in conjunction with the frequency response of the operational amplif ier  
would c rea te  a low frequency "bounce" on the output of the switch. The cumulative 
effect of severa l  switches being activated during coarse  alignment of the IMU would 
cause  the  input limiting diodes of the e r r o r  amplif ier  to be driven into the active 
region and effectively shor t  out the ac e r r o r  signal  to  the amplifier. See following 
illustration. 
i RNARIES LIMITING DIODES 
- 
With the l o s s  of this  e r r o r  signal, the read counter would not increment and 
t 
I 
of the feedback pulses to subtract  the "loaded" angle, when the gimbals moved, the 
e r r o r  counter would overflow on subsequent computer commands producing a l o s s  
of information to the CDU and a failure t o  achieve the commanded CDU angle. 
The diodes were  removed and the e r r o r  amplifier modified to improve i t s  
saturation character is t ics  thus producing a l a r g e r  l inear  operational region. 
( 3 )  The Block I1 CDU encountered severa l  component associated problems 
during the manufacturing period of the Apollo program. The part  types that exhibited 
fai lure modes were (1) RTL micrologic, (2) t r ans i s to r s ,  (3) t r ans fo rmers ,  
(4) capacitor,  (5) re lays ,  and (6) r e s i s to r s .  
a. The micrologic NOR gates used in  the digital modules of the CDU 
exhibited both "open" gate fai lures and "shorted" gate fai lures during subassembly 
testing a t  AC Electronics Corporation. The majori ty of the fai lures occurred during 
vibration tes ts .  A minority of the fai lures were attributed to over-voltage s t r e s s  ap- 
plied by the t e s t  fixture during the ear ly  s tages  of the program. 
The fai lures induced by the vibration of the modules were attributed to  con- 
taminants within the flatpack of the micrologic. A "screening" vibration t e s t  was 
conducted at the module manufacturer to  remove this mode of failure. The vibration 
"screening" vibrated the micrologic flatpacks along th ree  perpendicular axes. 
b. The t r ans i s to r  used in  the CDU ac  switches was a 2N2351 device. 
During the program this t r ans i s to r  exhibited failure modes that were attributed to 
the "purple plague" and to internal  contamination. The corrective action taken was 
to  institute a centrifuge and X-ray inspection for incoming t r ans i s to r s  at AC Elec- 
t ronics  and to  improve cleaning procedures at  the manufacturer 's  facility. A second 
source  of supply was a lso  obtained for pa r t s  procurement. 
c. Trans fo rmer  fai lures occurred via two different modes. The Bush 
t r ans fo rmer  (1010724) used i n  the main summing amplifier exhibited inductance shifts  
a f t e r  potting the  module. The inductance shift was found to  be the resul t  of lamina- 
tion shifts within the t ransformer .  This condition was corrected by an improved 
method of sealing the laminations. 
The other mode of t r ans fo rmer  fai lure was associated with wire breakage in- 
t e rna l  to  the UTC t rans fo rmer .  The wire s i ze  used to wind these t r ans fo rmers  was 
rminations and the fine wire 
y the hard potting compound 
used in  the t r ans fo rmer .  The correct ive  action was to replace the t ransformer  with 
a compatible unit wound with l a r g e r  wire. 
d. ~ a i l u r e  modes of the capacitors used in the CDU were associated 
with two types of capacitors.  One capacitor exhibited high leakage character is t ics  
af ter  potting i n  a module and after  being subjected to vibration testing. This fai lure 
mode was found to  be predominantly associated with a capacitor from one manufac- 
t u r e r  (Kemet). The corrective action was not to use this  product in the construction 
of the CDU. The other capacitor was .a polystyrene film unit. This capacitor ex- 
hibited film rupture result ing in shorted units and poor connections to the film for  
external  leads.  The correct ive  action was to replace the polystyrene unit with a 
Mylar capacitor. 
e .  The re lays  used in the CDU for  DAC output t r ans fe r s  were type 
SCD1010353-7. Contamination of the relay by solder balls produced fai lures of these 
units in  the initial s tages of CDU manufacturing. Subsequent tightening of the inspec- 
tion procedure by the manufacturer removed th is  failure mode a s  a problem. 
f. Fai lures  associated with res i s to r s  were confined to  the high res i s -  
tance value metal  f i lms and the carbon r e s i s t o r s  used in  the main summing ampli- 
f iers .  The metal  f i lm r e s i s t o r s  were found to be changing values under module 
rework.  It was concluded that the abras ive  mater ia l  used during depotting was 
establishing a high electrostat ic voltage on the r e s i s t o r s  and in  tu rn  punching through 
and /o r  changing i t s  metal film character is t ics .  The corrective action was to  change 
the type of abras ive  mater ia l  used during the depotting process .  
The carbon res i s to r s ,  of which the re  were only two in each CDU axis, ex- 
hibited a drift character is t ic  upon potting that forced the associated res is tance  value 
to  fal l  outside the specified l imits .  The correct ive  action for th is  phenomenum was 
to  change the specification to accommodate the drift.  These r e s i s t o r s  occupied a 
noncritical position in  the function of the CDU; hence, the specification variance 
could be tolerated.  
4. 6 Electronics Packaging 
4. 6.1 Constraints  on Packaging Design 
The G&N electronic packaging design evolved a s  the resul t  of compromises 
among conflicting constraints. Besides the principal goal of achieving required 
performance within the operational environment, the impact of schedule, weight, 
reliability, cost, power drain, producibility, and logist ics were al l  considered. 
The constraint of schedule affected both design and design evaluation. Schedule re -  
quirements dictated the ea r ly  re lease  of the design to  production. Functional, me- 
chanical and the rmal  design evaluation of prototype hardware in  the expected environ- 
ment occurred simultaneously with ear ly  production. Necessary  design modifications 
result ing f rom the evaluation were somet imes  incorporated a s  r epa i r  fixes. 
Fac to r s  which had p r imary  influence in the packaging design were the space- 
craft environment and interface constraints, and for Block I, the requirement for in- 
flight diagnosis and module replacement. 
4. 6. 2 Interface Control Documents 
Spacecraft constraints  were defined in Interface Control Documents (ICD). 
The ICDS affecting the package design defined volume envelopes, weight require-  
ments, the rmal  interfaces,  mounting arrangements,  acceleration, vibration and 
shock environments, ma te r i a l  compatibility, and color and markings.  The ICDs 
developed a s  the G&N and spacecraft  designs matured.  Ear ly  g r o s s  interface defi- 
nitions were  refined with occasional design modifications on both s ides  of the inter-  
faces to accommodate other associated designs. 
The requirement  for inflight maintena-nce was a consequence of the high re-  
liability requirements imposed by NASA on all the Apollo contractors.  Since the 
fai lure r a t e s  of the high reliability components for Apolio had yet to be determined, 
the conservative approach was to  provide for  inflight maintenance. 
Block I experience, however, showed that the required overall  reliability 
could indeed be  rea l ized without resor t ing to  inflight maintenance. This require-  
ment was therefore  removed for the Block I1 command module and LM G&N systems.  
4. 6. 4 Materials  Testing 
NASA and a l l  contractors had been doing extensive flammability, toxicity, out - 
gassing, and odor testing of mater ia ls  in accordance with NASA "Procedures  and Re- 
quirements for  the Evaluation of Space Nonmetallic ~ a t e r i a l s "  MSC-A-D-66-3. As 
a resul t  of these  tes ts ,  many engineering mater ia ls  were banned f rom use within the 
spacecraft  if they were to interface with the cabin atmosphere. Also, in  Block 11, a 
great  emphasis was placed on avoiding the use of flammable mater ia ls .  These con- 
siderations led to the decision t o  package the equipment, whenever possible, into 
sealed metal  containers. Because the Block I1 and L M  inert ial  subsystems were  
functionally identical, an attempt was made to use common equipment wherever pos- 
sible in the two sys tems.  
4.6.4.1 Corrosion Protection & Associated Design Restraints. - The extensive use of 
magnesium in  the s t ructura l  members  of the Apollo airborne electronic assembl ies  
introduced the possibility of ser ious  corrosion problems that required solution. 
There  were cer ta in  parameters  common to all the assembl ies  that tended to com- 
pound the problem when considering methods of protecting the equipment against 
corrosion. In addition to basic protection, the requirements for  both the Block I1 
CM and LM finish sys tems were:  (1) electr ical  grounding, ( 2 )  thermal  t ransfer ,  and 
(3)  outgassing. A fourth consideration, for LM assembl ies  only, was emissivity. 
Hard vacuum [vacuum below the level  of l o m 6  m m  Hg (torr)] affects ma te r i a l s  
in two general  ways: Fi rs t ,  the mater ia l  contains adsorbed and absorbed gasses  
which may be removed by outgassing. Secondly, vaporization o r  sublimation of the 
mater ia l  o r  of a volatile (o r  toxic) component of the mater ia l  may occur. The r a t e s  
of these  reactions can be radically affected by temperature.  The amount and nature 
of potentially toxic and objectionable products outgassing f rom crew bay mater ia ls  
were  evaluatedand analyzed to  insure astronaut safety and well-being for optimum 
mission performance. The outgassing concentration of individual contaminants was 
related to the effective habitable spacecraft  volume, In general, mater ia ls  that 
outgassed organic substances in excess  of 100 ppm per  weight of sample  was con- 
sidered unacceptable for use in  manned spacecraft  crew bay a reas .  
l'he selection of organic mater ia ls  fo r  corrosion protection was evaluated 
and considered acceptable in  t e r m s  of outgassing character is t ics .  
Outgassing products f rom the modules were entrapped i n  the hermetically 
sealed containers. Outgassing contaminants f rom the wire-wrap side of the headers 
were minimized since this  was the side that mounted directly to  a coldplate and/or  
spacecraft  s t ructure .  
4.6.4.2 Required Surface Treatments.  Electr ical  bonding of the PSA, PEA, PTA, 
and CDU to spacecraft  s t ructure  was accomplished by using a spotface under mounting 
screwheads  a s  an e lec t r ica l  conductive path. The engaged threaded section of the 
mounting sc rew completed the path to the spacecraft  s t ructure  ground. Thus elec- 
t r i c a l  currents  were flowing through the case  to the S IC  s t ructurevia  a dissimilar  
meta l  path. The total number of electronic assembly mounting sc rew fas teners  was 
analogous to  
s t ructure  ele 
were an inherent part  of the design, and the only means of controlling galvanic cor- 
rosion was to exclude mois ture  f rom the mated metal  surfaces.  The solutions for 
the various assemblies were a s  follows: 
(1) CM PIPA Electronics Assembly (PEA) -- A stepped, rubber gasketed 
ir idi te aluminum washer was used under the cover screws,  o r  a s  an alternate, 
the DOW 19 spotface was coated with an RTV-108 after  assembly of the cover- 
to-header screws.  
( 2 )  CM Power and Servo Assembly (PSA) -- The counterbores in the cover 
were filledwith an  RTV-108 after  assembly. 
( 3 )  CM and LM Coupling Data Unit (CDU) -- (a) The cover screws and nuts, 
after  assembly of the two halves, were coated with RTV-108; (b) the lower 
washer, which was under the captivated header-to-structure mounting sc rew 
head, was bonded in  place. The adhesive surrounded the washer periphery, 
masking the Dow- 19 magnesium surface.  Epon 919 was used a s  an adhesive. 
( 4 )  LM Power Servo Assembly (PSA) - -  (a)  A stepped, rubber gasketed 
ir idi te aluminum washer was used under the cover sc rews ;  (b) a thin bushing 
sleeve was bonded to the magnesium in  the precessed wells. 
(5) LM Pulse Torquing Assembly  ( P T A )  -- Same a s  itern ( 4 ) .  
The electronic assembl ies  required a means  of dissipating generated heat. 
The modules t r ans fe r red  heat to the assembly header which in turn  transmitted heat 
to a coldplate heat exchanger o r  the spacecraf t  s t ructure .  The assembly-to- coldplate 
o r  s t ruc tu re  interface surfaces  were Dew-17 magnesium with zinc chromate p r i m e r  
(MIL-P- 8585) and 3M 400 polyurethane paint (SCD 1012543) (per ND1002291). 
Total p r i m e r  and paint thickness was 2 mi ls  maximum. A coating was r e -  
quired on these  magnesium surfaces, fo r  the mating surface was alodine aluminum. 
This meant that the rmal  hot and cold spots would have condensed water, creating a 
corros ive  galvanic couple. This coating reduced the thermal  t r ans fe r  efficiency 
when compared to  an  unpainted interface, but i t  was within the l imi ts  to maintain 
sufficient cooling even in  a vacuum environment. This was partially accounted fo r  
by the application of DC-340 thermal  g rease  to the assembly mounting interface fo r  
the CM and the application of alumina-filled RTV-601 for  the LM. 
External  surfaces,  with the exception of heatsink surfaces  of actively cooled 
electronic assembl ies  in the LM, possessed an infrared emittance of 0.40 o r  l e s s  
in  the region of the  electromagnetic spectrum between 5 microns and 35 microns.  
This was a requirement for  thermodynamic equilibrium in the LM. A number of 
finishes were evaluated using an emissometer ,  and i t  was determined that an alumi- 
num filled epoxy paint developed by MIT/IL provided an emittance value around 0. 30 
when applied on Dow -17  magnesium. 
The specific requirements for  Apollo electronic equipment with regard  to low 
emissivity, outgassing, thermal  conductivity, EM1 shielding and corros ive  environ- 
ments  led to studies in these specific a reas .  It is beyond the scope of this r epor t  
to describe a l l  the surface  treatments,  conversion coatings, organic coatings, o r  
any combination of these t rea tments  that were tested. The selection of the combination 
of t rea tments  and coatings a s  detailed in preceding paragraphs was the most compat- 
ible with the exposure medium. 
4. 6. 5 Block I PSA Design 
The Block I Power and Servo Assembly (PSA) contained al l  the electronics 
for the ISS except for  a few modules located in  the IMU and CDUs. The PSA also  
contained most  of the electronics for the optical subsystem. It consisted of ten 
nickel-plated magnesium alloy t rays ,  each containing a number of replaceable mo- 
dules. There  were a total of ninety modules in the ten t r ays .  Each t r a y  had a lo- 
cating tongue that  fitted into a groove in the PSA end connector assembly to insure  
proper  alignment of e1ec;trical connectors. 'The tapered tong~re also helped to main- 
tain physical contact between the base of the t ray  and the the rmal  interface mater ia l  
which t ransmit ted  heat to the spacecraft  coldplate. On the front of each t r a y  was a 
t e s t  connector, guide pins to locate the t r ay  and a captive fastening screw used to 
jack the PSA into place. A stiff metal  s t r ip ,  called a toe plate was fastened to the 
spacecraft  s t ructure  and provided support for  the front end of the t r ays .  The fas-  
tening s c r e w s  bolted into the toe plate. The modules plugged into feedthrough con- 
nectors on the vert ical  wall of the t r a y  and were held in place with mounting screws.  
Intra-tray wiring was done on the other side of the vert ical  wall. The wiring 
was encapsulated with polyurethane. Moisture protection of the tes t  connectors was 
provided by individual gaskets and connector covers.  Figure 4-35 shows a typical 
tray.  
The PIPA and IRIG calibration modules contained selected components which 
were  matched specifically to a single IMU. It therefore appeared advisable to pack- 
age these  electronics in  a separa te  sealed PSA when the IMU was changed. This as-  
sembly was called the PIPA Electronics Assembly (PEA) in the command module 
and the  Pulse Torque Electronics (PTE) in  the LM. The  Block I1 and LM electronics 
CDUs were  identical except that two coarse  align modules were not needed in the 
CM CDU and therefore were not plugged in. 
4. 6. 6 Block I1 and LM Electronics 
The Block 11 and LM electronics consisted of one CDU, one PEA o r  PTE, 
and one PSA. The PSA for  the command module also contained the electronics for 
the optical subsystem. There  were no OSS electronics in the L M  PSA. 
The Block I1 and LM PSAs, PEA, and P T E  were al l  basically s imi lar  in 
package design. Each contained a machined header to which the modules were at- 
tached on one side, while the r e v e r s e  side contained the inter-module wiring and 
output harnessing. A s t ructura l  cover and gasket were bolted to the header on the 
module side to  provide a hermetic seal .  All electr ical  connections to these assem- 
blies were through sealed connectors. Each assembly contained a slight positive 
p r e s s u r e  using an iner t  gas  with a helium t race .  The wiring was sealed by a solid 
polyurethane encapsulant. 
The CDU for Block I1 and LM contained two separa te  header assemblies.  
The long modules mounted a c r o s s  the width and bolted into the header.  The two 
headers  were bolted together with modules back to back. A gasket between the 
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Fig. 4-35 Power and Servo Assembly 
headers provided a hermet ic  seal .  In this  configuration, the wiring planes were on 
the outside and sealing was  provided by a solid polyurethane encapsulant. Light 
sheet meta l  covers  provided mechanical protection for the encapsulation. The CDU 
was pressurized slightly above one atmosphere using an iner t  g a s  with a slight helium 
t race .  
The gasket s e a l s  provided a near  hermet ic  seal  for the electronic packages 
and prevented leakage to  levels below standard cc /  s e c  of helium ac ross  a one 
atmosphere p r e s s u r e  differential. A sea l  of this  quality significantly limited the 
outgassing of toxic and malodorous mate r i a l s  f rom inside the sealed assembly and 
offered positive protection of the unit f r o m  mois ture  environment. The integrity of 
the seal  could be 100% tes ted  at  the factory o r  i n  the field. 
4. 6. 7 Module Design 
Module design remained essentially s imi la r  between Block I and Block 11. 
The module was the lowest o r d e r  replaceable unit. In o r d e r  to  obtain the utmost 
in  reliability, the proven welded cordwood module was utilized. This configuration 
was used throughout the ISS in  the Gimbal Mounted Electronics, the Power and Servo 
Assemblies, and the PIPA Electronics.  
In lower  heat dissipating circuits ,  the cordwood components were mounted 
between two epoxy fiberglass wafer boards and interconnected by welding. This as-  
sembly was then mounted i n  an aluminum (Block I) o r  magnesium (Block 11) frame, 
welded to the output pins and foam-encapsulated. 
Generally, any module over  10 Watts heat dissipation utilized an aluminum o r  
magnesium heatsink. These were tape control machined t o  receive component pa r t s  
and output connectors in  cordwood fashion. Point-to-point welded interconnections 
were made on both s ides  of the module. After the module was tested electrically and 
inspected, the module was then encapsulated with foam potting. 
The design of the CDU digital modules was dictated by the l a rge  number of 
integrated circuit  flatpacks in  this  assembly. The CDU modules were long and nar- 
row consisting of two fabricated interconnection matr ices  to  which the flatpacks were 
bonded. The interconnection matr ices  were in tu rn  bonded to a r i b  in  the magnesium 
module header and connected to the output pins. Each matr ix  was built up of l a y e r s  
of etched meta l  conductors and Mylar insulators.  The flatpacks were then welded to  
the conductors. CDU modules with analog components were of the  same  shape a s  
above but with the heatsink machined to receive cordwood components. 
lVIodule geometry was derived by evaluating the following considerations: 
(1) function, ( 2 )  reliability, ( 3 )  repairability, and (4) producibility. Experience in- 
dicated that the functional circuit,  a s  breadboarded and schematically drawn by the 
circuit  designers,  was very often the best  compromise.  Normally, package design 
affects  the initial schematic only when the available volume is too small .  
Depending upon the geometry of the module, two, three,  or  four sc rews  in 
the f r a m e  held the module i n  place. These  mounting screws were usually captivated 
sc rews  that allowed the module to be mounted into place o r  dejacked. The CDU 
modules had two mounting and dejacking screws,  one at ei ther end. 
Insertion of the  module into the header connector was blind. Since the re  was 
some danger that the  pins would be slightly bent o r  broken, hard meta l  alignment 
pins were used to guide the insert ion of the module with proper  connector pin align- 
ment.  When the module was not inser ted  i n  a header, a shielding sk i r t  was provided 
to  protect the male  connector pins. 
EM1 bonding of all analog modules in  the electronic packages was provided by 
a s t ructura l  ground on the modules that consisted of a s ta in less  steel  pin mounted i n  
a spotfaced-tapped hole in the module f rame  connected to an output pin. 
4. 6. 8 Connector Design 
The Apollo sys tem connector was the Malco "Mini Wasp. " It was a tuning fork 
fr ict ion connector with a nylon insulator and mounted on 0. 125"centers. The electronic 
modules of a l l  the packaged hardware were interconnected by means  of Malco pins that 
were  se t  into the module housing and mated with pins in  the header s t ructure .  In gen- 
e ra l ,  the module was fitted with a male  connector pin and the header o r  t r a y  used the 
female pin. The male  pin had a nickel base with a 0. 000050 inch minimum gold- 
plating. This metallurgy was selected because it offered the best combination of 
desirable character is t ics ,  namely: (1) corros ion resistance,  (2) low surface  r e s i s -  
tance, and (3) compatibility with res is tance  welding. The female connector could be 
described a s  a wrappost with a beryllium-copper base, 0.000200 s i lver  plate, and a 
final plate of 0.0000 50 minimum gold. The female wrappost was compatible with the 
mechanical wirewrap process .  
The c r i t e r i a  used for evaluation of terminations, i. e . ,  soldering welding, 
wirewrapping, o r  crimping were:  (1) reliability, including joint life with respect  to 
mechanical integrity and contact res is tance ,  ( 2 )  compatibility with s t ructure  and i t s  
dynamic environment, (3) interconnection density required, (4) ease  of repairability, 
and (5) t ime,  skill and tooling required to make the termination. 
In Block I, the module-to-tray connectors were environmentally sealed by 
individual module gaskets.  M'hen the inflight module replacement requirement was 
dropped, the environmental sea l  was supplemented by the application of Dow Corning 
DC-4 silicone g rease  around the connector pins. In Block 11 and LM the module-to- 
header interfaces were wholly within the sealed packages and required no additional 
environmental protection. During system installation into the spacecraft,  all G&N 
external  interface connectors had a l ibera l  amount of DC-4 g rease  applied to  the pins 
to aid in excluding mois ture .  
4. 6. 9 Thermal  Design 
4. 6. 9.1 General Considerations. The thermal  aspects of the electronics packaging 
were concerned with the removal of heat from the modules. This was accomplished 
by providing a the rmal  conductive path f rom the modules to spacecraft-supplied cold- 
plates. The coldplates were  of an internal pin design sandwiched between two 0. 020 
inch thick plates. A water glycol solution, maintained between 3 2 ' ~  and 55OF, was 
circulated through the coldplates. Typical thermal  res is tances  f rom coldplates to 
2 
coolant were on the o r d e r  of 3. 5 O F I ~ a t t l i n  .
4. 6. 9. 2 
modules mounted to a ver t ica l  member  of a removable t ray .  The requirement for 
inflight maintenance, with the requirement of handling the modules and t rays ,  pre-  
cluded the use of the rmal  conductive grease  between the PSA t rays ,  and the coldplate. 
Consequently, North American developed a thermal  interface mater ia l  consisting of 
a rubber-like tubing (118 inch OD) with a copper foil helically wound on the outside. 
This mater ia l  was laid side by side to fo rm a mat and was placed between the cold- 
plate and the PSA. Late in  the  Block I program, the inflight maintenance require-  
ment was abandoned and a thermally conductive grease ,  Dow Corning DC-340, was 
used in  conjunction with the thermal  interface mater ia l  to effect a better  heat t ransfer .  
Figure 4-36 sl-iows a typical component mounting method and the res is tances  
considered in the the rmal  analog. A nodal network was written for each t ray ,  which 
included spreading within the t r ay  down to the coolant. Solving this  network gave the 
component temperature .  For  high component reliability, junction of silicon devices 
were  not allowed to exceed 105 '~ .  These measures  insured control of the interface 
temperature  a t  the t r a y  base  with NAA to not exceed cer ta in  temperature  l imi ts .  
These l imi ts  varied f rom 90°F to 1 2 0 ' ~  for the ten t r a y s  that comprised t h e  Block I 
PSA. 
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Fig. 4 -36 Typical Component Mounting 
4. 6 .  9. 3 Block 11 Thermal  - . The Block I1 the rmal  design had the modules 
mounted directly to a header  which in tu rn  was mounted to the coldplate. Figure 
4-37 shows the typical packaging arrangement used and the heat flow paths from 
components in the modules to the coldplate. Header contact with the coldplate was 
through the rmal  islands.  The cutaway mater ia l  between islands was used for module- 
to-module interconnecting wire runs and power l ines a s  well a s  for weight reduction. 
Sizing of the islands was based on a heat density not to have exceeded 3 Wattlin. i n  
o rde r  not to  have excessive AT'S into the coolant f r o m  the header s o  that high coolant 
inlet t empera tu res  could be used. 
Module packaging i s  shown in Figure 4-38. Two different modules were used: 
a meta l  heat sink type to  package high power dissipating components, and an open 
f rame  type for low power dissipating components. F o r  equal volumes, the open 
f rame  type was considerably lighter, but the the rmal  res is tance  through foam was 
two o r d e r s  of magnitude g rea te r  than that of a metal  heat sink. 
A the rmal  analog was assembled which coupled together the components, 
modules, header  and cover t o  the coolant and surrounding environment. Control of 
the interface temperature  at  the thermal  islands insured that the silicon devices 
would not exceed rel iabil i ty l imits .  The temperature  l imit  for the thermal  islands 
was 120°F. 
4. 6. 9 .4  CDU Thermal  Design. The CDU heat flow paths a r e  shown in  Figure 4-39. 
This design had two t i e r s  of logic and analog modules. The heat flows from each 
module into the t r ays ,  down to the thermal  r a i l s  and into the coldplate. 
The logic flatpacks were of a low power type such that thermal  s t r aps  to 
t ranspor t  away the heat within the modules were not necessary.  Analysis showed 
that the mult i layer boards bonded to a metal  f rame were  sufficient to remove the 
heat f rom the flatpack junction to the modulelframe interface at a AT of 1 8 ' ~ .  The 
junction of the logic elements was not allowed to exceed 7 0 ' ~ .  
A the rmal  analog was assembled that coupled the modules and t r ays  to the 
coldplate and local  the rmal  environment. The indications were that the thermal  r a i l  
0 
temperature  was not to exceed 1 1 0 ' ~  if the logic element junction of 1 5 8 ' ~  (70 C)  was 
not to be exceeded. 
It is important to  note that the CDU was designed to be interchangeable be- 
tween the L M  and CM vehicles. 
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The automatic wirewrap process  was utilized f o r  the single plane header. 
Because of wire  densit ies,  the high reliability automatic interconnection scheme was 
suited to  producibility and repairability. The lengths of the wires in each header 
caused some concern since they were a source  of coupled noise where wires r a n  
parallel  for a finite length. The lengths and routing of the wires were determined 
by a computer program.  The only res t r ic t ions  placed on the program were those 
inherent in the wiring patterns available with the Gardner-Denver automatic machine. 
4. 6.10 Packaging Prob lem 
(1) A major  mechanical difficulty in the Block I PSA was to achieve an ade- 
quate thermal  interface between the PSA t rays  and the spacecraft coldplate. Tes t s  
of the the rmal  interface mater ia l  showed that thermal  conductance varied in  direct  
proportion to  the depth of i t s  compression. Other t e s t s  indicated that the p ressures  
2 
required to deflect the mater ia l  to achieve the desired conductance (100 ~ ~ u / h r / O ~ / f t  ) 
were much higher than originally anticipated. These forces caused bowing at  the 
t r a y s  and plate, thereby reducing conductivity a c r o s s  local a r e a s  on the interface. 
Closer to lerances  for  the t r a y  locating tongues, stiffening of the t rays ,  and changing 
the toe plate f r o m  
However, i t  was no 
mitting the use  of conductive g rease  on the the rmal  interface material ,  was the prob- 
l e m  adequately solved. 
(2 )  The module designs were plagued by numerous modifications required by 
circuit and component changes. As was pointed out previously, scheduling constraints  
dictated a r e l e a s e  to production concurrent with engineering evaluation testing. 
Nearly all the modifications resulted f rom circuit  changes determined by th is  testing. 
Component changes were made to bring circuit  parameters  to optimum design centers ,  
o r  because reliability determined that a part icular  component was unreliable. Wiring 
changes and component placement was al tered to  minimize electromagnetic coupling 
between circuits .  Circuit  changes were made when the original design was found t o  
be marginal  under adverse  operating conditions. In some instances, high power 
dissipation components were relocated to  remove local hot spots. Where possible, 
the changes were  made a s  a " repai r  fix" by depotting o r  rework of manufactured 
modules, and the necessary  changes being incorporated into forward production. 
Where changes were too extensive, modules were scrapped and replaced with new 
designs, the change f rom te rna ry  t o  binary torquing of the PIPAS required new 
module design. 
( 3 )  The Block I inflight module replacement feature required that the mo- 
dules be removed using only a number 10 Allen wrench. The modules were fastened 
to the t r a y s  wi th  number 10 capkve Allen head bolts, a n d  necked down near  the bolt 
liead to provide c learance  through a threaded portion of the module. There  were 
numerous bolt fai lures rn the ear ly  systeins caused by shearing of the bolt heads. 
Necking down the bolts left an insufficient wall t l~lcl tness in the region between the 
bolt shank and the Allen head r e c e s s .  A bolt confiiguralion change t o  increase  the 
mate r i a l  thickness i n  that region plus a ma te r i a l  change to  a s t ronger  bolt 
solved that  problem. 
(4) When the IMU gimbal mounted electronic packages were designated, i t  
was felt that  a n  added measure  of quality control could be achieved i f  the modules 
were  encapsulated i n  c lea r  potting. It was reasoned that if one could s e e  inside the  
module, g rea te r  c a r e  would be taken in the assembly of the module, and that fact 
would add to the reliability of the assembly.  The cordwood assembly was packaged 
inside a t ransparent  Lexan case  then potted with a transparent  potting material .  
The Lexan cases  exhibited a high incidence of cracking and crazing. Numerous at- 
tempts  to  solve the  crazing problem proved futile. Finally, a drawn aluminum case  
was designed for the  gimbal mounted electronics, and the visual inspection feature 
was abandoned. 
evaluation of the Block I1 CDU. The response of the modules within the headers  to  
vibration o r  shock inputs f rom the spacecraft  s t ructure  was higher than anticipated. 
Although not a cr i t ica l  problem, the condition was not desirable.  A corrugated meta l  
damper plate was placed between the two a r r a y s  of modules t o  help res t ra in  the 
modular response.  This decreased the module resonance peaks to reasonable levels  
with a sufficient margin  of safety. 
(6) The CDU was fastened t o  the LM spacecraft with bolts that passed through 
clearance holes i n  the CDU flange, coldplate, and coldplate support s t ructure  and en- 
gaged nut plate fas teners  on the f a r  side of the support s t ructure .  The mounting bolts 
were chosen such that the bolt shank would pass  completely through the clearance 
holes. P roper  account was not taken of the imperfect lead in  threads  and resulted in  
bolts with too long a gr ip  length. As a result ,  the bolts could not be screwed f a r  
enough into the fas teners  to  a s s u r e  proper CDU mounting. This condition was dis- 
covered after  the CDU was installed into the spacecraft.  The bolts were then r e -  
moved and replaced with cor rec t  s ize  bolts. An investigation disclosed that a s i m i l a r  
condition existed for the mounting bolts of the PSA, CDU and computer in both the  
Block I1 command module and the  LM.  Appropriate action was taken to cor rec t  the 
problem. 
(7) Block I PSA modules utilized a block anodized aluminum housing and two 
types of encapsulation mater ia ls .  The bottom end of the module was encapsulated 
with Stycast 1090, and the remainder  of the module was encapsulated with polyurethane 
foam, After encapsulation, the bottom of the module was machined to obtain the re -  
quired dimension f rom the bottom of tlie module to  the bottom of the connector. An 
examination of severa l  modules that failed during humidity qualification test ing dis- 
closed that the  Stycast 1090 had separated f rom the housing and allowed mois ture  t o  
penetrate the module. An engineering investigation determined that the adhesion of 
Stycast 1090 t o  black anodized aluminum was at best  marginal. Silicone and hydro- 
carbon oils, acting a s  contaminates were  found on the separated surfaces  of one mo- 
dule. These contaminating agents were present  i n  sufficient cluantities to prevent 
adhesion. The forces  imparted by the milling cutter  during the machining operations 
were  found to cause separation where low peel strength existed. 
Satisfactory adhesion was obtained by f i r s t  priming the aluminum housing 
with a thin coating of C7 epoxy adhesive. This change was incorporated in a l l  for- 
ward production modules. In addition, m e a s u r e s  were taken to  insure that module 
components were  f ree  of contamination. The module machinery technique was re -  
vised to  prevent the milling operation f r o m  imparting abnormal peel forces  to  the 
assembly.  
Modules which had already been constructed, were repaired by mechanically 
removing a groove of Stycast 1090 around the periphery of the encapsulated region 
where i t  interfaced with the housing and filling i t  with C7 epoxy adhesive. There  
were no fur ther  module fai lures.  
(8) Block I hardware developed shor t s  i n  the PSA t r a y  header wire result ing 
f rom cold flow of the wire insulation. This phenomenon occurs  when a Teflon- 
insulated wire is subjected to smal l  but constant p ressure  against a sha rp  corner  
such a s  another Malco pin, mounting boss, o r  thermal  island. The continuous pres-  
s u r e  does not resul t  in immediate cutting of the insulation but r a the r  in  gradual  r e -  
gress ion of the insulation. Proper  selection of new wire insulations, such a s  Mylar 
and polyamides which a r e  m o r e  res is tant  to cold flow and st i l l  compatible with the 
encapsulant ma te r i a l  in the wirewrap plane, alleviated the problem. 
Section V 
SYSTEM FLIGHT EXPERIENCE 
5. 1 Synopsis 
The Apollo GN & C system had successfully flown in seven flights a s  of 12 
March 1969. This experience provided data fo r  an  identification of the elements of 
sys tem design, prelaunch and flight activities that were most influential in  achiev- 
ing success.  
The prelaunch, flight activities and data reviewed included four unmanned 
Apollo launches ( t h r e e  command modules and one lunar module ) and th ree  manned 
missions. Comparisons were  made between ground measured data and measure -  
ments  made during missions. The calculated system performance f o r  some guidance 
phases of the mission were  based upon ground measurements and compared to actual  
inflight performances and to sys tem specified performance. 
The review of the experience indicated that the  significant factors enabling 
the  Apollo GN& C system to successfully perform its function were  the early recog- 
nition of necessary design changes for stable performance, the  ability to predict 
the  expected system performance, the discipline imposed by the policy of allowing 
no unexplained failures and the ability to diagnose flight operational anomalies. 
The elapsed t ime of major  i tems f r o m  the design inception to  the first flight 
was l e s s  than five years.  
Brief Time Schedule 
System Design S ta r t  a t  MIT 
G N &  C Installation in F i r s t  Flight 
Spacecraft 
First Flight P rogram Release 
First Flight 
October 1961 
September 25, 1965 
January 1966 
August 25, 1966 
During th is  period of time, concepts of the lunar landing mission operations 
were changing and GN& C system requirements were added, subtracted, and modi- 
fied. The system was designed to be fully integrated with the astronaut a s  well a s  
to  have an automatic capability, The f i r s t  four flights were  unmanned and required 
the  automatic system, The original  design intent was to have a conlpletely se l f -  
contained navigation system, During the program,  i t  was stipulated that pr imary 
navigation would be the function of the ground-based tracking network. Both means  
of navigation were  accomodated a s  ground-transmitted spacecraft  s t a t e  vectors,  
5.2 Prelaunch Operation 
The Apollo GN& C sys tem on the launch pad a t  KSC was subjected to approx- 
imately 1 2  months of sys tem testing. Then a final  t e s t  f o r  verification of flight 
readiness  was performed. When the flight readiness  t e s t  was successfully completed, 
the  GN& C sys tem was ready f o r  the  mission. The countdown operations followed. 
The average lunar module G N &  C system was checked out f o r  severa l  weeks 
p r i o r  t o  the scheduled flight. The computer erasable  memory  was then loaded fo r  
flight operations and the sys tem turned off, except f o r  IMU temperature  control. 
The sys tem was not activated again until it was in  space. The average CM GN& C 
sys tem was operated fifty hours in support of the countdown. The sys tem was ex- 
erc ised through automatic operational checks and a f inal  calibration tes t .  The 
init ial  conditions f o r  the  mission were  loaded into the computer erasable  memory 
and, by gyro compassing, the iner t ia l  measurement unit was commanded to s t a r t  
the  automatic platform alignment. About two weeks p r io r  to launch, the  alignment 
of the iner t ia l  measurement unit was verified by the astronaut using the  optical 
sys tem space sextant to  sight on illuminated targets  two mi les  f rom the  launch 
vehicle. The launch vehicle had demonstrated enough stability s o  that optical v e r i -  
fication was not required in the final countdown. 
The control room f o r  the spacecraf t  checkout and launch was located twelve 
miles  f r o m  the  launch s i t e  in the MSOB ( Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 
F igure  5-1 ), In the control room, the  s e r i a l  digital data f rom the spacecraft  was 
processed by the ACE (Acceptance Checkout Equipment)  computers which in tu rn  
displayed the information to the t e s t  engineers a s  me te r  and oscillograph readings, 
event lights o r  CRT (cathode r a y  tube) displays. In addition to  standard data the 
te lemetry  transmitted f rom the flight computer to the ground was processed to p ro -  
duce a CRT display analogous t o  the onboard DSKY display that the astronauts were  
monitoring. The K -START (Keyboard Sequence to  Activate Random Testing ) com- 
mand sys tem duplicated the keyboard section of the onboard computer DSKY. The 
keyboard entry was paralleled with a tape reader  allowing f o r  automatic, rapid, 
e r r o r - f r e e  command sequences f r o m  the control room to the onboard computer, 
The capability f o r  remotely monitoring and commanding the G N &  6 sys tem was ex- 
ploited in the design of the prelaunch t e s t  procedures to  enable paralleled testing of 
spaceera i t  subsystems,  
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Fig.  5 -1 Apollo Prelaunch Operations 
5. 2. 1 Prelaunch Checkout Design Objectives 
The Apollo guidance computer was programmed to compensate the sys tem 
f o r  the predominant instrument e r r o r s .  The objective of the prelaunch calibration 
test ing was to  provide t e s t  est imates of the present  values of the e r r o r  coefficients 
f o r  use  a s  compensation and to provide data f o r  determining the uncertainties to  be 
expected. 
The unique character is t ics  of an iner t ia l  sys tem utilizing a genera l  purpose 
digital computer with a remote control  capability were exploited in the design of the 
prelaunch calibration tes ts ,  The guidance sys tem calibration t e s t  requirements 
were  designed to  minimize the launch preparation t ime, The t e s t  -method utilized 
gravity t o  eliminate the need f o r  external  references .  The known amplitude of 
gravity was used to calibrate the  accelerometers ,  The gyro drif t  calibration was 
based on the  detection of the vector rotation of gravity by the accelerometers ,  The 
drif t  information had t o  be separated f rom accelerat ions caused by launch vehicle 
accelerat ion resulting f r o m  sway and f r o m  noise a s  a resul t  of quantization in the 
pulsed integrating pendulous accelerometer.  The velocity quanta s i z e  f o r  the CM 
was 5.85 c m / s  and f o r  the LM, 1 c m /  s. The information was separated f rom 
the  noise by a simplified optimum linear f i l ter ,  which included in i t s  s t a t e  vector, 
es t imates  of launch vehicle disturbances. 
The measurements  made on the launch pad were usually used a s  reconfirma- 
tions of the selected compensation values. The compensation pa ramete r s  were 
accelerometer  bias and scale-factor  e r r o r s  f o r  the  th ree  accelerometers ,  and gyro 
b 
of fifteen t e rms .  
5 .2 -2  E r r o r  Analysis f o r  Prelaunch System Flight Worthiness Demonstration 
The measurements  made p r i o r  t o  launch were used a s  indications of uncer-  
tainties to be expected during a mission. The prelaunch sys tem performance data 
had specified tolerances. In the c a s e s  where the specified tolerances were exceeded, 
the  flight worthiness of the sys tem was evaluated on the basis  of the probable m i s -  
sion effect of the deviating parameter .  As an example, shif ts  of gyro  drift parame-  
t e r s  beyond specified l imits  during prelaunch t e s t s  occurred on Apollo 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Decisions about the flight worthiness of those sys tems were  made by f i r s t  classifying 
the  problem a s  indicating possible catastrophic fai lure in flight o r  one indicating 
performance degradation. In c a s e s  where reliability problems were  suspected, the 
Iner t ia l  Measurements Unit was replaced (Apollo 6 ) .  In the other cases ,  where 
the  t e s t  data showed a performance degradation, determination of the mission effect 
was required. This determination required the development of e r r o r  analyses that 
related variat ions of each of the measurable  pa ramete r s  to  the mission. 
Each mission in  the Apollo program is unique. A separa te  e r r o r  analysis is 
t o  be performed f o r  each. The mission performance requirements,  based upon a 
typical lunar  landing, were  defined ear ly  in the Apollo program. Because of the  
variety of missions and mission objectives, it was necessary  to have a separa te  
e r r o r  analysis f o r  each mission,  F o r  a l l  miss ions  except Apollo 5, the segmented 
mission phase approach to e r r o r  analysis using a linearization technique was entirely 
adequate and was pursued, An e r r o r  analysis was conducted using both the speci -  
fication values,  as well a s  the demonstrated values, for the i ;N& C sys tem,  A 
cornparisoil of specification, actual ground measurement,  and flight resul ts  f o r  
selected miss ion phases is presented in the following table and Figures  5-2 through 
5 -6. 
1-cr Uncertainty Based on 
Specified Actual P r e -  
Miss ion and ~ a r a n i e t e r s  Pe r f c rmance  Flight Data 
Apollo 4 (SA50 1) 
1. Pos i t ion  e r r o r  a t  r e - en t ry  s t a r t  
2. Velocity e r r o r  at  r e - en t ry  s t a r t  
3. Pos i t ion  e r r o r  at  splash 
Note: *NASA-5-68-454 
Apollo 5 ( Lb11) 
1. Altitude uncertamty a t  per igee  af ter  APS cutoff 100,890.2 ft 109,079.7 ft 
2. Pos i t ion  e r r o r  lndlcated at  SIVB cutoff 5.6 nm 4.22 nm 
3. Velocity e r r o r  mdicsted at  SIV'B cutoff 132.5 f t / s  100 f t / s  
Apollo 6 (AS502) 
1. Pos i t ion  e r r o r  at  re-ent ry  s t a r t  
2. Velocity e r r o r  a t  r e - en t ry  s t a r t  
3. Pos i t ion  e r r o r  at  r e - en t ry  end 
Notes: 
*MSC-PA-H-68-9 
**Due to  fa i lure  of the SIVB to  re-ignite,  the 
r e - en t ry  t r a j ec to ry  was  not a s  planned; there-  
fore ,  the ent ry  e r r o r  i s  meaningless.  
Apollo 7 (AS205) 
1. EOI cutoff position uncertainty 
2. EOI cutoff velocity uncertainty 
3. Rendezvous T P I  burn position uncertainty 
4. Rendezvous T P I  burn velocity uncertainty 
5. Pos i t ion  uncertainty at  drogue deploy 
6. Velocity uncertainty a t  drogue deploy 
Apollo 8 (AS503) 
1. EOI cutoff position uncertainty 
2. EOI cutoff velocity uncertainty 
3. T W  cutoff position uncertainty 
4. T W  cutoff velocity uncertainty 
5. Pe r i l une  uncertainty following LO1 (3  ) 
6. Apolune uncertainty following LO1 (3 ) 
7. Pos i t ion  uncertainty a t  drogue deploy (CEP)  
3.1 nm 
73 f t l s  
1.95 nm 
13.7 f t / s  
2.8 nm 
56 f t / s  
4.3 nm 
70.7 f t / s  
1.25 nm 
12.2 f t l s  
0.31 nm 
4.7 nm 
1.92 nm 
3.9 nm 
66 f t / s  
1.1 nm 
10 f t l s  
0.23 nm 
2.2 nm 
0.96 n m  
Best 
Es t ima te  
E r r o r  
7.5 nm* 
140 f t / s *  
7.4 nm* 
Unavailable 
0.0 nm 
2 f t l s  
2.7nm* 
10.2 f t l s *  
* * 
2.6 nm 
60 f t / s  
0.51 nm 
Unavailable 
2 . 2  nm 
Unavailable 
TABLE 5-1 
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Fig. 5-3 Comparison of Predicted and Actual SIVB Cutoff 
E r r o r s  on Apollo 5 
The unmanned Apollo 5 flight was such that  known initial conditions f o r  each 
thrusting phase were not available. As  the sys tem guided the vehicle based upon 
its actual  s e t  of initial conditions, the guidance e r r o r s  could not be treated with 
l inearized perturbations. The resulting position and velocity e r r o r s  became m o r e  
nonlinear a s  the miss ion progressed.  The mission was scheduled f o r  nine ear th  
orbits ,  and the small-angle assumptions usually used with gyro dr i f t  were no longer 
applicable. The only solution was to conduct a large  number of Monte Carlo e r r o r  
analyses of the  complete mission. 
Some interest ing examples of how e r r o r  analysis helped resolve  operational 
problems that occurred on the ear ly  flights a r e  included he re  for  the  r e a d e r ' s  evalu- 
ation. The flight plan f o r  AS-202 called f o r  a sub-orbital flight of approximately 314  
of an orbit  with a maximum entry range coupled with a maximum heat - ra te  input to  
the heat  shield. The original  requirements called f o r  an  entry-angle uncertainty 
specification of 112'. This was an  easy achievement with the ground giving a s ta te-  
vector  update. During the checkout phases of the vehicle, it was learned that the re  
were  phases in the mission program when a n  update should not be sent 
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System E r r o r s  
because of onboard software deficiencies. This resulted in  a condition where a 
backup sys tem would be required f o r  guidance. As checkout proceeded, it was 
c l e a r  that  iner t ia l  performance could, with a 30 uncedainty,  not exceed 1/30e 
However, nea r  the flight readiness t e s t ,  the performance requirement was stated 
to  be 0. 05' with a 30 uncertainty. The sys tem would not have made i t  without up- 
date and might not have even with update. However, n e a r  launch the  requirement 
of 112' was reimposed and no update was attempted. Post-flight analysis showed 
the entry angle e r r o r  t o  be 0. 12'. 
Another operational consideration where the e r r o r  analysis  was used con- 
cerned notification to  the GN& C system that launch vehicle lift-off had occurred. 
This d iscre te  command given t o  the spacecraf t  guidance computer was to change the 
mode of operation f r o m  gyrocompass to boost monitor. T h r e e  methods were used 
to  achieve this:  ( 1 ) At a t ime  about five seconds before lift-off, a d iscre te  command 
called Guidance Reference Release  (GRR ) was given; ( 2 ) At lift -off, the same  
hardwire  d iscre te  that went t o  the launch vehicle guidance sys tem was also sent  to  
the  Apollo GN& C system when the vehicle actually lifted off; and ( 3 )  A backup lift- 
off command could have been sent  to  the compute 
uplink command f r o m  the Mission Control Center 
At T-15 seconds, monitored and progressed by a digital computer, the 
Saturn vehicle countdown proceeds automatically. Holds had occurred after  T-5 
seconds and it was common pract ice  to  recycle back to  T-15 minutes thus creating 
a possible problem. Should a sequence like th is  occur,  the guidance system would 
be released and proceed to  monitor the  boost. Should recycle occur,  there  would 
be insufficient settling t ime  t o  re-establish orientation of the GN & C system by gyro- 
compassing, The e r r o r  analysis  resul ts  indicated that  the GN& C system would 
navigate and monitor boost properly even i f  it were released well ahead of lift-off, 
Because of program considerations, it was decided to  remove the GRR signal and 
to  launch with only two methods of indicating lift-off. 
5.2.3 Checkout History and Experience 
The Apollo system spends a majority of i t s  life in checkout. The following 
table summar izes  the history of sys tems to  date. The average number of operating 
hours  accumulated in checkout was 2460 hours during a n  average 10.45-month 
spacecraft  testing period. 
Spacecraft CantractorEs Plant  Mentiedy Space Center G&N System 
--- -
hstal lat ton,  System Removed/ Shapped System Removed/ Launch Months lh Operation 
System Completed Remetalled to KSC Reinstalled Date Spacecraft Hours 
P P
Apollo 3 
AS202 11 6 /66  None 4/16/66 None 8 /25/66  6.1 2192 
GBrN 17 
A p o h  4 
AS501 8 /29/66  None 12/22/66 None 111 9/67 14.3 2907 
G&N122 
Apollo 5 
LM1 11/12/66  M U  replaced 6/23/67 Replaced 1 /22/68  14.3 2626 
G&N603 12/66 , Computer 6/67 
IMU 7/67 
Apollo 6 
AS502 11 3 /67  6/67 11/23/67 Replaced LMU 41 4/68 8.6 2669 
G&N123 
Apoll0 7 
AS205 12/16/67 None 5130168 None 10/11/68 10.0 2345 
G&N204 
A p o h  8 
M 5 0 3  4 / 1 / 6 8  None 8 /12/68  None 12/21/68 6.6 1905 
G&N208 
Apollo 9 
AS504 5 / 2 / 6 8  ReplacedDSMY 101 5/68 Replaced IMU 10.0 Unavailable 
CM104 
G&M209 31 3/69' 
LM3 101 7 /68  None 6!14/68 Replaced 17.0 Unavailable 
G&N605 IMU twlce 
TABLE 5-2 
The success  in meeting schedules and establishing the flight worthiness of a l l  
the  hardware  was attributed to  ear ly  recognition of the importance of considering 
checkout problems in the design, to  minimization of equipment removals by carefully 
reviewing a l l  anomalies f o r  flight impact, and to  the discipline imposed by allowing 
no unexplained fai lures.  
Spacecraft testing revealed that the re  was a high probability of applying and/  
o r  removing spacecraft  power to  the G N &  C sys tem in a n  incorrect  sequence, The 
f i r s t  sys tem design did not incorporate protective fea tures  f o r  making the sys tem 
tolerant  of incorrect  power sequencing. Incorrect  power sequencing resulted in  
performa.nce shifts of inert ial  components. Consequently, the design was changed 
t o  provide internal  protection against such an occurrence which, subsequently, saved 
many hours  of r e t es t  and stabilized the performance data obtained in spacecraft  
testing. Another example involved ground potential changes in docked t e s t  configur- 
ation. The possibility of r e v e r s e  potential on the sys tem was not considered in the 
initial design, When spacecraft  t e s t s  indicated that r e v e r s e  voltages could exist  a s  
a resul t  of grounding configurations, the G N &  C system electronics design was 
changed t o  tolerate r e v e r s e  voltages, 
The prelaunch checkout had to  guarantee that the equipment would operate 
during the  mission. When any discrepancy existed, positive action was taken to  
eliminate possibility of f a i lu re  in  flight. An example of th i s  was the fai lure of the 
GN.& C sys tem to  accept an entry mode change command once during checkout of 
the AS-202 system, Even though the problem was never  duplicated, the relays that  
could have caused this  single malfunction were  replaced. Another example involved 
the computer in the s a m e  mission. While one of the computers was undergoing in-  
spection a t  the factory,  it was discovered that one of the vibration isolation pads 
was missing f rom the  oscil lator module. Subsequent examination of other available 
modules revealed that, on the  basis  of the sample  examined, the re  was about a 20% 
chance that  one of the vibration isolation pads was missing in the computer in the 
The ear ly  GN& C system operations were plagued by the occurrence of un- 
JI 
explained restart"'. The concept of NO unexplained fa i lures  required that each 
r e s t a r t  be explained. The computer r e s t a r t s  were frequent ear ly  in the program 
but a s  effort was applied to explain each one they were reduced to  zero ,  Noise 
susceptibility in t e s t  connectors was discovered and corrected by a computer shor t -  
ing plug, Software e r r o r s  were  discovered and corrected by new software. P r o -  
cedural  e r r o r s  were  discovered by means  of ACE playbacks and laboratory verification, 
The solution therefore involved hardware changes, software changes, procedural  
changes and, above all,  education and understanding on the pa r t  of a l l  G N &  C sys tem 
operation personnel. The successful  operation of the hardware during the Apollo 
flights w a s ,  pr imar i ly ,  the  resul t  of this  careful  disciplined engineering that ex- 
amined a l l  facets of the situation and left no a r e a  uncorrected. 
5, 3 - Flight Operations 
--
During a miss ion the GN& C operation was monitored by computers in the 
Real  T ime  Control Center ( R T C C )  in Houston. The digital data generated by the 
:x 
A r e s t a r t  is an internal  protective mechanism that enables the computer to recover 
f rom random program e r r o r s ,  operator e r r o r s ,  and f r o m  environmental disturb - 
ances.  Restar t  at tempts t o  prevent the loss  of any operating functions. 
onboard computer consisted of lists of two hundred 14-bit computer words t r a n s -  
mitted once every two seconds, The contents of the lists were designed to  provide 
information relevant to  the mission activity, The data were  used to drive displays 
on the g u i d a ~ c e  officer 's  corrsole and numerous other  support consoles, The amount 
of data f rom the guidance computer was limited by the  word s ize  and t ransmiss ion 
ra te ,  The program design, however, allowed the program to  select  the  quantities 
to  be transmitted and thus compensated f o r  this deficiency, The data used f o r  the 
real - t ime displays were selected pr ior to  the mission and were  based onthe flight 
control ler ' s  experience and operational requirements. In r e a l  time, the data format  
was quite inflexible. 
The control of the sys tem was accomplished in the same computer complex. 
The  data transmission paralleled the onboard keyboard-entry capability. The data 
transmitted consisted for the most  part  of an  update of the spacecraft position and 
velocity, which was determined by ground tracking stations and converted into the 
p roper  format by the Houston RTCC. The controller had the capability of commanding 
t h e  spacecraft  computer through an  analogous keyboard with the s a m e  codes a s  those 
of the astronauts. 
Review of the data obtained f rom flight monitoring indicated that the ground 
calibration enabled accurate e r r o r  compensation. Review of the anomalies in flight 
operations indicated that the re  was a reasonable amount of t ime available during 
the  mission f o r  troubleshooting and diagnosis of problems. The only cases  that  
could not be diagnosed in r e a l  t ime  involved inadequate real-t ime data. 
5. 3, 1 Guidance System Monitoring During a Mission 
The monitoring of the guidance sys tem performance during the mission con- 
s is ted  of comparing navigation data f rom other sources  (ground tracking, Saturn V 
guidance, LM backup for CM, CM backup f o r  LM ), computing accelerometer  out- 
put with no input at zero gravity, and determination of the quality of the iner t ia l  
r e fe rence  by successive inflight optical realignments of the IMU. These successive 
realignments were performed severa l  hours apart  s o  that the rotations of the  IMU 
stable member  required to  realign it were mostly the  result  of gyro drift with the 
fixed e r r o r s  reduced inversely proportional to this t ime  interval. There  were  also 
operational techniques utilizing s t a r  and planet horizons f o r  checking the commanded 
attitude pr ior  to a velocity -change maneuver. 
The onboard measurementof  the available IMU performance parameters  
could have been used to  fur ther  improve the performance,  The compensation p a r a -  
mete r s  could be modified through the keyboard, ei ther onboard o r  from the guidance 
officer 's  console in Eloustoil, 
The guidance sys tem monitoring was designed to  provide the flight controllers 
with data upon which a prediction of the future operation of the  system could be made. 
The flight controllers had pre-programmed decision points that enabled the mission 
to  continue with a backup system in control, o r  with a new mission plan if thei r  data 
indicated that the p r imary  system might not perform adequately during the ensuing 
cr i t ica l  mission phase. 
The data te lemetry  f r o m  the  spacecraft  was limited; hence, the ability to  
predict future operation was difficult. The l imits s e t  f o r  the various parameters  
were  selected on the basis of the worst performance experienced during design 
evaluation t es t s  and prelaunch tes ts ,  excluding catastrophic failures. 
Onboard measurements  to date have indicated excellent performance. The 
only onboard meas  able fo r  the unmanned missions ( Apollo 4, 5, 6 ) 
was accelerometer  output at zero  gravity ( a b ) .  The manned missions also included 
inert ial  platform drift  a t  ze ro  gravity (NBD ). The iner t ia l  component data a r e  pre-  
sented in the  following table and in Figure  5-7.  
F igure  5-8 shows the monitoring of the IMU over a long period of continuous 
operation. The data indicate that stability of inert ial  operation was achieved in 
the design. The entire component data history is presented in Figures 5-8 and 5-9. 
5. 3. 2 Mission Diagnosis 
The adequacy of a l l  subsystems to continue into the next phase and t o  complete 
the mission was reviewed continuously by the flight controllers. It was important 
therefore  t o  diagnose problems in r e a l  t ime in support of the GO/ NO-GO decisions. 
The flight experience showed that the re  was adequate t ime  available f o r  problem 
diagnosis and that the re  was a capability for  real-t ime troubleshooting. There  were 
two types of problems where real-t ime troubleshooting was of no value. These were  
problems involving actual  hardware fai lures and involving incompatibilities resulting 
f rom inaccurate models of the spacecraft  used in the control programs. 
Accelerometer  
Abx A b Y 
( c m / s 2 )  ( c m / s 2 )  
-- 
Bias 
AbZ 
( c m / s 2 )  
Gyro B ~ a s  D r ~ f t  
Less Compensation 
NBDX NBDY NBDZ 
(meru)"' (meru)  (meru) 
- -- 
Apoll0 4 
In-flight measurement  
Compensation 
Apollo 5 
In-flight measurement  
Compensation 
Apollo 6 
In-flight measurement  
compensation 
Apollo 7 
During the Apollo 7 mission the crew removed power from 
the guidance system during inactive periods. Data was 
gathered on gyro drift and acce le romete r  bias. 
Last  prelaunch measurement  0.2 0.24 
a. Accelerometer and gyro data tollowlng boost. 
In-flight measurement  0.275 0.0 
b. Accelerometer  and gyro data at  145 hours  following 
several  on-board removals  and re-applications, 
In-flight measurement  0.309 0.0 
Apollo 8 
The Apollo 8 missionwas flownwith the guidance system 
continuously operatmg. The monitoring of the inertial 
reference and accelerometer  e r r o r s  provides us  with a large 
set  of data on Apollo inert ia l  system performance in space 
environment. 
Expected value f rom last  ground measurement  0.0 0.845 
a. Accelerometer  and gyro data following boost 
In-flight measurement  0.0 0.83 
b. Accelerometer and gyro data during t ranslunar  coast 
In-flight measurement  0.0 0.83 
c. Accelerometer  and gyro data in lunar orbit 
In-flight measurement  0.0 0.83 
d. Accelerometer  and gyro data during t raneearth coast 
In-flight measurement  0.0 0.82 
Apollo 9 
Expected value based on ground measurements  0.38 -0.004 
a. LM system after  turn-on in orbit 
In-flight measurement  
b. C?il system a f t e r  turn-on in orbit 
In-flight measurement  -0.53 -0.34 
Expected value based on ground measurements(2 '  0.648 -0.10' 
Notes. 
(1)  One meru is 0.015 degree per hour. 
12) The compensation value was changed in orbit. 
Gyro B l o  Drlf l  
Ifllght measuramtnt - Ground prcdlctlonl 
I 
Accelcrnmdcr Blas t rror 
Fig. 5-7 Gyro Bias Drift (NBD) and Accelerometer Bias 
Flight Data 
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+1 
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GROUND ELAPSED T I M E  (HOURS) 
Fig. 5-8 Gyro  Drift  
PIP B I A S  
F i g .  5-9 PIP Bias 
The following examples of problems involving the GN & C sys tem that have 
been explained in r e a l  t ime  i l lustrate the capa.biiity that does exist: 
( 1 )  APOLLO 4 (AS501 ), During the mission, i t  w a s  reported that a large  
difference existed between the y indicated by the onboard computer and the y a s  
compared f r o m  r a d a r  tracking data. y is the angle between the position vector and 
the  velocity vector. Real-t ime measurement  of accelerometers indicated the GN& C 
sys tem was operating properly. The difference was found to be a ground computa- 
tion e r r o r .  The guidance sys tem was allowed to continue in control of the  mission. 
( 2 ) APOLLO 6 (AS502 ). During the mission,  a divergence was observed 
between the attitude information supplied by the GN& C inert ial  reference and the 
backup body-mounted attitude gyros. The divergence was f i r s t  attributed to  GN& C 
malfunction. Real-t ime review of prelaunch data f o r  the backup sys tem indicated 
that the drift r a t e s  measured on the ground accounted f o r  the divergence. The 
GN& C sys tem remained in p r imary  control  f o r  a successful  mission. 
( 3 ) APOLLO 7 During the mission,  a procedure f o r  using the landmark- 
tracking navigation program f o r  navigation sightings on the horizon was determined. 
The procedure,  however, did not work in the spacecraft.  The computer was p ro -  
grammed with a reasonable assumption that landmarks would be on the surface  of 
the earth. The at tempt to  u s e  the program f o r  horizon sightings above the surface  
of the ea r th  ra the r  than the landmarks resulted in the attempt to compute the square  
root  of a negative number. This resulted in a res tar t .  The e r r o r  in the procedure 
was quickly determined by ground tests .  
a. Computer Res ta r t - -The  Apollo computer had a catalog of navigation 
s t a r s  identified by numbers. The astronaut,  by keying in a numerical  code, told 
the  computer the s t a r  to be used. The r e s t a r t  was the result  of the astronaut not 
selecting any s t a r  when the computer requested a s t a r  selection. The computer 
interpreted the selection of "no" s t a r  a s  s t a r  number 0; the catalog, however, s tar ted  
with s t a r  number 1. The resul t  was a computer r e s t a r t  resulting f rom accessing a 
memory location address  that did not "exist. I '  The r e s t a r t  was diagnosed f rom rea l -  
t ime  displays. 
b. Mark Button "Fai luref1-  The computer assimilated line-of -sight 
data f r o m  the optics only upon astronaut command, which consisted of an interrupt 
caused by depressing the "mark" button on the navigator's control panel. The l ine- 
of -sight information was used f o r  rendezvous navigation a s  well a s  fo r  inert ial  
platform. realignment, To protect the rendezvous navigation information f rom being 
modified by platform alignment sighting data, the computer programmers  prevented 
the processing of alignment "marks" during rendezvous navigation, The problem 
occurred when the Astrona~rL terminated the rendezvous navigation program in a 
fashion not expected by the  programmers .  This termination left  the  computer with 
the information that no alignment "marks" were to be processed. The next attempt 
at realignment failed a s  a result  of an apparent fai lure in the "mark" interface to 
the computer. Ground troubleshooting uncovered the cause and a reselection and 
proper termination of the navigation program eliminated the problem, 
c. Accelerometer Bias Change--The accelerometers in the Apollo 
inert ial  measurement unit were Pulsed Integrating Pendulous Accelerometers,  
PIPAs. The accelerometer  used a pendulous m a s s  a s  a torque summing element, 
The accelerometer bias (output with no input) resulted f rom the residual torques 
in the instrument. During a mission, a t  zero  gravity, the accelerometer was cal -  
ibrated by monitoring i t s  output, During Apollo 7 ,  the flight controllers noticed 
that the expected low output at ze ro  gravity decreased to  zero. This was interpreted 
a s  a possible hardware fa i lure  and an inflight tes t  was conducted to  determine if 
the  instrument was operating properly. The t es t  consisted of a maneuver to  thrus t  
along both directions of the  accelerometer input axes. The results  showed that the  
instrument was operating properly. The cause f o r  the lack of any output was simply 
the  PIPA reaching an  operating region in f ree - fa l l  where the torque generated by 
electronic nonlinearities was equal and opposite to the residual electromagnetic 
torques, and this yielded zero  bias. 
( 4 ) APOLLO 8 ( Prelaunch Alignment during the Transear th  Coast ) The 
commanding of the  Apollo guidance computer consisted mainly in selecting numeri-  
cally coded programs and loading the desired number a t  the  t ime  the computer r e -  
quested the information. The loaded information was redisplayed fo r  confirmation 
by the Astronautprior to  being acted upon by the  computer. The astronaut confirmed 
that he indeed wanted the displayed program to  be executed by depressing a key on 
the  keyboard. 
The prelaunch alignment program was coded 01. It was inadvertently se lec -  
ted by the  astronaut during the t ransear th  coast. The problem that a rose  resulted 
mainly f r o m  the fact  that the erasable portion of the computer memory was t ime-  
shared. The effect on the contents of the erasable  memory of start ing program 01 
a t  that t ime  was unknown. The problem was quickly dealt with by the crew and the 
contents of the memory verified by the ground to be correct .  
The problems invo2viiig the G N &  C sys tem in the Apollo flights were  minor. 
They provided an object lesson of the types of problems to  be expected in a l a rge  
program with many opportunities f o r  e r r o r  in design and operation, 
The operational problems can be categorized to indicate where the operational 
s y s t e m  is most  susceptible to  e r r o r .  The types of problems to date have been the 
following: 
a .  Ground E r r o r s - - T h e  problems that  can be categorized a s  ground 
e r r o r s  included only those that a r o s e  in r e a l  time. These types of e r r o r s  can be 
dealt  with by rea l - t ime troubleshooting. Some examples have been already described. 
b, Operator E r r o r s  - -Although the interface between the astronauts 
and the  guidance sys tem had been carefully engineered during manned missions,  
the deficiencies of the sys tem showed up very clearly in the examples described. 
The selected major  rea l - t ime problems, categorized below a s  opera tor  e r r o r s ,  
c lear ly  reflect  difficulties in the design of the interactive computer programs and 
the i r  use  under mission conditions. These types of problems a lso  can be easi ly 
diagnosed and corrected.  
c ,  Misinterpretation of Design Data--The attitude and thrus t -vector  
control  sys tems incorporated in the Apollo guidance computer memory depend on 
accura te  models of the spacecraft.  Problems a r i s e  when the spacecraft  responds 
to  commands different f rom those that the  computer program expects, The result  
can be a performance degradation resulting f rom either a logical e r r o r  o r  incorrect  
information in  the computer; both have occurred:  
AS202 L /D Problem--The otherwise successful  suborbital mission 
missed  the target  by 200 miles.  The major  cause was the lift-to-drag rat io,  L/D, of 
of an expected 0. 35 ve r sus  a n  actual 0.25 with the resul t  that the vehicle had insuf - 
ficient lift t o  attain the targeted range. 
APOLLO 6 DPS Engine Shutdown--The control program f o r  guidance 
during L M  descent propulsion sys tem engine operation monitored the  thrus t  build-up 
a f t e r  the engine had been commanded to f i r e .  If the thrust  build-up had not occurred,  
the  program was designed to  tu rn  off the engine and generate an a larm.  During the  
flight, the engine thrus t  build-up, fo r  the f i r s t  descent engine burn, did not occur 
a t  the r a t e  expected by the program, and the computer turned off the engine. The 
p rogram was designed s o  that appropriate rea l - t ime commands could have res tar ted  
the  control  program but, because of ground tracking considerations, the mission was 
flown with backup procedures.  
d. Mjsinterpretatior* of Flight Telemetry Data- -The spacecraft  te le  - 
rnetry data a r e  processed by a computer complex a t  Houston to  provide rea l - t ime 
displays f o r  the flight controllers,  The limitations of that sys tem require that some  
data not be displayed, The display, therefore ,  does not give an exact picture of 
the spacecraft  s tatus,  The p r ime  example of how the  selected displays caused m i s -  
interpretation occurred on Apollo 8. 
The flight plan of Apollo 8 called f o r  the power to the GN& C optical 
subsystem to be left  ON throughout the mission. The telemetry fo r  the s t a t e  of that 
power was not selected f o r  rea l - t ime display, The computer monitored the sextant  
articulating line-of -sight angles, and this  information was transmitted a s  pa r t  of 
the computer down-telemetry, Several  t imes  during the mission, the computer data 
indicated that the "trunnion" angle, one of the two data encoded optics sys tem angles, 
changed f r o m  the expected 0' to  an unexpected 45'. This change was unexplainable 
f rom the available data. The sys tem operation, however, indicated that by recycl-  
ing normal  optics operating procedures the sys tem was not affected. The decision 
to continue to the moon was based on that fact .  Severa l  fa i lure  models were  invented 
during the miss ion to  explain the problem. Later ,  during astronaut debriefing, it 
became apparent that the problem was attributed t o  the switching O F F  of optics 
power. With power removed, the change in angle was t o  be expected each t ime  the  
power was reapplied. A sea rch  through the data, which was not processed in r e a l  
t ime,  confirmed that explanation. 
e. New Phenomena- -To date, the re  have been very few s u r p r i s e s  in 
the  flight operations of the Apollo GN& C system. The following observations will 
have an effect on future GN& C design: 
Visibility--Navigation in cislunar space  and alignment of the i n e r -  
t i a l  platform depend on the astronaut 's  identification of navigation s t a r s .  The debr is  
generated by the spacecraf t  can appear in the optics a s  s t a r s  to make t r u e  s t a r  
identification difficult. The Apollo missions, therefore,  have made extensive use  
of the computer-inert ial  measurement unit combination to direct  the optical line-of - 
sight to aid s t a r  identification. 
Per igee  Torquing--The s i ze  of the  Apollo spacecraft  resulted in  
considerable attitude changes in ear th  orbit a s  a resul t  of atmospheric drag at  pe r i -  
gee, This could be costly in fuel  f o r  large  space stations, 
f ,  Hardware Prob lems-  -There  were very few G & N related hardware 
problems in  the Apollo missions,  The careful  ground t e s t  and review of t e s t  resul ts  
were  the main  reasons f o r  the inflight success ,  Hardware problems that occurred 
in flight resulted in use of backup systems.  
The major  problem that involved the G & N was the Apollo 6 ground update 
procedure. The unmanned Apollo miss ions  were dependent on ground tracking navi- 
gation data to  a much g rea te r  extent than the manned missions.  Several  navigation 
updates were  planned f o r  Apollo 6. The navigation data o r  o ther  remote  commands 
to  the computer were  transmitted in  a triple-redundant code, KKK, The computer 
would not accept data that did not conform to this  code. 
During the Apollo 6 mission,  severa l  at tempts to  send navigation updates 
were  rejected by the computer, The most  likely cause f o r  rejecting the data was 
electromagnetic interference.  Review of the interface did indicate a possible prob- 
l em resulting f r o m  ground command lines left disconnected a t  launch and untermin- 
ated. These  wires were acting a s  the probable antenna f o r  picking up the noise, 
The source  of the in ter ference  was l a t e r  determined to  be a n  ion pump a s -  
sociated with the fuel  cells. The ion pump in the Apollo 7 spacecraft  generated the 
s a m e  problem during a ground t e s t  in the altitude chamber. The Apollo 6 ion pump 
had not been ground tested in the altitude chamber. Wiring changes were  a lso  made 
in  subsequent spacecraft  t o  eliminate the possible noise pickup in the ground com- 
mand l ines.  
5, 4 Conclusions 
( 1 ) Flight performance indicated that the  sys tem e r r o r  mode contained in 
the  specification was a good representation of the actual sys tem e r r o r s  during a 
mission.  There  was excellent agreement between the  ground and the  free-fal l  inertial 
p a r a m e t e r  measurements.  
( 2 ) The quality and reliability was designed and built into the equipment. 
With a well planned and well designed prelaunch checkout, inflight hardware p ro -  
blems were  minimized. 
( 3 ) Operational experience showed that automatic prelaunch checkout of 
space  guidance, navigation, and control sys tems proved to be the best approach. 
( 4 )  The mission techniques were designed ai'ter "Lie hardware was built, 
Therefore,  the hardware had to be flexible to accommodate different mission appli- 
cations. 
( 5 ) The complexity of the G N &  C system,  a s  well a s  of the total spacecraft ,  
dictated that emphasis be placed on simulation f o r  verification and training. 
( 6 ) There  was reasonable t ime  available f o r  inflight problem diagnosis, 
and the re  existed an ability fo r  troubleshooting and diagnosis both in flight and on 
the  ground. 
( 7 )  Any problem found must  be related ( b y  the use  of s t r ic t  build control )  
t o  al l  possible sys tems,  and the effects evaluated based upon requirements. 
( 8 ) The concept of no unexplained fa i lure  was additional assurance of 
achieving success  during the complex Apollo effort. 
Section V I  
The Guidance and Navigation ( G  & N ) design and manufacturing effort was 
managed by the  Guidance and Control Division of the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,  
and MIT was assigned p r ime  responsibility fo r  a l l  phases of the G &  N design. MIT's 
responsibility included determination of the G & N configuration, design concepts, 
performance manufacturing methods and techniques, reliability and quality assurance,  
operation performance,  computer programming, crew procedures,  ground support  
equipment, configuration control, negotiations with the spacecraft  contractors f o r  
G & N integration with the spacecraft ,  and technical direction to the G &  N manufac- 
turing contractors.  
Soon af ter  the design phase was initiated, MSC let  out contracts  t o  par t ic i -  
pating contractors  fo r  the manufacture of the  G & N under MIT supervision. 
Raytheon Corporation was selected to  build the computer group, Kollsman Instrument 
Corporation the optical units, and AC Electronics Division ( fo rmer ly  called AC 
Spark Plug Division of General  Motors Corporation) was selected t o  build the  r e -  
mainder  of the G & N system including the inert ial  subsystem, Displays and Controls, 
PSA, CDU, interconnecting ha rnesses ,  s ignal  conditioning equipment, navigation 
base, eyepiece, and s torage unit, AC Electronics Corporation was a lso  given the 
task  to  assemble  and t e s t  the complete G & N System. Separate contracts  were  
awarded t o  AC Electronics Corporation and Sperry Gyroscope Corporation f o r  the 
manufacture of the  IRIGs and PIPAs. 
Engineering personnel f rom these  participating contractors were brought in 
a s  temporary  resident engineers to  a s s i s t  in the design. This gave the manufacturing 
organizations the opportunity to  become intimately famil iar  with the design a s  it 
developed, and t o  develop an awareness of the philosophies, design concepts, t r ade -  
offs and compromises that a r e  an  integral  par t  of any development effort, The 
contractors  in genera l  sent well qualified senior  personnel to  a s s i s t  in the  task.  
The successful  design of the  Apollo G & N system was dramatically demon- 
s t ra ted  by the spectacular  G & N performance evidenced throughout the Apollo flights. 
Most design changes evolved f rom schedule constraints  that demanded ear ly  
re leases  of design Lo production. The schedule did not permit  the luxury of testing 
breadboards and prototype models in the expected environments p r io r  to design r e -  
lease. Much of the tes t ing occurred af ter  production was too f a r  along to make 
indicated design changes without prohibitive expense. F o r  th is  reason, changes 
were  not made unless  i t  could be demonstrated that the existing design simply would 
not suffice fo r  the intended task.  Designs were  re leased f o r  production before in ter -  
face constraints  were  formalized with the spacecraft  contractors,  a situation that 
made Interface Control Document ( ICD ) negotiations troublesome, resulting in  
additional design changes and compromises,  and in  s o m e  instances, leading to  l e s s  
than optimum spacecraft  configuration. 
NASA, evoking the Apollo Configuration Management Manual NPC 500 - 1, 
imposed s t r i c t  configuration control  requirements on a l l  Apollo contractors. Im- 
plementation of these  requirements  required a major  documentation effort. Ear ly  
designs were released with c l a s s  B documentation and were  not subject t o  fo rmal  
configuration controls but were  used mainly f o r  information, sys tem integration, 
and production planning, Design changes were  readily made and documented a s  
s imple  revisions to  the drawings and specifications. With the re lease  to manufac- 
turing, the documentation was formalized a s  c l ass  A, and subject to  a l l  rigid con- 
figuration control and configuration identification restr ict ions.  
Correspondingly, every change resulting in  a piece p a  r t t h a t  w a s n o t  
throughly interchangeable in forward o r  backward production required a new par t  
number, and additionally, pa r t  numbers were required f o r  a l l  related higher a s -  
semblies. This procedure led to  a major  documentation effort on the part  of the 
design groups who maintained the i r  own drawings. Moreover, complaints were  
registered that the design effort was being diluted by documentation. 
The many changes that  were  made was a consequence of designs being r e -  
leased p r i o r  to  adequate test ing evaluation. The complaints notwithstanding, 
configuration documentation difficulties did have a stabilizing influence in the  design 
a reas .  In any case ,  changes that were not mandatory simply were not made unless 
a significant benefit in cost ,  schedule and reliability was evident. The ultimate 
configuration control was effected through f o r m a l  design review and change control 
boards. 
As previously indicated, iriterfaee agreements with the spacecraft  contrac - 
t o r s  were  troublesome and a t  t imes  difficult, NASA had labored with the contrac- 
t o r s  to  establish formal  interface negotiating procedures and had assisted in defining 
the  interface a reas ,  Preliminary irJorniation was exchanged and preliminary in ter-  
face control  documents were prepared. NASA then left it to  the contractors to work 
out interface details and to  document the agreed upon interfaces in approved ICDs. 
Dialogue was maintained between the contractor and MIT, and design information 
was being exchanged, but no r e a l  progress  in defining the interfaces was being made 
at that  time. Each G& N and spacecraft  contractor had a constricted schedule to  
mee t  and was not willing to  invalidate that schedule t o  accommodate another associa-  
t e ' s  design. 
During the spring of 1965, very few ICDs were approved. It was becoming 
increasingly evident that a number of interfaces were incompatible. In the s u m m e r  
of 1965, NASA assembled a task f o r c e  to  resolve a l l  of the interface differences. 
Within the span of a few weeks, a l l  interfaces were negotiated and ICDs signed. 
Where design changes were indicated, implementation directives were  received 
f rom NASA. Where design data were  insufficient, supplements were issued. 
Henceforth, NASA closely scrutinized a l l  ICDs. Changes, a s  required,  
were  promptly negotiated, thus keeping cost  and schedule impacts to  a minimum. 
The  lesson to  be learned f rom the foregoing experience is that contractors,  left 
to  thei r  own devices, will invariably procrastinate and belabor details in defense of 
the i r  own designs. What is needed is an objective arbi ter  to p r o v i d e a continuing 
impetus to the program by resolving a l l  design contentions. 
The ICDs that caused the  most trouble for  the ISS were the pr ime dc power 
ICDs, the thermal  ICDs and the  ICDs that define the mechanical attachment of the 
G & N equipment t o  the vehicles. 
The G & N electronics, which was designed to  operate from 28  Volt - + 570 
spacecraft-supplied power source,  manifested problems when some ci rcui ts  operated 
above the  prescribed level and were thermally overstressed. Below that level, the  
c i rcui ts  would be operating outside of their  dynamic range, and performance would 
be accordingly degraded. After the design re lease  t o  the manufacturer, both space- 
craf t  contractors revealed that they could not meet the 28 V - + 5%. The problem 
was finally resolved by NASA when the spacecraft power sys tems were  modified t o  
maintain the voltage to  28. 5 V + - 1470. Some G & N circuitry was a lso  redesigned t o  
accommodate these levels. Problems with the thermal  ICDs were caused by the 
fac t  that the rmal  conductance between the electronic packages was l e s s  than originally 
designed for. This predicament necessitated relocating s o m e  of the modules in  the 
command module PSA to  reduce local  hot spots. Module relocation, in turn ,  af -  
fected the PSA bolt mounting pattern; and a s  a result ,  the spacecraft  coldplate r e -  
quired redesigning. 
In summation, the Apollo experience has  shown that MIT design capabilities 
in collaboration with the participating contractor manufacturing function, were  a 
most  effective means  of developing the  Guidance and Navigation System. Unhampered 
by the myriad detai ls  associated with production tooling and logistics, MIT was able 
t o  concentrate i t s  r e sources  of talent to produce a relatively smal l ,  effective design 
team. As such, MIT, unlike l a r g e r  organizations, was not plagued by internal com - 
munication problems and design control  bureaucracies. Moreover, because of i t s  
unique nature,  NIIT was in  a position t o  monitor the activities of the participating 
contractors without being influenced by profit motives, thus virtually insuring a 
quality end item. 
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